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To what degree do the methods of management for territorial and maritime disputes relate to 
voting patterns in the United Nations General Assembly? In particular, do actions taken by the 
disputants in managing their disputes exert influence on their fellow disputant’s foreign policy 
preferences in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) reflective of the nature of these 
attempts? As territory has been found to be one of the most important driving factors in the 
conflict between states, understanding the impacts of different settlement methods in the active 
conveyance of information to other state actors in attempts to settle can provide insight into the 
general contentment of states with international law and their place in the international system. 
This potential impact in understanding the degree settlement attempts are reflected in UNGA 
voting is important, not only to the disputants but also to the wellbeing of the international 
system as a whole. In this dissertation, I seek to assess the relationship between settlement 
attempts on territorial and maritime disputes with resulting voting patterns in the UNGA. To do 
this, I conduct a large-N quantitative analysis to assess general support for my theory’s 
hypotheses, followed by the examination of five case studies involving China to determine 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Literature Review 
Introduction 
 In order for a state to exist it must possess territory over which it is sovereign. This forms 
a core component of the bedrock on which the modern international system rests. It comes as no 
surprise, then, that when territorial control is disputed between states, the disputants take their 
quarrel seriously. Sometimes these disputes are resolved through peaceful settlement while other 
times conflict is pursued, though in both cases the territorial dispute itself may languish for 
decades or more before it is finally settled. China and India have several disputed areas along 
their borders, which have seen both violence and peaceful attempts at settlement since their 
origination in the 1800s when territorial control of India shifted multiple times along the 
boundaries with China, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. The greatest incidence of violence between 
these two states was the eruption of the 1962 Sino-Indian War. Many border clashes and 
violations have been instigated by both sides with the result that the disputed areas have often 
been tense and attracted a lot of attention from both governments and the international 
community. In more recent years, China and India have signed agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 
2012 and 2013 in the hope that peace might be maintained along the disputed areas. The disputes 
themselves continue to shape and mold the interactions between China and India to this day. 
Similarly, long enduring disputes have grown increasingly contentious between the states 
bordering the South China Sea, most notably between China and several other claimants, 
especially Vietnam and the Philippines. Though to a large degree similar disputes, interactions 
between China and Vietnam have been different from those between China and Philippines. In 
the case of China and Vietnam, their shared border was the site of a brief war in 1979, a conflict 
that ended in a stalemate that contributed to frequent border clashes well into the 1980s. Only 
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since 2000 have these disputes begun to be put to rest, though tensions remain in the South China 
Sea itself. The Philippines has had similar clashes with China, over the Spratly Islands in 
particular, but has not engaged in outright war. Being the weaker economic and military power, 
the Philippines has acted carefully to ensure its security and claims in the South China Sea, most 
recently in the court case they brought against China which asserted in 2016 that their claims 
were illegal. 
These disputes shared by China, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines have consumed 
many resources, much wealth, and considerable political effort to manage over the duration of 
their existence. So much so that the disputes have been referenced in other interactions the states 
have engaged in. That being said, it might be expected that states take interactions over their 
disputed territories into account in other political areas beyond the dispute itself such as in 
international organizations in which they are members. To what degree do types of settlement 
attempts for territorial and maritime disputes relate to voting patterns in the United Nations 
General Assembly? In particular, do peaceful/violent actions taken by the disputants contribute 
to a convergence/divergence in voting similarity between the disputants in the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA)? As territory has been found to be one of the most important driving 
factors in conflict between states, it stands to reason interactions over territorial disputes will 
exert effects on other interactions between states. Understanding the impacts of different 
settlement methods between disputants can provide insight into voting in the UNGA, which 
serves as a proxy for the general respect of states with regards to the place of international law 
rule-based order in the international system. After all, violent attempts to settle territorial 
disputes explicitly violate international law regarding territory, sovereignty, and the norms of 
what is permissible in the international order, things which have been increasingly reinforced 
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since the end of World War II. This potential impact in understanding the degree settlement 
attempts are reflected in UNGA voting is important, not only to the disputants, but also to the 
wellbeing of the international system as a whole. To so explicitly and overtly act violently 
counter to what has been enshrined in the structure of the UN reveals states that do so as not 
willing to respect the rules on which the modern international system is based, and thus the more 
states that behave this way, the more the functioning international order is at risk to degenerating 
into what it was prior to the World Wars wherein conflict and upheaval was more common and 
cooperation less so. Depending, then, on the strength of the relationship between these two 
phenomenon, states and the leaders of the international community have greater incentive to pay 
attention to territorial disputes and act to reinforce the likelihood of successful peaceful 
settlement of disputes, that the general place of international law is strengthened in the 
international system, especially as regards to efforts to expand and codify it via resolutions in the 
UNGA. 
Although some researchers examining the international relations between states see 
interactions in the UNGA as being primarily symbolic, the fact remains that it is the main forum 
in which all states are able to come together, and vote on issues, on a regular basis (Voeten 
2000), and as such has served as part of the bedrock in which modern international efforts have 
been made in attempts to mitigate illegal violence between states. In the worst-case scenario, 
even if the UNGA is “merely a passive arena for the political interaction of member states 
(Dixon 1981, p. 47),” the point remains that studying these interactions over time and across 
issues will reveal insights into the interactions between states in the international community. As 
Voeten (2000) presents it, even though the analysis of UNGA voting behavior can have its 
issues, it remains one of the best means with which to examine the structure of the international 
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system following the end of the Cold War. This is primarily due to how the interactions in this 
forum serve as a representation of the opinions, alignments, and even changes in the international 
system as a whole. With this in mind, and given the importance of territory to states, it stands to 
reason that different types of settlement attempts will have different impacts on disputant 
relations with each other, which might be expected to be reflected in behavior outside of the 
direct dispute interactions, such as voting in the UNGA. 
In order to establish the importance of the theory presented and tested in this project, I 
begin with a presentation of the importance of territory to states, how it is linked to conflict in 
the international system, and what research has been done regarding territorial disputes. This is 
necessary to fully understand the grounding in which this theory is based, particularly to the 
degree it helps contribute to the understanding of the analyses conducted in the following 
chapters. From there I present what is still missing from this research and how my research 
project contributes to it. I conclude with a general outline of the rest of this project. 
 
Territory and Conflict Between States 
While states can go to war over many things, when we examine the data, territory tends 
to be an issue that comes up often as a cause of war (Heldt 1999; Hensel 2000; Kocs 1995; 
Mitchell and Thyne 2010; Mitchell and Thies 2011; Vasquez 2001, 2004). In point of fact, in the 
period of 1816 to 1945, territory was a contributing cause to 65% of wars, a percentage that 
increases to 72% for conflicts following the end of World War II (Vasquez and Henehan 2011). 
This might well be due to unresolved territorial claims potentially increasing the likelihood of 
conflict by forty times as compared to other issues (Kocs 1995).  
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Territorial borders themselves can be particularly salient to when a war might break out 
according to decades of research into these kinds of disputes (Atzili 2005; Bennett and Stam 
2004; Gibler 2007; Hensel et al. 2008; Kratochwil 1986; Mandel 1980; Silberfein and Conteh 
2006; Siverson and Starr 1990; Starr 2002; Starr and Most 1976, 1978; Starr and Thomas 2005). 
It has been established that it often serves as one of the most important predicators of war or 
conflict escalation (Hensel 2000; Vasquez 2001; Vasquez and Henehan 2011), which holds true 
regardless of how escalation is measured (Braithwaite and Lemke 2011). Of these areas under 
dispute, borders that diverge from previously existing administrative frontiers, whether internal 
or external, are particularly likely to lead to territorial disputes (Carter and Goemans 2011), 
especially when said borders lack standing in international law (Kocs 1995; Owsiak 2012). 
There are relationships between regime types and conflict over territorial disputes as 
well. First of these findings deals with the general lack of conflict between democracies when 
these shared stable borders (Gibler 2007; Miller and Gibler 2011). What this ends up 
contributing to is points of contention between these bordering democracies that tend to have less 
salience to the survival of the states themselves, thereby leaving the door open to a greater room 
to maneuver in finding a settlement that falls short of conflict (Miller and Gibler 2011). 
Interestingly, there have been some findings that suggest that stable borders between states is 
what contributed to states attaining democratic status (Gibler 2007), which has found support in 
a range of other studies (Kacowicz 1995; Mitchell and Prins 1999; Miller and Gibler 2011; 
Owsiak 2012). Indeed, when it comes to conflict, it appears that territorial disputes, and the 
variables that relate to them, matter more than regime type variables when it comes to whether or 
not disputes might spiral into conflict (James, Park and Choi 2006). 
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Territorial disputes themselves might also have impacts that can be felt outside of the 
dispute itself. According to Senese (2005) and Rider (2013), territorial disputes between states 
are often more likely to lead to arms races.  They may also spur on the formation of new 
alliances (Gibler 1996, 1997; Sprecher 2004; Senese 2005). These things in turn can contribute 
to a higher probability of conflict, which is supported by Vasquez (2004) in his findings that 
outside allies, enduring rivalries, and arms races are all more likely to contribute to war as 
compared to non-territorial disputes between states. That being said, where territorial disputes 
co-occur alongside other disputed issues, they can become increasingly contentious (Dreyer 
2010). When states have rivalries with other states, disputed territory between them can 
contribute to tensions (Lektzian, Prins and Souva 2010), even leading to normal rivalries 
becoming enduring ones (Dreyer 2012; Fuhrmann and Tir 2009; Goertz and Diehl 1992, 1993). 
In point of fact, when rivalries are based around territory they tend to be more enduring than 
those that are based in ideological or regime-based differences (Dreyer 2012; Miller and Gibler 
2011). 
Given the costs associated with conflicts surrounding territory, both in the short and long 
terms, it becomes rational for states to attempt to settle these issues. Unfortunately, this becomes 
increasingly difficult to do over time as a territorial dispute becomes more entrenched, leading 
for the disputed area to acquire additional symbolic value (Hassner 2006), especially when 
political agents construct narratives to affect the nature of the conflict (Goddard 2006; Goddard, 
Pressman and Hassner 2008). That being said, a large percentage of research in the literature on 
territorial disputes tend to focus on the armed conflict between the disputants more so than the 
management, or peaceful settlement, of these disputes (Frazier 2006; Hensel 2001; Powell and 
Wiegand 2010; Wiegand 2011a). More has been done in recent years, and this project hopes to 
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make an equally valuable contribution in terms of how these settlement interactions impacts 
voting patterns in the UNGA. 
 
Settlement Attempts 
 Since territorial disputes can be so costly for the states engaged in them, especially in 
regards to economic and military costs (Simmons 2002, 2005), it behooves these countries to 
attempt to settle them in a manner that will reduce the costs over time. The expectation here is 
that, following peaceful transfers of territory, peace between the disputing state will occur 
(Goertz and Diehl 1992), especially in cases where the transfers are themselves mutually 
acceptable to both parties (Vasquez 1993). This is even more effective when the settlement itself 
is legally based (Huth 1996; Kocs 1995). Contrary to the peaceful approaches, which tend to 
constrain leaders from being able to use violent attempts in the future, when territory is 
transferred as a result of violence future armed conflict is more likely to occur (Gibler and Tir 
2010; Tir 2003, 2006). That being said, research by Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009) asserts 
that there is no systematic effect from violent or peaceful territorial treaties on the likelihood of 
future territorial change. Regardless, research has shown that specific types of dispute 
settlements have resulted in different results and levels of effectiveness.  
There are a range of settlement methods disputant states might utilize in an attempt to 
settle their disputes.  The default approach, maintaining the status quo, is where the state would 
be motivated to make no change in attempting to settle the dispute, be it a militarized or peaceful 
attempt.  This being the case, the dispute itself is maintained, and the situation takes on the 
characteristics of a negative peace between the opponents (Klein, Goertz and Diehl 2008). 
 8 
 If states decide to settle their disputes, however, there are a range of approaches they 
might pursue.  The first of these is bilateral negotiations, under which the disputants themselves 
directly engage with their counterparts in attempt to settle the shared dispute, and as such require 
no outside facilitation (Shaw 2003).  This first attempt tends to be particularly likely to be used 
by states when territory is under dispute (Hensel 2001; Hensel et al 2008; Mitchell and Thies 
2011). The next deals with non-binding dispute resolution methods, specifically mediation, 
conciliation, or the use of good offices by a third party. For these first two types, if there is a 
history of failed settlement attempts on a specific dispute, it becomes more likely in the future 
for subsequent third-party assistance, while if there is a history of success bilateral attempts are 
more likely (Hensel 1999). 
Beyond this are the binding dispute methods of arbitration and adjudication that bring in 
a third party to rule on the merits of the case, which leads to a decision on how the dispute 
should be settled (Bercovitch and Rubin 1992; Cassese 2005; Merrills 2011; Powell and 
Wiegand 2010; Shaw 2003).  Arbitration can be particularly appealing to leaders of democratic 
states, as this method provides a way to protects themselves from domestic criticism (Huth, 
Croco and Appel 2011). In fact, the likelihood of legal dispute resolution increases by three 
times if the states involved have democratic political institutions (Allee and Huth 2006). 
Ultimately the odds of peaceful resolution increases when the legal principles involved justify 
resolution in favor of one state over another (Huth, Croco and Appel 2011, 2012). Perhaps this is 
due to making the decision process that much simpler by not having to come up with a ruling 
that equitably satisfies both parties. It has even been found that another factor of influence in 
choosing a dispute settlement method it the win-loss record of the challenger state (Wiegand and 
Powell 2011). 
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These last two methods share three general characteristics.  Firstly, a third party, not the 
disputants themselves, determine terms of settlement.  Secondly, unlike mediation, states agree 
to honor the ruling before the decision is handed down. Lastly, principles of international law are 
incorporated in the process of the settlement attempt, which are consistent across different 
disputes as the law is itself consistent.  The tensions inherent in these types of settlements have 
meant that arbitration and adjudication have seen less usage than other peaceful settlement 
attempt methods. That being said, these latter two methods boost the overall credibility of the 
disputants for wanting to settle the dispute in peaceful manner since, by participating, they do so 
with the full knowledge of the potential costs that might ensue should they not stand by them. To 
bring both parties onboard for an attempt at arbitration or adjudication then seems to indicate that 
much more commitment to settle the dispute. 
 Just because states start to commit to settling their shared territorial disputes does not 
always mean that they will successfully be able to do so. In the case of a disputed territory 
having strategic value, even if it is divisible states might still resort to violence over it due to 
facing a commitment problem (Carter 2010). Emotional and symbolic value can also hamstring 
an attempt before it even begins. In examining the Palestinian-Israeli dispute, Kaufman (2009) 
shows that emotional narratives regarding the disputed area prevent any compromises from being 
reached, thereby escalating the conflict, all because anything less than complete victory is seen 
as losing. This being the case, there sometimes can be other motivations for states to attempt to 
settle their territorial disputes beyond simply seeking to put them to rest to avoid the economic, 




United Nations General Assembly and General Voting Patterns 
The UNGA, one of the six primary organs of the United Nations (UN) and the only one 
of which each member is represented and allowed to vote, was first convened in January of 1946. 
Since that first year the initial membership of fifty-one countries has expanded to include one 
hundred and ninety-three by present day. In terms of its role, the UNGA is in charge of 
exercising the deliberative, supervisory, financial and elective functions relating to the matters 
covered by the UN Charter. That being said, its primary role, and the one of which has received 
the most scrutiny by the academic community, is in its’ serving as a forum in which to discuss 
issues affecting the international community and the recommendations they arrive at, as the body 
itself has no real power to enforce these resolutions or to compel any state to act. Most decisions 
generally require a simple majority vote, though for matters related to the admission of new 
members, budgets, or issues of peace or security, a two-thirds majority vote is required. Given 
the status of the UNGA as the only forum in which the vast majority of states in the international 
system convenes and votes regularly on issues, that is to say express their preferences in an 
observable manner, a number of theoretical attempts at understanding voting patterns within this 
body have resulted. In particular, many researchers have sought to use UNGA voting in order to 
determine dimensions of interactions in international relations, including such things as voting 
blocs and political alignments, especially during the Cold War period (Alker 1964; Alker and 
Russett 1965; Bailey, Strezhnev and Voeten 2017; Gartzke 1998; Holloway 1990; Holloway and 
Tomlinson 1995; Kim and Russett 1996; Lijphart 1963; Voeten 2000, 2004, 2013). 
 In terms of understanding the general structure of the international system during the 
Cold War, the world community might best be thought of as composing a bipolar continuum 
dividing it into a Western bloc, an opposing Eastern bloc, and a range of non-aligned countries 
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across the center between both groups. This period in time was characterized by intense 
competition between the wealthy and democratic Western bloc, led by the United States, and 
their communism aligned Eastern bloc, headed by the Soviet Union. The remainder of the states 
in the international system were generally unaligned with either faction fully, though they also 
varied with the degree of their involvement in the Cold War conflict, as well as the 
characteristics of their states. It is in this period that we see the first, classic study of UNGA 
voting by Alker and Russett (1965), in which they assess voting as generally following an East-
West dichotomy, with a North-South as another frequently underlying pattern of voting behavior. 
This second division was found to be based in large part on differences in levels of economic 
development, with both patterns being supported to some degree in subsequent studies (Alker 
1964; Alker and Russett 1965; Holloway 1990; Lijphart 1963; Newcombe, Ross, and Newcombe 
1970; Van Staden and Stokman 1970). Once the Cold War ended, however, this initial bipolar 
system that had dominated world politics and UNGA voting for the initial decades of the UN’s 
existence went away. 
 With this being the case, Voeten (2000) set out to assess how voting patterns had varied 
following the end of the Cold War, ultimately arrival at two different examinations of potential 
changes in UNGA voting, with underlying theoretical perspectives as to why they might have 
varied this way. The first of these is what Voeten (2000) terms Dealignment, in which states 
pursue voting informed by their preferences on each specific issue, rather than relying on 
consistent geopolitical affiliations to inform their votes. Under this first approach, even when 
there is bloc voting on specific issues, this is due to association with more ad hoc coalitions 
rather than groups that inform voting on other issues. To illustrate this, Voeten (2000) cites how 
most European countries tend to vote in favor of the US stance on defense issues, though they 
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tend to vary a bit more on human rights or trade issues to which they might have different 
preferences. What this approach signifies for patterns in UNGA voting is the overall 
dimensionality, that is to say the potential spread of voting outcomes, has increased, with the 
specific issues on the UNGA’s agenda having more influence on voting outcomes. This stands 
contrary to the alternative that Voeten (2000) presents, that of realignment. Under the 
realignment thesis, voting in the UNGA is not necessarily less structured as it was during the 
Cold War, only that other alignments might have replaced the East-West division of the 
opposing sides that existed during this period in the history of the UNGA. Overall, Voeten 
(2000) suggests that these new alignments might be theoretically derived from both realist and 
liberalist perspectives of international relations. What follows are the hypotheses he suggests.  
 
Realist Hypotheses of Alignment in UNGA Voting 
 From the realist perspective, it is possible to present the ending of the Cold War as 
fundamental shift in the distribution of power. The scale of this shift might be labeled as 
systemic as it completely altered the overall distribution of power and the global hierarchy 
(Gilpin 1981). According to realists, then, states will respond to this change by adjusting their 
behaviors to take into out the new distribution of power, though their overall goals and how they 
interact will not change meaningfully (Ikenberry and Doyle 1997). Following this line of 
reasoning, Voeten (2000) presents three hypotheses based on realist theories: a stability 
hypothesis; a structuralist hypothesis; and a counterhegemonic hypothesis. 
 Regarding the stability hypothesis, the perspective that Voeten (2000) summarizes states 
that the ending of the Cold War will not change the basic factors underlying state behavior in the 
international system, namely that each state pursues their security with the perspective that the 
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greater international community exists in a state of war in which every other state is a potential 
opponent. Thus, other than former Communist states emerging into new alignment with the 
West, and European countries achieving somewhat more distance from the US, the overall 
voting behavior within the UNGA will still share similar patterns with what occurred during the 
Cold War itself. 
 A second realist hypothesis that Voeten (2000) sets out to examine is the structural one, 
wherein weak states are expected to share common interests in preventing the adoption of policy 
positions favored by stronger states on the basis that this would lead to an increase in their 
insecurity (Iida 1988). In the case of the current structure of the UN, developing states in the 
Global South would have vested interests in a strong UN, as it would act to protect them against 
the predations of the stronger states in the Global North, whereas these more developed states 
would be determined to keep the UN weaker so as to maximize the utility of their power. Work 
by Kim and Russett (1996) found that, by the 1990s, the cleavage between the North and South 
actually took prime position over the previously reigning Cold War alignments in terms of 
UNGA voting. In addition, Voeten (2004) also finds that a preference gap between the United 
states and the rest of the world has opened up since the Cold War ended, a gap that has widened 
at a constant rate over time from the period 1991 to 2001. 
 The last of the realist based hypotheses is based around the idea of a counterhegemonic 
bloc. Generally speaking, Voeten (2000) suggests that challengers to US hegemony would be 
either rising powers with disproportional growth rates (like China) or states that would seek 
opportunities to expand contrary to the guiding principles of the international system (one 
example being Iraq under Saddam Hussein). Thus, this hypothesis would suggest that states 
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seeking to challenge the US and the principles of the international system would come together 
to form a counterhegemonic bloc. 
 
Liberalist Hypotheses of Alignment in UNGA Voting 
Standing distinct from the realist perception of patterns of voting in UNGA are the 
liberalist perspectives, which see shifts in international politics as generally stemming from 
changes in the domestic principles or structures of states. Under the approach, then, any shifts in 
voting alignments in the UNGA might not only be determined by the structural variables of the 
international system but might also be influenced by domestic political regimes (Voeten 2001). 
 The first hypothesis of this perspective that Voeten (2001) suggests is centered around 
regime type and how it tied into the end of the Cold War. Given that the Cold War ended with 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Voeten (2001) suggests that the ending of this ideological 
conflict would lead to a tightening of the alliance between liberal democratic states against those 
states that had yet to make the transition from other regime types. With states expected to vote in 
line with their interests, Voeten (2001) would suggest that the new voting blocs would be 
composed of these democracies on one side and non-democracies on the other. This hypothesis 
might have some merit as Voeten (2000) himself finds that a greater degree of democracy is 
related to more “Western” voting behavior, and Potrafke (2009) finds that government ideology 
itself has had a strong influence on whether a state votes in line with the US. 
 
Other Factors Influencing Patterns in UNGA Voting 
Several additional factors have been examined in terms of determining influences on 
UNGA voting, with some of the earliest work in this regard seeking to examine the role that 
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geography and shared history might play. Rai (1972) found that historical and military ties were 
an important factor in the voting of countries in Latin America. Several decades later 
Montenegro and Mesquita (2017) would tackle a similar project in seeking to determine the 
relationship between the BRICS countries and the voting affinity in their respective regions. 
Overall, they found that there was a high degree of cohesion regionally for Brazil, China, and 
South Africa (Montenegro and Mesquita 2017). More generally, there has even been found a 
considerable level of cohesion between Brazil and African states in the UNGA, partly as a result 
of a rising public profile in the international system (Seabra and Sanches 2019). That being said, 
this general cohesion does not mean they in line all the time (Seabra and Sanches 2019). Specific 
characteristics of a state, such as human rights issues, have also been found to have a relationship 
with voting in the UNGA (Hug and Lukács 2014; Primiano and Xiang 2016).  
The leaders of a country have also been shown to exert some influence on voting patterns 
in the UNGA. The new leaders of states have been found to vote in line with the United States 
more consistently than leaders that had held their position longer (Dreher and Jensen 2013). 
Thus, some researchers have called for more attention to be directed to the dynamics of domestic 
political competition and leadership selection in order to more fully predict foreign policy 
changes by states (Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2015). Moreover, leader change in nondemocratic 
states has been found to lead to voting more neutrally in relation to the voting of the United 
States (Smith 2016). Conversely, leader change in democratic states appears to have no 
systematic impacts on voting alignments (Smith 2016), though the ascendance of individual 
leaders has contributed to shifts in voting patterns, an example being the election of President 
Trump which saw UNGA voting agreement with Western countries reduced by 7.2 percentage 
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points on average as compared to previous presidents, a change that was especially pronounced 
in NATO member countries and on topics related to the Middle East (Mosler and Potrafke 2020). 
More generally, democracy has itself been examined in terms of its influence on voting in the 
UNGA (Hug and Lukács 2014). Dreher and Sturm (2012) find that the more democratic a state 
is, the more they tend to vote in line with the G7 countries. In addition, there is greater voting 
alignment between states that have similar political leanings, and as they become more 
democratic (Dreher and Sturm 2012). That being said, some research has also found that part of 
the reason democracies might support US positions in the UNGA might be due to the linkage of 
US aid to voting (Carter and Stone 2015). Democracies in the developing world tend to be 
critical of voting positions by the US in the UNGA as compared to autocracies, which might be 
due to the sensitivity of their governments to public opinion (Carter and Stone 2014). Despite 
this, these same democracies tend to comply with US voting positions more so than autocracies 
due to the US being more likely to carry out threats and uphold promises to manipulate aid if the 
state is a democracy (Carter and Stone 2014). 
Development and trade have also been assessed for its link to voting behavior in the 
UNGA. For states that have a stronger national capability, and thus less dependence on foreign 
relationships, there is less of a likelihood of voting in line with the G7 (Dreher and Sturm 2012). 
In terms of those states that are larger or richer, they tend to vote relatively consistently, whereas 
states that are poor and the target of aid tend to shift their voting patterns more often, which may 
be indicative of vote-buying by other states (Brazys and Panke 2017). Worryingly, Brazys and 
Panke (2017) conclude that one of the ramifications of this is that the international norm 
environment might not be set in stone and instead be more susceptible to changes by revisionist 
actors than has been previously assumed. Corruption has also been assessed to find that voting 
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alignment with the US rises as corruption decreases (Dreher and Jensen 2013), while more 
corrupt states tend to vote in line with one another (Dreher and Sturm 2012). Lower GDP per 
capita also carries a higher likelihood of voting similarly to the US, though GDP growth has no 
significant effect on voting (Dreher and Jensen 2013). Lastly, there is some support for a link 
between rising exports and imports with a state to voting similarity (Dreher and Sturm 2012). 
Lastly, the provision of aid has itself been extensively examined for a relationship with 
vote similarity in the UNGA. Initially during the height of the Cold War, US economic aid was 
found to have very little relationship to voting patterns in the UNGA, whereas the aid provided 
by the USSR had a greater impact on voting (Rai 1972). Over time this changed. Since 1985, US 
law has given the State Department the responsibility of identifying important votes in the 
UNGA, that aid disbursements might occur to reflect voting decisions (Carter and Stone 2015), 
with the result that US aid has a direct impact on ensuring voting compliance (Carter and Stone 
2010; Dreher, Nunnenkamp and Thiele 2008). While many poorer countries in the UNGA place 
importance on their voting independence (Carter and Stone 2010), the US systematically 
provides more bilateral foreign aid to countries that are moving away from its’ position or hold 
unfavorable opinions in the UNGA following the end of the Cold War (Woo and Chung 2017). 
Program aid, grants, and untied aid are particularly likely to influence voting behavior in the 
UNGA (Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele 2008), and even the projects, programs, and loans of 
the World Bank and IMF have been found to increase voting similarity with the G7 countries. 
Only the poorest of democracies have voting preferences that stand out as more in opposition to 
US positions that autocracies do, perhaps indicating that they are more willing to take symbolic 
stands on issues voted upon in the UNGA, even if it means they lose access to foreign aid (Carter 
and Stone 2015). The relationship between aid and voting even touches on the elected members 
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of UNSC, such that these states vote similarly to the US and the other permanent members as the 
number of loans they have increases (Hwang, Sanford, and Lee 2015). Overall, the dependence 
on aid appears to increase voting similarity between the provider and the receiver in the UNGA 
(Dreher and Sturm 2012). 
What these findings indicate is that, contrary to some paradigmatic arguments as to 
international organizations not mattering, states often do behave in a manner that shows they 
care about influencing voting in the UNGA. Even when they do not directly attempt to influence 
voting, factors like corruption and trade (Dreher and Sturm 2012) seem to exert influences on 
voting alignment anyway. Thus, each of these examined relationships provides support 
theoretically to the notion that external interactions to the UNGA, such as interactions over 
territorial disputes, might in turn impact voting in the international organization. Territorial 
dispute interactions are unique of those above in the sense that the management of them can be 
starkly positive (peaceful attempts) or negative (violent attempts) in terms of the methods 
themselves. This being the case, and sidestepping whether or not international organizations 
matter to the overall international system, this project proceeds along an issue-based approach to 
studying interactions between states within IOs, wherein states cooperate (or struggle) over a 
range of issues (see work by: Diehl 1992; Hensel 2001; Keohane and Nye 1977; Mansbach and 
Vasquez 1981).  
 
Gaps in the Literature 
To this point, research has examined the factors that influence the likelihood of dispute 
settlement, factors that have influenced the selection of settlement methods, and the overall 
results of successful settlement on relations between the former disputants. This dissertation 
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project moves to examine one scenario that has been under-examined, which is the extent that 
action taken in regards to territorial and maritime disputes can impact interactions with states 
outside the direct dispute itself. This new theory draws in part on the logic of work by Atzili and 
Pearlman (2012). They break down how states have incentives to use threats or punishments 
against other states in order to coerce the targeted states to exert influence on non-state actors to 
cease conducting attacks of the coercers’ territory. Essentially, the logic of their theory is that the 
state hosting a non-state group is forced to play two games simultaneously (Atzili and Pearlman 
2012). On the one level, the state must deal with the actions and threats of the state it is disputing 
with, while on the other hand also manage its policies with the non-state actor it is hosting. 
For this project the logic is similar, but instead of using coercion to send a message to a non-state 
actor, is it possible that the message is instead being sent not just to the fellow disputant but to 
the international community as a whole? Could states utilize territorial dispute settlement 
attempts to signal something to the international community? The answer might be found in 
examining how these interactions over territorial and maritime disputes might be reflective of 
international norms themselves, specifically those outlined previously in the scope of the United 
Nations Charter. 
 Several research projects up until now have made the case that, since territory is often 
subject to emotion and normative elements, territorial disputes themselves might also be 
explained to some degree by adopting social and psychological perspectives and, more 
importantly for this project, by drawing on subjective conceptions of justice and international 
norms (Barzilai and Peleg, 1994; Forsberg 1996). In presenting the underlying motivations of the 
UN in terms of codes of behavior acceptable in the international system, and the fact that the vast 
majority of states in said international system account themselves members of the international 
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organization, it stands to reason that the guidelines of state behavior enshrined in the UN Charter 
are the guidelines in which the member states are throwing their support behind in terms of how 
the international system itself should function. That is to say that, by being member states, they 
will act in concert against threats to international peace and security, particularly in the sense of 
acting “…to bring about by peaceful means, in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might 
lead to a breach of the peace (United Nations 1945a),” all with the UN itself existing as a 
“…center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends (United 
Nations 1945a).” Thus, the expectation is here that being a member state of the UN, yet acting in 
a violent manner in pursuit of territorial or maritime settlement that is illegal under the Charter, 
said states are in spirit protesting the international laws and norms surrounding the UN as they 
are preventing these states from acting in the manner they wish regarding their disputes. This can 
be indirectly supported by the literature supporting how a consensus over international norms 
can increase the likelihood of peaceful territorial change, despite diplomatic interventions or past 
experiences not having this influence (Kacowicz 1994). It stands to reason that states who differ 
on their perspectives of international norms might conceivably see greater conflict between 
themselves over these disputes due to these differences. This might especially hold true in 
situations where states might wish to signal other states outside the disputing dyad, such as 
Wiegand (2011a) finds when states demonstrate their resolve to an opposing state to credibly 
signal said resolve to other states as well. In sum, should this be the case, we can expect that 
attempts to settle territorial and maritime disputes that violate these subjective conceptions of 
justice and international norms are made in protest of the international system from which they 
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come. This being the case, we can expect the impact of these dyadic settlement interactions to 
exert influences on other political arenas, such as voting in the UNGA. 
 
The Rest of the Project 
In the turbulent international system of the present, it is now more important than ever to 
understand the relationship between interactions over disputed territory, interactions in terms of 
voting in the UNGA, and how it links to stances on the structure of the US-led international 
system. My dissertation extends scholarship on territorial disputes and conflict management by 
examining how interactions over these, often contentious, phenomena can impact interactions 
beyond just the dispute itself, in this case in terms of voting patterns in the UNGA. By 
understanding how these international political arenas interact, it will become more possible to 
determine when political dissension and conflict in the international system might spread from a 
localized dispute between a dyad of states to become multilateral in nature. Further, this work 
will contribute to an elaboration on the relevance of territory to understanding interstate 
interactions in the international system beyond those directly related to the dispute itself. In the 
next chapter, I outline the theory being presented to test the interrelationships between territorial 
dispute settlement attempts and voting in the UNGA. Chapter 3 will outline the methodologies 
being utilized in this project, starting with the quantitative dataset construction and analysis. This 
chapter will conclude with the first of the quantitative analyses, seeking to assess all the 
hypotheses as applied to all territorial and maritime disputes from the advent of the first UNGA 
session in 1946 up through 2015. Chapter 4 then progresses to the presentation of the qualitative 
case design, why the case studies were selected to illustrate the theoretical logic of the project, 
and the examination of these specific qualitative case studies to best demonstrate the logic of the 
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theory as applied at the state level. The final chapter presents my conclusion and reiterates an 
overview of the findings of this project, the contributions it makes to the literature and policy 






















Chapter 2: Theory 
Introduction 
The study of the importance of international organizations has been ongoing for some 
time now. That being said, the general influence of international organizations on interactions 
between states is still somewhat heavily debated (Mitchell and Hensel 2007), with several 
different perspectives putting forth their own projections. These perspectives generally are 
positive, negative, or dismissing of the importance of IOs in the world system. First, 
institutionalists hold a positive perspective of IOs, which they theorize limit the impacts of 
anarchy in the international system, and in so doing increase opportunities for cooperation 
between states (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). This might occur through IOs’ purported ability to 
reduce transaction costs and uncertainty, while also increasing the flow of information between 
international actors (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Keohane 1984). On the other hand, it has been 
suggested that institutions might contribute to reductions in the levels of cooperation, and even 
an increase in levels of conflict between states (Mitchell and Hensel 2007). This is represented 
by work showing when states with alliances might act against each other (Bueno de Mesquita 
1981) and how shared membership in preferential trade agreements can encourage the use of 
economic sanctions (Hafner-Burton and Montgomery 2006). Lastly, there are those who hold 
that IOs simply do not matter one way or another for the international system, based on the 
argument that states will only bow to the stances of IOs when it is in their own self-interest 
(Mitchell and Hensel 2007). Indeed, this last stance assumes that, should relative gains concerns 
indeed be paramount, states will not cooperate with other states in situations where their security 
concerns are compromised (Grieco 1988; Mearsheimer 1994-95). But might it equally be the 
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case that similar logics to those above contribute to international politics impacting interactions 
in international organizations, such as the UNGA? 
This reverse relationship, wherein interactions between states influence subsequent 
interactions in international organizations, in this case the UNGA, is of core interest to this 
project. Importantly, studies of external factors influencing voting in the UNGA is not new, 
though to this point, settlement attempts on territorial disputes has not been examined as a 
potential factor of influence in voting patterns. The contribution of this dissertation to both the 
study of territorial disputes and the United Nations is an expansion of theoretical linkages 
between the two and an empirical assessment of this theory. By demonstrating how contentious 
interactions over territory relate to voting in the UNGA we can get a sense for how direct 
interactions between states shape and influence indirect interactions in the international system, 
specifically the shape, role, and importance of international law in governing relations between 
states. If violent interactions over territory are found to relate to voting in the UNGA against 
greater roles for international law, and greater protections from the possibility of conflict and 
war, states might be galvanized to act more directly in propagating international law and against 
those states that seek to violate it through the use of force. In this chapter I present and test this 
theory, with the hope that doing so will provide a greater understanding of new ways in which 
territorial disputes matter to interactions in the international system, particularly in terms of their 
impacts on international organizations like the UNGA. 
This brings me to a more complete examination of the underlying rules that the United 
Nations is based around, the presentation of which is necessary to understand why territorial 
dispute settlement attempts will lead to specific voting patterns in the UNGA, and how violent 
attempts will be indicative of protest against the US-led international system grounded in 
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international law. Following this, I present an assessment of work done regarding UNGA voting 
patterns in terms of realist hypotheses, liberalist hypotheses, and other factors that have been 
found to possess influence. From there I present this dissertation’s theory on territorial dispute 
management and UNGA voting, and then present how I aim to test this theory. I conclude this 
chapter with a presentation of hypotheses on UNGA voting similarity between the disputants 
involved in a territorial dispute, and hypotheses on voting similarity between the disputants and 
the US as the main steward of the international system. 
 
The United Nations in the Modern International System 
Given the degree that the United Nations (UN), and by extension the international 
community, has pursued measures to inhibit the forceful acquisition of territory, disputed or 
otherwise, it stands to reason that states attempting to settle their territorial and maritime disputes 
will see the methods they select result in effects on the behavior of their fellow disputants in the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), or at the very least convey the degree the state is 
contented or discontented with their place in the US-led international system. Perhaps the 
methods of dispute management selected will even effect the distance between the average 
general foreign policy preferences of UNGA state members beyond the dyad itself, both in terms 
of average general foreign policy preferences and even individual foreign policy preferences, 
such as human rights. This, however, might depend to some degree on the importance of territory 
to states and in the international system. 
 That being said, before diving into the literature on territorial and maritime dispute 
settlement itself, it is important to grasp an understanding of the international system as it 
currently stands. Only in doing so are the connections between territorial dispute settlement and 
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voting in the United Nations General able to be understood. The international system in its 
current incarnation owes its existence to the actions taken by the Allied Powers during World 
War II. Founded in 1945, the purpose of the United Nations has been to adhere to the four 
components of its Charter outlined in article 1 (United Nations 1945a): 
1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective 
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by 
peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, 
adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a 
breach of the peace. 
 
2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to 
strengthen universal peace. 
 
3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an 
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and 
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion. 
 
4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends. 
 
From the examination of these four guiding principles of the United Nation’s operations, it is 
clear to see that the core of their activities are meant to spur on cooperation in the international 
system and to prevent the outbreak of violence between its member states. These guidelines 
likely come about as a reaction to the incidence of World Wars I and II, and a desire to avoid the 
massive costs associated with these conflicts.  
Another point of key importance that needs to be underlined in order to get at the link 
between territorial disputes and voting in the United Nations General Assembly has to do with 




1. Membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving states which 
accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the 
Organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations. 
 
According to the Charter of the United Nations itself, “peace-loving states” are those to which 
the international organization is open to and through whom it operates. It might be said then that 
it is the expectation of the United Nations that peace be maintained in all legitimate interactions 
between countries on the world stage. Those that violate said peace then might well be those that 
have issue with the world order on which that peace rests. 
 Another important component of Article 4 deals with the mention of “states” themselves. 
According to general accepted practice, in order to be categorized as a sovereign state, an entity 
must possess its own territory, a permanent population, and the institutions through which it 
might undertake the activities necessary of statehood. Key to this definition is the importance of 
territory itself, for without territory it would be impossible to possess a permanent population 
and vastly more difficult to construct the institutions necessary of statehood. 
In international law, the principle of territorial integrity is generally invoked to prohibit 
unilateral secession, to prevent border changes, or to prohibit the use of force by one state to 
seize territory from another (Moore 2015). It is this last use in international law that is of special 
relevance to the management of territorial and maritime disputes between states. Unless there is 
just cause, the resort to military force in the management of these disputes is wrong according to 
international law. Even in cases where conflict is justified, the way in which the state uses force 
may be unjust (Moore 2015), such as in situations of failing to respect the distinction between 
civilians and combatants, or utilizing a disproportionate response to an action by the other 
disputant.  
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Generally speaking, according to the international law of today, the acquisition of 
territory by force alone is illegal (Shaw 2017). Even the United Nations (UN) has moved in this 
direction with the 1970 Declaration of Principles of International Law by the UNGA, which 
provides for the territory of a state not being an object of acquisition in situations wherein 
another state uses threats or outright force (United Nations 1970). Even if the challenging state 
should succeed in extending control over a territory in this manner, according to the UN this 
acquisition will not be recognized as legal. The only way acquisition of territory through force 
might become legitimate is through further action of an international nature, such as by the 
creation of a treaty of cession or through the gaining of international recognition (Shaw 2017, 
372). 
 Though this latter path does theoretically provide a path for the acquisition of territory by 
force to become legitimately held, Article 2, Paragraph 4 of the UN Charter (United Nations 
1945b) states: “[a]ll members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.” Since being passed by member 
states, this principle has been enshrined in international law, and as such is binding upon the 
states of the international community (Shaw 2017, 854). For example, the Eritrea-Ethiopia 
Claims Commission took the position that the use of force to settle their dispute would violate 
international law even when some portion of the disputed territory was subject to a valid claim 
by the state pursuing the use of force (Shaw 2017, 858). This brings me to the UNGA and the 
examination of the voting that occur within it. 
According to this approach, states would then have a range or cooperative or conflictual 
strategies to choose from in pursuit of their goals (Mitchell and Hensel 2007), which by 
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themselves will signal information about state preferences. This is important for a number of 
reasons for this study of territorial dispute settlement attempts influencing UNGA voting. In the 
case of territorial dispute settlement attempts, it is hard for violent and peaceful attempts to be 
interpreted as anything but what they are: confrontational non-cooperation and contempt for the 
international laws underlying the contemporary US-led international system, or conciliatory 
collaboration and respect for these same international laws. Given that private information 
provides incentives for states to misrepresent their interests in pursuit of gaining advantages over 
opponents (Fearon 1995), these public interactions make clear where states stand regarding these 
issues and the international law governing how they are supposed to be settled. International 
organizations then, in this case voting in the UNGA, can provide an objective reaction and 
source of information (Abbott and Snidal 1998) as to how states react to dispute settlement. In 
addition, according to Keohane (1984, p. 94), international organizations are further a source of 
independent information regarding disputes, as they actively collect such information when they 
become involved, which is then circulated amongst members. In the case of territorial dispute 
settlement attempts, it stands to reason reactions to which are chosen by disputants will be 
reflected in voting in the UNGA. Most importantly, IOs establish generally adhered to patterns 
of legal liability or accountability (Keohane 1984; Mitchell 1994), as well as new norms and 
practices in the international system due to their status (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). This 
brings me to a more complete presentation of the theory of how territorial dispute management 





A New Theory of Territorial Dispute Management and UNGA Voting 
To this point I have demonstrated the importance and usefulness of the UNGA and voting 
patterns to understanding conflict and interstate interactions in the international system. Previous 
work has suggested voting preferences as being derived from structural or internal factors, but 
what if we go one step further and examine voting patterns as being influenced by state 
interactions outside the UN, specifically as a result of signaling? What about specific issues that 
states really care about, such as territory and how states go about settling disputes over it? This 
brings me to the reiteration of the two major questions driving the core of this research 
dissertation: 
Question 1: To what degree do these attempt methods influence disputant foreign policy 
preferences, as indicated by voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly? 
 
Question 2: To what degree does the information actively conveyed by the settlement attempt 
method utilized by states in managing their ongoing territorial and maritime signal contentment 
with the US-led international system? How is this reflected in general UNGA voting relative to 
the voting of particular disputants?  
 
 The causal story behind the relationship between territorial dispute interactions and 
voting patterns in the UNGA is straightforward. Following the formal establishment of the 
territorial integrity norm in the UN Charter, states that became members of the UNGA became 
obligated to respect the norm and refrain from the use of force in any territorial dispute they were 
engaged in. When states act to attempt to settle their territorial disputes they are signaling 
information of how they perceive the role of international law in the US-led international system. 
Peaceful attempts signal a respect for international law and present the state acting as such as 
being more trustworthy and worthy of cooperation. Violent attempts signal a lack of respect for 
international law and present the state acting this wat as being worthy of suspicion and less 
cooperation. With this information being conveyed regarding the respect for the territorial 
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integrity norm and international law, voting patterns in the UNGA will converge or diverge 
respectively. For example, one might expect a state that uses violence in their territorial dispute 
interactions will vote in a manner to limit international law whereas those that pursue peaceful 
methods might vote in line with preserving, and even expanding the influence of international 
law on the international political system. This brings me to the literature on signaling. 
 According to the literature, signaling might best be thought of as: 
“…the purposive and strategic revealing of information about intent, resolve, and/or 
capabilities by an actor A to alter the decisions of another actor B to improve the chances 
that an outcome desired by A is reached when the desired outcomes of A and B are 
dissimilar (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017, 5).” 
 
In general, signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of information relevant to another 
actor’s decisions (Morrow 1999). Given pervasive uncertainty regarding another state’s 
intentions and resolve, states signal information to the degree they can in order to either threaten 
or reassure, depending on their goals (Fearon 1994b; Kydd 2005; Schultz 2001). Signaling is 
important to all types of interactions between states in the international system. In cooperation or 
peacebuilding, conveying peaceful intentions and a commitment to follow through in 
collaborative efforts can ensure peace is maintained, while signaling strength in coercive 
bargaining situations might lead to the attainment of goals without costly conflict (Kertzer, 
Rathburn, and Rathburn 2020). 
Early research into signaling has found that most outcomes in foreign policy tend to be 
dependent on the interactions between multiple actions, particularly in terms of the extent that 
one actor’s behavior is dependent on the intent and capabilities of other actors (Gartzke, 
Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Further work has been done on the signaling of resolve in 
crises (McManus and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Schelling 1966; Carson and Yarhi-Milo 2017; Fearon 
1994b; Schultz 2001) and as a means of reassurance to escape a detrimental security dilemma 
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(Axelrod 1984; Glaser 2010; Jervis 1978; Keohane 1984; Kydd 2005). Since interactions over 
territorial or maritime disputes might be thought of as zero-sum interactions, issues of 
incomplete information and commitment arise, since states have an incentive to misrepresent 
these issues to make it more likely to achieve their policy goals (Fearon 1995). Attempts at 
settlement, then, might serve as good active communicators of information to fellow disputants 
to the extent they are indicative of their commitment and what they are bringing to bear on the 
settlement attempt process. This is to say the more costly a threat is the more likely it is to be 
credible in conveying a state’s commitment, in the hope that such would disincline their fellow 
disputant from acting for fear of suffering the costs (Fearon 1990, 1992, 1994). Fearon (1997) 
specifically references tying hands, wherein costs increase in a state backs down, and sunk-costs, 
wherein first actions are costly, as examples of this signaling in action. For this projects 
purposes, and to the UNGA as an organization, these actions might also indicate contentment or 
discontent with international law underlying the US-led international system as a whole. 
 Generally speaking, signaling at its core is purposive, such that any recipient will acquire 
information from the action, and if no such information is gained, then no signaling occurred 
(Cho and Kreps 1987). In addition, signaling must also be strategic, in the sense that it will 
influence the payoffs of the involved actors (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Even 
the number of actors might influence the impacts of signaling, such as through the creation of 
additional avenues of information transmission (Trager 2015). Extra-dyadic ties (an example 
being networks of trade partners discussed in Gartzke and Weseterwinter (2016), or in the case 
of this project the UNGA) might also be useful in credibly sharing information about a state’s 
resolve regarding an issue. After all, acts as simple as diplomacy and talking can change the 
perceptions and payoffs for the disputing actors (Trager 2010).  
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Since territorial disputes often are zero-sum in nature, signaling to exchange information 
might help avoid bargaining failure, and prevent the progression from militarized interstate 
incidents from progressing into a full-blown war (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017, 
7). For the purposes of this project, signaling might be utilized to demonstrate discontent with 
the international law-based, US-led international order (Fearon 1997) via a violent attempt at 
settlement, or to demonstrate a contentment with a US-led international order (Keohane 1986) 
via a peaceful attempt at settlement. Core to this is the place of the territorial integrity norm 
enshrined in the UN and in international law, under which the borders of a state are considered 
sacrosanct in the international community and the use of violence to redistribute them is seen as 
in violation of the international system as it currently exists. Violent attempts contrary to this 
norm, therefore, are a rebuke to the international system and can be expected to be reflected in 
UNGA voting patterns as other states who pursue more peaceful, international law-based 
interactions will have differences preferences for the functioning of the international system. 
When it comes to the selection of the dispute settlement method for putting a territorial or 
maritime dispute to rest, one of the factors that can influence the selection is the state’s 
willingness to relinquish control of the power to influence the outcome (Gent 2013).  In general, 
bilateral negotiations stand at one end of the spectrum with the disputant states retaining the most 
amount of control over the dispute settlement (both process and eventual distribution of the 
territorial or maritime dispute) while adjudication stands at the other end of the spectrum with 
the least amount of control over the dispute settlement retained by the disputing states.  To select 
a dispute settlement method that gives up a large amount of control to international courts would 
seem to indicate that much more commitment on the part of the disputant states to settle the 
dispute. 
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In the case of an attempted settlement, however, does it even matter which method is 
used?  Given the importance of territorial and maritime disputes to states, it is expected that the 
resulting impacts of settlement attempts will be manifested in the foreign policy preferences of 
the disputing states, as represented by ideal points in UNGA voting data. Since territory is so 
important to the existence of states in the international system, to act in certain ways over 
disputed territorial or maritime areas would be an effective means to signal contentment or 
discontentedness with their position in the US-led international system, which in turn, we could 
expect to be manifested in the voting patterns of the UNGA. 
To be clear, the causal logic holds that, when interacting over territorial disputes, states 
might be engaged with multiple audiences. Fearon himself indicates that in certain situations 
leaders might well be signaling to multiple audiences, both foreign and domestic, and not just 
one specific state (Fearon 1997). In terms of how we might expect signaling conveyed by 
territorial dispute interactions to impact foreign policy preferences, it comes down to 
perspectives on international law. Interactions over territorial disputes are tied to the fundamental 
foundation on which states, territory, and since international law outlines the behaviors that are 
and are not acceptable in the international community of states then states will inherently wish to 
stay aware of how others are behaving regarding this subject. States behaving aggressively 
regarding their territorial disputes likely see such actions as their most effective option in settling 
the dispute in their favor, or that any punishments levied against them as being minor compared 
to losing the dispute. In terms of foreign policy, then, these states might be expected to act in 
other political areas in a manner that limits international law and potential punishments that 
might be imposed upon them. From the perspectives of other states, seeing the threat of states not 
bound by the territorial integrity norm they will act in a manner to protect their security and 
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sovereignty, such as through efforts to maintain and expand international law or efforts to 
pressure states that engage in violence to fall back in line. 
Ideal points, also termed dynamic national ideal points, in this case they consistently 
serve to capture the position of states in UNGA voting compared to how the US votes on all 
measures. Ideal points generated from UNGA voting are an effective means towards glimpsing 
the preferences of member states towards specific spheres of foreign policy, and by extension 
their contentedness with the US-led international system. Without these ideal points to serve as 
reference to UNGA state preferences, and to present the US as a central point indicative of the 
character of the international system, it becomes much more difficult to determine the preference 
pattern of states and whether they are content or not with prevailing international law and the 
US-led international system. 
Violent attempts at settlement by a state will convey information that they are aggressive, 
untrustworthy, and lack respect for the US-led international system. UNGA ideal points, 
indicative of each disputant’s foreign policy preferences, might be expected to diverge as the 
target of the aggressive attempt at settlement expresses their displeasure with the actions of their 
counterpart in the dispute. Conversely, if a state were to pursue peaceful dispute settlement, they 
will actively convey information about being a good citizen of the US-led rules based 
international system, a respect for rules of international law, and the potential of being a more 
trustworthy partner. UNGA ideal points in this second situation might be expected to converge 
as the target of the peaceful attempt conveys reciprocal trust in the actions of their counterpart in 
the dispute. In general, it might also be expected that settlement attempts of a violent or peaceful 
manner will result in similar levels of the respective states dissatisfaction or satisfaction with the 
US-led liberal order in the international system. 
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By starting with an examination of the degree foreign policy preferences represented by 
voting preferences in the United Nations General Assembly, I first assess if there is a link 
between behavior in dispute settlement and UNGA voting. From there, if a link is found, then it 
becomes possible to see the degree that the voting itself is in line with or contrary to the US-led 
international order. Again, this is possible through the use of ideal points generated from UNGA 
state preferences, which utilize US votes as the central point to indicate to what degree the 
member states’ votes vary, thereby indicating preference for the structure of the international 
system, and by proxy the contentedness for it being US-led or not. 
So why exactly would it matter if UNGA votes are close to the US position or not? It 
comes down to the research conducted by scholars like Voeten (2001) who have found 
interactions in the UNGA to be influenced by the shape and structure of the international system 
around it. Given the liberalist motivations that can be tied to the UN from its founding in large 
part by the United States after World War II, such as the reduction of conflict in the international 
system and a general respect for a territorial integrity norm, it stands to reason the aims of the 
UNGA as an institution and the United States will be close. That being said there can still be 
variation between the closeness of voting by other states and the United States, which can be 
theorized to be indicative of the stances of these other states regarding the US-led international 
system as represented by the UN. This is important as if alignment in voting is close between a 
state and the US, there is less room for conflict which makes the international system that much 
more peaceable, whereas if voting diverges by a significant degree, there is more room for 
conflict, which in turn might spill over into the international system itself. Since the UNGA does 
not exist inside a black box, but is likely influenced by interactions between states within the 
international system itself, it stands to reason (in following an issue-based approach to 
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interactions in the UNGA) that certain issues will have impacts on overall voting. In search of a 
sufficiently important issue to test this with, one need look no further than territorial and 
maritime disputes. Given this projected influence on voting patterns from state interactions over 
territorial and maritime disputes, it is important to understand the struggles over territory 
between states, how these disputes might be settled, and the perceived values a territory might 
possess, which are addressed in the coming sections. 
 
Testing A Theory of Territorial Dispute Management and UNGA Voting 
The focus of this current research, then, is to assess the impacts of different settlement 
scenarios of territorial disputes in which states actively signal information when attempts at 
settlement are made, and the consequent voting actions taken by the members in the UNGA.  
These voting actions can be examined both comprehensively as average voting scores, and 
specifically by examining average voting within issue types, such as human rights. Particularly, 
in situations like this, are there settlement attempt methods that might actively convey 
contentment or discontent with the states place in the US-led international system, and result in 
actions in the UNGA that are more in line with those who respect the US-led international order 
or instead indicative of a divergence from this perspective?  Generally speaking, crises in the 
international system are sequential in nature, with states proceeding in an action-reaction 
progression (George and Smoke 1974). Understanding how states choose to actively signal their 
objectives, and the means and commitment with which they will pursue them, can provide 
insight into how the management of territorial and maritime disputes might convey the 
perspectives of contentment or discontent with the disputant actor’s place in the US-led 
international system (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017), particularly in terms of their 
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foreign policy preferences such as those indicated by UNGA voting. With this in mind, the 
hypotheses of this project are as follows. 
 
Settlement Attempts and (Dis)satisfaction Within the Dyad 
 These initial hypotheses deal with the degree that types of settlement attempts interact 
with the foreign policy preferences of the states within the disputing dyad, as represented by the 
UNGA votes by each state. 
H1: Peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to foreign policy 
convergence between the disputants, as indicated by the ideal points generated from 
UNGA voting. 
 
H2: Violent settlement attempts will be significantly related to foreign policy divergence 
between the disputants, as indicated by the ideal points generated from UNGA voting. 
 
Previously it was mentioned that signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of 
information relevant to another actor’s decisions (Morrow 1999) and that signaling is at its core 
purposive, meaning any recipient will acquire information from the action, and if no such 
information is gained, then no signaling occurred (Cho and Kreps 1987). Given the position of 
the UN in the international system, and the UNGA as one of the best arenas for examining the 
changing patterns of interactions between states, it also serves as a good indicator as to the 
settling of territorial disputes conveying information that, in turn, shapes the foreign policy 
preferences of states as represented by UNGA voting. 
Should empirical findings indicate no significant differences between settlement then the 
conclusion might be reached that interactions over territorial disputes do not convey information 
that causes shifts in foreign policy behaviors at the level of the UNGA. Given that no state is 
more likely to shift its foreign policy behavior than the one directly impacted in the dispute itself, 
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it stands to reason that examining these dyadic interactions first and foremost will be the initial 
required step to determine if signaling in territorial dispute interactions is occurring and having 
an impact at the level of the UNGA Should support be found for H1 and H2, this would align 
with the embeddedness of the territorial integrity norm in the current world order stewarded by a 
US-led UN. In addition, by directly comparing the voting preferences of the disputants 
themselves, we will see individual country level respect for the territorial integrity norm as it 
directly applies to disputants over the distribution of territory. This will in turn will provide 
further support for this theory’s hypothesized relationship between interactions over territory and 
UNGA voting in the set of hypotheses. 
Regarding the direction of significance in these first hypotheses and given previous 
research into territorial dispute settlement, we might expect that peaceful settlement attempts 
might contribute to greater efforts of cooperation, or in this case a convergence of foreign policy 
preferences as indicated by UNGA voting. Contrary to this, if violent settlement attempts are 
pursued, we might expect the relationship to be in the opposite direction. In other words, there 
will be foreign policy divergence as represented by UNGA voting. The expectation with this first 
set of hypotheses is that, given the personal salience of the territorial dispute to the states in the 
dyad, they are the most inclined reward or punish their counterpart with their voting preferences 
in the UNGA. 
 
Settlement Attempts and (Dis)satisfaction With The US-led International System 
 There are a number of additional hypotheses that touch on how settlement attempts 
within a disputing dyad potentially impact the voting patterns of the other states in the UNGA. 
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H3a: Peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA voting 
convergence between the disputants of a territorial dispute settlement attempt and the 
United States. 
 
H3b: Non-binding peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA 
voting convergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United 
States. 
 
H3c: Binding peaceful settlement attempts will be significantly related to UNGA voting 
convergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United States, at a 
level greater than non-binding peaceful settlement attempts. 
 
H4: Violent attempts at settlement will be significantly related to UNGA voting 
divergence between the disputants of the settlement attempt and the United States. 
 
Much like in the first set of hypotheses, and again based on previous research, we might expect 
peaceful settlement attempts to be indicative of contentment with the US-led international system 
as these disputants of the settlement attempt are acting within the framework of the Charter on 
which the United Nations is based. Going a step further, by moving from non-binding to binding 
attempts at settlement, the disputants involved in the settlement are expressing more contentment 
with the structure and function of the US-led international system. Likewise, violent attempts 
made will be indicative of discontent with the US-led international system and should be 
reflected in UNGA voting. 
This line of thinking owes itself to the place of the territorial integrity norm in the 
international system and how the UN has tied into its adoption by the international community. 
Understanding the evolution of norms explains how important this territorial integrity norm has 
become based on the work of the UN. A norm itself is defined by Finnemore and Sikkink (1999, 
p. 251) as “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors of a given identity and an international 
regularity norm is strong when it is respected and viewed as legally binding by the great majority 
of states.” Put simply, then, the territorial integrity norm can be thought of as the growing respect 
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by sovereign states for outlawing of force as a legitimate means with which to alter boundaries 
between states. A number of studies have gone on to assess respect for the territorial integrity 
norm, one of the most important being by Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009). In the project, 
Hensel, Allison, and Khanani (2009) examine not just the successful violent seizure of territory 
but unsuccessful violent attempts as well. They find that, in general, the territorial integrity norm 
has reduced territorial conflict, and that the greatest impacts of the norm appear to stem from 
pressure by the states who have wholeheartedly accepted it, rather than any one specific treaty on 
its signatories (Hensel, Allison, and Khanani 2009). 
 That being said, the respect for territorial integrity is an anomaly when you examine the 
span of recorded human history. The medieval world did not have any true international 
boundaries like those that separate the territories of states today. Authority over land was 
constantly overlapping and shifting (Clark 1961). For this reason, the legitimacy of borders was 
often tied to dynastic lines, such as royal or noble families, and each had the absolute right of 
rule within these boundaries (Zacher 2001) unless challenged by another seeking to usurp this 
control. This would result in the majority of wars occurring before the emergence of the modern 
world order being over the acquisition or preservation of territory, and even then, wars of this 
nature occasionally occur up to the current day. It would not be until the creation of territorial 
states with exclusive authority over their domains that the modern world would emerge (Zacher 
2001). Even then, it was not until the 1700s that precisely surveyed national borders would 
become common (Clark 1972). 
 According to the work of Zacher (2001), which primarily draws on war data compiled by 
Holsti (1991) (with additional data pulled from Bercovitch and Jackson 1997; Goertz and Diehl 
1992; Huth 1996; Kacowicz 1994; and Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1998), the percent of wars 
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that led to the redistribution of territory was 79% from 1648-1712, 80% from 1713-1814, 80% 
from 1815-1917, 88% from 1918 to 1945, and finally 30% from 1946 to 2000. This abrupt shift 
in percentages in large part owes itself to the attempt to enshrine a respect for territory in the 
League of Nations, which was ultimately more successful following the creation of the United 
Nations and its support of the territorial integrity norm. Regarding the emergence of this norm, 
and the consequent time period at the core of this research project, Finnemore and Sikkink 
(1999) present norm development as going through three stages: emergence, acceptance, and 
institutionalization. 
 The first stage for the territorial integrity norm, emergence, began with the ending of 
World War I and is primarily typified with Article 10 of the League of Nations Covenant, with 
many of the major proponents of it being Western democratic states (Zacher 2001). In the time 
leading up to the creation of the League Covenant, President Woodrow Wilson spoke of the need 
of such covenants to create mutual guarantees for both political independence and territorial 
integrity of all states regardless of status or power (Zimmern 1939; Egerton 1978; and Knock 
1992). Ultimately enshrined in the Article 10 previously mentioned, it read: “The members of the 
League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity 
and existing political independence of all Members of the League (Zacher 2001),” and signified 
the first formal support of the territorial integrity norm. Regardless, from this period up until the 
start of World War II several multilateral treaties and declarations came into being that strove to 
uphold the new territorial integrity norm. Zacher (2001) lists the 1919 League Covenant, the 
1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, and the League of Nation’s adoption of the Stimson Doctrine in 1931, 
which denied the legitimacy of territorial changes as a result of force (Stimson and Bundy 1948), 
as the most prominent examples. That being said, this time frame only counts as the emergence 
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stage of norm adoption due to the general tolerance by state actors of the actions taken by 
Germany, Italy, and Japan in their search for territorial expansion, which culminated with the 
brutal actions of World War II due to the lack of effective efforts in preservation of the new 
territorial integrity norm by states party to the League of Nations. The greatest war in recorded 
history would have some benefits for the territorial integrity norm, however, in that once the 
conflict concluded there was a surge in support for adoption of the norm (Zacher 2001). As such, 
the international political system following the end of World War II would go on to be structured 
around three central tenets: equal sovereignty of states, competence internally regarding 
domestic jurisdiction, and the preservation for existing territorial boundaries (Elden 2006). 
 The acceptance stage, typified by growing support for the norm and integration of in into 
state interactions such that it becomes legally binding (through treaties being one example), 
began with the adoption and ratification of Article 2 (4): in the UN Charter during June of 1945. 
This was due to the Western Allied Powers exhibiting strong support for the integrity of state 
boundaries following the aggression of World War II, though the Soviet Union in particular 
continued to view boundaries through a more classical perspective, namely that the winners in a 
conflict were entitled to claim their opponent’s territories. Though most states recognized the 
expanded boundaries of the Soviet Union after the war, all party to the San Francisco conference 
of 1945 agreed to recognize the existing boundaries in the UN charter, specifically that: “All 
Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any state. (UN 1945b).” According to Zacher 
(2001), the most important multilateral accords from this stage were the 1960 UN declaration 
that set out to protect the integrity of states’ territories and that the colonies still in existence at 
this time were eligible for self-determination based on their current borders, the Organization of 
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African Unity’s charter provision in 1963 and 1964 resolution respected boundaries inherited 
from their status’ as former colonies, and lastly the Helsinki Final Act of 1975. For this reason, 
given the time span of these efforts, it is no real surprise that this acceptance stage endured up 
through the end of the 1960s and early 1970s. In addition to these international organizations, 
many others have enshrined territory integrity in their founding charters, such as the Arab 
League (1945), the Organization of Arab States (1948), and the African Union (2000) (Elden 
2006). Even the European Union and NATO require all states seeking to join their organizations 
to set aside all territorial disputes before they are allowed in (Elden 2006). 
 The final stage of norm adoption is the institutionalization stage which is typified with 
the adoption and integration of additional international accords, and the implementation of 
multilateral efforts to more effectively result in state compliance. According to Zacher (2001) 
this last stage started in 1976 and continues on to the present. Further solidifying the hold of the 
territorial integrity norm were the efforts by the International Court of Justice to adjudicate 
several territorial disputes, with the principle of uti possidetis (literally “as you possess”) 
contributing to rulings that found that states have rights to the territories ceded to them by prior 
governing states, and that other states, as such, do not have legal right to take these territories by 
force (Prescott 1998). In the case of a large number of African states, upon gaining independence 
they sought to preserve the previously existing colonial boundaries, despite them cutting across 
natural and ethnic boundaries in many areas (Malanczuk 1997; Ratner 1996). Part of the 
reasoning of these newly independent states at the time was that any challenge to a border of an 
African state as being illegitimate would cause all the borders to be thrown into question 
(Malanczuk 1997; Ratner 1996; Zacher 2001). Thus, international law attempts largely to protect 
existing borders, perhaps even more so than recognizing their artificial nature (Elden 2006). 
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 Ultimately the UN would have the effect of encouraging the acceptance of the territorial 
integrity norm through its numerous resolutions, monitoring devices, and even commissions that 
touched upon this purpose (Barnett and Finnemore 1999). From here things really began to take 
off. In 1999, the leaders of the European Union (EU) all agreed that member states should submit 
their remaining territorial disputes to the International Court of Justice for review, which had the 
benefit of contributing to the stability and legitimacy of the EU. This was also the approach 
taken by the successor states of the Soviet Union in their acting to respect their existing 
boundaries. Generally, this has been the pattern for those who account themselves members of 
the UN since its formation, as demonstrated by the relatively few cases of coercive boundary 
changes between states since the creation of the international organization and expansion of its 
membership from fifty to more than one hundred and ninety (Zacher 2001).  
 The arrival at a territorial integrity norm would not have been possible had democratic 
states declined to pursue the standard practice of territorial annexations following their victory at 
the end of World War II, and it certainly would not have endured had they (especially the United 
States) demonstrated a willingness to bring their military and economic forces to bear in the 
subsequent decades. Make no mistake, however, that the underlying premise of the successful 
adoption of the territorial integrity norm was a strong commitment by states, especially the 
United States, to a global political order in which this largest force of international violence was 
declared illegal (Zacher 2001). Even in the case of claims for independence, outside of 
colonialism the principle of territorial integrity is a strong protection for any parent state (Vidmar 
2012). Thus, any intentional violation of the territorial integrity norm by a state is not only in 
violation of this norm, but acts contrary to the will and structure of the US-led international 
system in the decades since the founding of the UN. 
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In summation, my theory presents territorial dispute management interactions as 
influencing voting patterns in the UNGA, in which the attempts themselves signal information 
on each state’s preferences regarding international law in the US-led international system as 
helmed by the UNGA. This is dependent on the degree that the UN and the international 
community as a whole has acted to institute a norm against violent acquisition of territory. States 
acting in accordance with this territorial integrity norm by attempting to settle their disputes 
peaceably will signal respect and adherence to the role of international law in the international 
system, whereas as states who pursue violent actions will demonstrate the opposite. As stated 
previously, and key to this perspective, it is difficult for violent and peaceful attempts at 
settlement to be interpreted as anything else but what they appear to be. Peaceful efforts signal a 
state as being worthy of cooperation and trust, whereas violent efforts will lead to relationships 
of distrust and suspicion. The information as a result of these interactions will convey either a 
respect for or a disrespect of the territorial integrity norm and international law, which in turn 
will contribute to a convergence or divergence respectably in voting patterns within the UNGA 
itself.  
In the next two chapters I test the two sets of hypotheses I introduced above. If support is 
found, peaceful dispute interactions will be reflected in convergence between the disputants in 
terms of UNGA voting (H1), whereas violent dispute interactions will see divergence between 
the disputants in UNGA voting (H2). In addition, peaceful dispute interactions should also be 
related to voting convergence with the US in the UNGA (H3a), and that the strength of this 
convergence should increase as these settlement efforts become more binding (H3b; H3c). 
Conversely, violent dispute interactions should result in the opposite and see a divergence with 
US voting patterns in the UNGA (H4). 
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Chapter 3: Research Design and Quantitative Analyses 
Introduction 
 In considering the overall methodological design of this research study, the use of a 
multimethod approach is an effective means to assess the impacts settlement attempt methods on 
the voting of disputants in the UNGA. A multimethod approach allows for fresh perspectives to 
be brought to bear on subjects of research, while also allowing for results of different methods to 
be corroborated (Hammond 2005). Indeed, using a multimethod approach can provide further 
clarification of findings, and even allow for the results of one method to inform another. For this 
reason, this study will utilize self-contained components of quantitative and qualitative 
approaches to the examination of the impacts of settlement attempt methods on foreign policy 
preferences, represented by the ideal points of UNGA voting data. I expect that by following this 
approach, the quantitative analyses for all states over the time period of study will assess the 
theory for external validity, while the case studies that follow will assess the theory for internal 
validity and provide additional verification for the findings of the quantitative analyses. 
Moreover, since the case studies focus on a number of disputes that include China, the main 
country held up as a challenger to the US in the international system, the second set of 
hypotheses that focus on contentedness with the US-led international system are more effectively 
tested as well. This chapter will focus on the quantitative analyses with the following chapter 
focusing on the presentation of a number of qualitative case studies relevant to the project. 
 
Research Design: Quantitative Method 
 To quantitatively test my theory, I analyze a sample of interstate territorial disputes 
amounting to 19,083 dyadic observations over the time period of 1946 to 2015. The unit of 
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analysis for this data is claim-dyad-year, indicating that there is one observation for each year 
from 1946 to 2015 for each of the dyadic pairs of states involved in a claim over disputed 
territory. To be included as a valid dyadic claim, an authorized representative of the disputing 
states needs to explicitly claim a geographic area, which is in turn claimed by at least one 
additional state (Hensel 2013). The inclusion of disputes is based primarily on those initially 
used by the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) project (Hensel 2001) and elaborated upon in the 
Territorial Peaceful Resolution of Disputes (TPRD) Dataset (Wiegand, Powell, McDowell 
2020), the latter of which is used for the analyses. The TRPD dataset covers a total of 183 
territorial disputes from around the world over the period of 1945 to 2015.  It follows the ICOW 
project in defining territorial disputes as being specific instances in which the authorized 
representatives of two or more states put forth competing claims over a particular area of land 
(Hensel 2013). For the TPRD dataset, territorial disputes are included from the first year that 
states issue competing claims, and they exit the dataset once exclusive sovereignty rights are 
established and acknowledged by all the disputes, or at 2015 when the observation period of the 
dataset ends. Each year includes whether or not a settlement proposal is made, as well as what 
type the proposal is, which for the purposes of this project has been modified to be negotiations, 
arbitration, and adjudication. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The main dependent variable utilized is the ideal points of the UNGA voting data. This 
data is originally sourced from Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), and include 4,335 divisive 
roll calls over sixty-seven sessions from January 1946 to December 2012, but has since been 
expanded to 2015. Dynamic national ideal points, in this case consistently capturing the position 
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of states compared to a US-led liberal order in the international system, were generated using 
resolutions that were identical across years to serve as bridge observations to help make the 
preference estimates of states in the UNGA comparable over time. The votes themselves are 
broken down into three options: yea, nay, or abstain. When it comes to abstentions, generally 
they can be treated as not conveying as much disapproval as a nay vote. Bailey, Strezhnev, and 
Voeten (2017) set up the data for each state to have a unidimensional ideal point in each year, 
with each ideal point centered on zero with a standard deviation of one. In my dataset, I also 
modify the data into dyadic form, and generate a new variable to represent the absolute value 
difference between the ideal points of each state in the disputing dyad. There are 13,355 
observations in this data with a mean of 1.019 and a standard deviation of .995. What this 
indicates is that UNGA votes between states and the US voting position is roughly in the middle 
between voting with or against the US across all the observations. One standard deviation out 
from this middle grouping of data indicates that there are some votes wherein the results of the 
voting are overwhelmingly in line with the US ideal point or overwhelmingly against it. This 
distribution of the UNGA voting data might in turn make it easier to determine if territorial 
dispute interactions consistently interact with the voting patterns. In addition, the percent 
agreement of each states voting in the UNGA with the US and China are included as well. 
The main alternative to ideal points used in the literature to examine UNGA voting is the 
S score presented by Signorino and Ritter (1999). The S score is a cardinal measure of foreign 
policy preferences, which is based on the votes cast by countries in the UNGA as compared to a 
specific country, most often the US. These S scores are created by examining one country and 
the US, which is computed as being one minus the absolute difference between the first country 
and the US’ vote scores in the UNGA, summed over all included votes, and then divided by the 
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number of votes. There are three advantages to using the ideal point approach as compared to 
affinity or S scores. According to Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017), the estimates allow for 
more valid intertemporal comparisons, the greater ability to distinguish signal from noise in 
identifying meaningful shifts in foreign policy orientations, and lastly for a more sensitive ability 
to determine which state in a dyad is responsible for their moving closer or further apart in their 
foreign policy orientations. 
Using UNGA voting data constructed as ideal points allows for an easier comparison 
between disputants, and between the initiator of the dispute attempt with average UNGA policy 
preferences. This makes the degree that states are diverging or converging with both their 
counterparts in the dispute and the average member of the UNGA easy to determine, and by 
extension their satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the status quo of the international system. 
Further, by examining these data over in the dyad-year format, it makes it easier to capture and 
examine variation in the ideal point preferences over time as they interact with differing types of 
dispute settlement. Unfortunately, due to the fact the UNGA exists for a period shorter than the 
availability of territorial dispute data lends itself to, my analyses are bounded by the availability 
of UNGA voting data turned into ideal points, which lasts from 1946 until 2015, making the 
dataset temporally a fifth bigger for the analyses of this project. 
 
Independent Variables 
The first independent variable utilized is peaceful settlement attempt in a given dyad 
year, which can be broken down into: (0) no attempt; (1) bilateral negotiations attempt; (2) 
nonbinding/arbitration attempt; and (3) binding/adjudication attempt.  This variable is utilized 
from the Territorial Peaceful Resolution of Disputes (TPRD) Dataset version 1.0 (Wiegand, 
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Powell, and McDowell, 2020) and broken down separately as dichotomous (dummy) variables to 
account for whether or not a peaceful attempt of the relevant type occurred in a given dyad-year 
or not. Bilateral negotiations are defined as being discussions that occur between the authorized 
representatives of each disputant to debate the sovereignty of the dispute (von Glahn and Taulbee 
2013; Wiegand and Powell 2011; Wiegand, Powell, and McDowell 2020). Arbitration is a 
binding settlement method based formal procedures that leads to a formal award of the territory 
by a arbitral panel between the disputants (Merrills 2011). International adjudication is also a 
formal binding settlement method, but tends to be more inflexible in terms of the rules and 
procedures as compared to arbitration. This last settlement occurs in international courts like the 
international court of justice (ICJ). In the TPRD dataset, some disputants proposed multiple 
settlement methods in a given year, which could sometimes vary in terms of their type. With this 
in mind, each observation where this occurs was coded as the highest formality for each 
disputant in the given year, even if they differed, which is in-line with what has been done in the 
past (Powell and Wiegand 2010; Powell 2020; Wiegand, Powell and McDowell 2020).  
The primary motivation in utilizing this dataset over ICOW, which has been widely used 
for territorial disputes, created by Hensel (2001) is that the TPRD dataset extends settlement 
attempts out to 2015, which is fourteen years longer than ICOW and amounts to a twenty percent 
increase in the duration of the dataset. In my non-directed dyad dataset, the presence or absence 
of a peaceful attempt in a given dyad-year allows me to test for the impact of these attempts 
based on ideal points. If in line with my theory, the impact of these settlement attempts will 
result in a decrease of the spread between the disputant’s ideal points, that is to say, their voting 
patterns in the UNGA will be more similar in the relevant dyad-year.  
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The second key independent variable of interest is dyadic MIDs, from the Correlates of 
War dyadic MID data (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004; Palmer, D’Orazio, Kenwick, and 
McManus 2020) for the years 1816-2001. MID onset is a dichotomous variable that indicates 
whether or not a MID occurred in a given dyad-year. As the alternative to the peaceful 
approaches presented in the TPRD Dataset, the incidence of MIDs related to the dyadic disputes 
should be related to an increased spread between the disputant’s ideal points, showing that the 
voting patterns of the disputants in the UNGA will be less similar in a relevant dyad-year. To 
determine if the relationship between the four independent variables and the dependent variable 
of UNGA voting ideal point similarity is in line with the theory presented previously, each of the 
settlement type variables are assessed alongside the general voting ideal points for the within 
dyad hypotheses (H1 and H2). Following this they will be analyzed with the percent voting 
agreement of US and China for the second set of hypotheses (H3a through H4). 
 
Control Variables 
To assess the robustness of my analyses, I also include a number of control variables that 
have commonly been used in similar research projects. I control for the influence of power 
differences between dyadic pairs by utilizing the Composite Index of National Capabilities, more 
commonly known as CINC scores (Greig and Enterline 2017; Singer, Bremer and Stuckey 
1972). Given that war has been linked to state behaviors in the international system, it would 
stand to reason that the existence of power parity in a disputant dyad will result in foreign policy 
preferences more sensitive to attempts at dispute settlement in the dyad. 
I also account for rivalry, as this may influence future interactions between the states 
(Thompson 2001), and the disputants may well be more sensitive to attempts made in the 
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presence of an ongoing rivalry. Specifically, I examine strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, and 
Thompson 2007) which is calculated as being based on perceptions of threat, enmity and 
competition within a dyad, though the occurrence of militarized interstate disputes is not a 
necessity for a dyad to be categorized under this type of rivalry. In addition, I include rivalry and 
enduring rivalry as calculated in Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006). According to Klein, Goertz and 
Diehl (2006), rivalry is a dyadic, interstate relationship in which two states confront each other 
over a similar set of issues in at least three militarized interstate disputes. Should this rivalry 
eventually see a minimum of six militarized interstate disputes over a period of at least 20 years, 
the rivalry is re-categorized as an enduring rivalry. 
As not all territories might be valued the same, I also control for salience of the territories 
based on the coding of ICOW datasets (Frederick, Hensel, and Macauley 2017; Hensel 2001; 
Hensel et al. 2008) and work by Huth and Allee (2002). Types of salience accounted for include 
size and population, resource, ethnic or religious claims, among others, and each of these 
variables is dichotomous. The logic here is that if a territory under dispute is less salient (i.e. seen 
as having less value) then states in the UNGA may be less divergent in their voting patterns as 
compared to disputants who see their disputed territories as having greater salience. Further, with 
economics in mind I also account for trade between the states of each dyad (Rider and Owsiak 
2015), which is presented as being in millions of USD per year. 
There are also a number of variables relevant to the characteristics of territorial disputes 
themselves that need to be controlled for as well. These range from the purely domestic 
motivations, to the types of value territory might hold for the disputing states, and even how best 
to leverage disputes into advantages for states that hold other interests. In terms of domestic 
motivations, the leaders of states might suffer domestic punishment if they take any missteps in 
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attempting to manage outstanding territorial disputes. This domestic accountability explanation 
holds that vulnerable leaders of states with territorial disputes should avoid territorial 
concessions, threats or even the use of force to otherwise avoid potential punishments from their 
domestic constituents (Wiegand 2011a). Specifically, the idea here is that leaders wish to remain 
in power, so in order to do so they strive to keep the general population happy by avoiding any 
policies that might be considered unpopular (Huth 1996; Wiegand 2011a). In addition, when a 
territory possesses some sort of value leaders will be less likely to offer concessions (Huth and 
Allee 2002). A number of studies have further elaborated on support for this link between 
domestic accountability and behavior in dispute settlement attempts (Allee and Huth 2006; 
Brody 1984; Chiozza and Choi 2003; Chiozza and Goemans 2004; Huth 1996; Mueller 1973; 
Ostrom and Simon 1985; Rusett 1990). 
Additional factors that might shape attempts at territorial dispute settlement deal with the 
perceived values a territory in dispute might possess (Diehl and Goertz 1988, 1991; Diehl 1992; 
Forsberg 1992; Hensel 2001). The idea here is, based on what these values are, a state might be 
more (or less) inclined to use force to seize the disputed territory or be more (or less) inclined to 
use peaceful attempts if the value is perceived as not being enough to warrant war. In general, 
however, the more valuable the disputed territory, the higher a price states will face when 
considering compromises or offers of concessions regarding the dispute (Fravel 2008). Strategic 
worth is the first of several values that a territory in dispute might possess. Having its roots in 
research as early as the first decade of the 20th century, strategic worth namely deals with the 
security value a disputed territory possesses for a state (Mackinder 1904; Spykman 1944; Sprout 
and Sprout 1968). In general, when a territory in dispute is strategically located, the possessor 
will act to consolidate their position, whereas the other state in the dyadic dispute will be less 
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likely to escalate with conflict (Carter 2010). Related to this work is the research on shared 
borders and contiguity, where researchers attempted to assess the degree shared borders and 
proximity to another state would contribute to the likelihood of war, from which significant 
linkages were found (Bremer 1992; Starr and Most 1976, 1978; Siverson and Starr 1990; Senese 
2005; Starr 2002; Starr and Thomas 2005; Vasquez 1995). 
A disputed territory might also possess intrinsic worth. Rather than focusing on the 
strategic, military value of a territory, intrinsic worth arguments are focused on the wealth or 
resources that a territory possesses. Oil, gas, and mineral wealth in particular have been assessed 
in regards to territorial conflict, though there was not found to be a link in terms of their duration 
(Lujala, Rød and Thieme 2007; Sorens 2011). Luckily, in best case scenarios the value of a 
territory can be broken down, thereby becoming divisible, and thus leading conflict to not be 
inevitable if the disputants come up with a way to equitably divide the disputed territory 
(Rosenau 1966, 1967).  
The value placed on a territory for disputing states might also be intangible, yet still 
contribute to an escalation in conflict to the level of war (Vasquez 1983, 1995). When a disputed 
territory appears to have high intangible values (i.e., symbolic worth) the chances of conflict 
breaking out is much more likely (Hassner 2006; Hensel and Mitchell 2005). This could be due 
to how the possession of this symbolic value makes it difficult for a disputed territory to be 
divided up, with the result that it can be treated as indivisible making compromise in settlement 
attempts unlikely or even impossible (Goddard 2010; Hassner 2003, 2009; Toft 2003; Walter 
2003). Even if part of a territory were to be successfully acquired in a settlement, by acquiescing 
to possession in part by the other disputant could be seen as a defeat by that party (Anderson 
1988; Toft 2006). This brings me to the last valuation that a territory might possess, that is not 
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being valuable in regards to any specific characteristic but in terms of it simply existing as a 
point of contention between states.  
To account for the influence of regime type on settlement, I utilize a number of 
Democracy Index scores from the latest research published by the V-Dem Institute (Coppedge et 
al 2020). The indices included are: the Electoral Democracy Index; the Liberal Democracy 
Index; the Deliberative Democracy Index; the Participatory Democracy Index; and the 
Egalitarian Democracy Index. Each of these indices are interval variables with a low of 0 and a 
high of 1, though they are representative of different aspects of democracy. Firstly, the Electoral 
Democracy Index is the main conceptual variable of democracy within the V-Dem dataset 
project, and is understood as comprising the essential elements of any representative democracy, 
whether it be liberal, participatory, deliberative or egalitarian. The index itself is calculated by 
taken the weighted average of the sub-indices with data on freedom of association, clean 
elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage, combined with the five-way 
multiplicative interaction between them. Secondly, the Liberal Democracy Index is calculated to 
assess the degree a state emphasizes the importance of protecting the individual and minority 
rights of its citizens against the tyranny of the state or majority. Thirdly, the Deliberative 
Democracy Index is calculated to assess the degree to which a state emphasizes the deliberative 
process in decision making of the polity, which is, generally speaking, one where public 
reasoning is focused on the common good. Fourthly, the Participatory Democracy Index is 
calculated to assess the degree a state emphasizes the participation of its citizens in its political 
processes, both in terms of electoral and non-electoral activities. Lastly, the Egalitarian 
Democracy Index is calculated to assess the degree that a state holds that material and immaterial 
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inequalities inhibit the formal rights, liberties, and the capacities of citizens and has taken strides 
to address this. 
Each of these democracy indices are included for both states in each dyad involved in a 
territorial dispute, and an additional variable is generated for the absolute value difference of 
each of the indices for the dyad pairs to more concisely examine the differences in democracy 
between the disputants. Given the trend in the international system to being more democratic, 
states in the UNGA might be less inclined to diverge in their foreign policy preferences in 
democracies as compared to more authoritarian regimes, particularly when violent attempts are 
made. Lastly, a variable constructed to account for years since the last incident of a militarized 
dispute, labeled as peace years, which would be linked to tension levels between disputants, and 
temporal dependence is accounted for by including a peace years squared, and peace years cubed 
(Carter and Signorino 2010). The expectation here is that, as the attempt made recedes in time, 
the less of an impact it will be exerting on the foreign policy preferences of the disputants, as 
conveyed by the ideal points of the UNGA voting data. 
 
Analyses 
In my analysis, I run several regressions on different combinations of variables to assess 
the relationship between settlement attempt types and voting ideal points in the UNGA. I 
estimate the first regression for the relationship between settlement attempts and UNGA voting 
within the dyad to estimate the foreign policy positions of states compared to the United States 
(Bailey, Strezhnev, Voeten 2017). To eliminate the possibility of reverse causation arguments, I 
lag the dependent variable by one year. The aim of this first analyses is to assess the support of 
the first three hypotheses underlying the theory, which hold that the territorial dispute 
management attempts will exert influence on the disputants voting in the UNGA. If no 
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significant differences are found, the null hypothesis will be supported and the theory will lose 
value. However, if results are in line with the theory, as is expected, support will be found to 
show that peaceful settlement attempts are significantly related to voting convergence in the 
UNGA (H1) and violent settlement attempts are significantly related to voting divergence in the 
UNGA (H2). 
Following this first analysis, I run two further regression models examining the 
settlement attempts and UNGA voting as compared to first the percent agreement with US 
voting, then the percent agreement with China voting. These analyses are run to compare both 
the comparisons of foreign policy preferences within the disputant’s dyad, and to compare the 
initiator of the dispute settlement attempt compared to the ideal points of the United States and 
China. The last regression buttresses the case studies, and will focus on the ideal points of those 
who make settlement attempts as compared to the ideal points of China. This serves as an 
indicator in the case studies for the degree UNGA voting ideal points are similar between China 
and its fellow disputants. This serves as a proxy for contentment for the international law based 
international system as led by the United States, as well as how potential challengers to the status 
quo of the international system might see interactions over issues that have been enshrined in 
international law when the United States ascended up the ladder of power following the end of 
World War II. As such, this second set of analyses are used to assess support for the last four 
hypotheses of the theory. If support is found, as is expected, peaceful settlement attempts will be 
significantly related to voting convergence between disputing states and the US (H3a). Non-
binding peaceful attempts will be related to voting convergence with the US (H3b), and binding 
peaceful attempts will be related to voting convergence at an even higher level (H3c). Lastly, 
violent attempts will be significantly related to voting divergence (H4). 
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Table 1.1 presents the results of the first model examining the impacts of settlement 
attempts on overall voting patterns in the UNGA, with time dependency controls. Overall, the 
results of this first model supports my theoretical claims. In terms of MIDs, it was positive and 
significant, indicating that the occurrence of militarized interactions over disputed territory in a 
dyad tends to lead to UNGA voting divergence, which supports my second hypothesis. In the 
settlement attempt dyads where MIDs have been attempted the difference between UNGA voting 
alignment increases from .62 to .70 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1. These 
results signify that when states engage in conflictual behavior over shared territorial disputes, 
their voting behavior in the UNGA is impacted such that more dissimilar votes occur. 
The results from the models for peaceful settlement attempts provide support for the first 
hypothesis, that when peaceful settlements occur, voting patterns will converge in the UNGA as 
well. Firstly, and again as theorized, the occurrence of negotiation attempts at settlement were 
significant and in the direction of UNGA voting convergence. In settlement attempt dyads where 
negotiations have been attempted, the difference between UNGA voting alignment decreases 
from .67 to .55 when the combined negotiations attempt rises from 0 to 1. Overall, this indicates 
that when negotiations between two disputing states occur, there tends to be voting convergence 
in the UNGA. Unfortunately, of the three peaceful settlement attempts arbitration was found to 
lack in significance. Though not found significant, in settlement attempt dyads where arbitrations 
have been attempted, the difference between UNGA voting alignment increases from .64 to .68 
when the combined arbitration attempts rise from 0 to 1. This result would seem to indicate that 
arbitration is not factored in as much as the other attempt methods for settlement when it comes 
to voting convergence or divergence in the UNGA. Lastly, adjudication attempts at settlement 
were significant and in the direction of UNGA voting convergence for this first model. In 
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settlement attempt dyads where adjudication have been attempted, the difference between 
UNGA voting alignment decreases from .64 to .51 when the combined adjudication attempt rises 
from 0 to 1. Much like negotiation attempts at settlement, when adjudication occurs between 
disputants voting convergence follows in the UNGA. 
An important and interesting result in these analyses is that, as peaceful attempts go from 
non-binding to more legal and binding, voting convergence increases in strength. Though no 
hypothesis was made regarding this difference for all states in the UNGA, it should be noted that 
this would seem to indicate some support for the idea that more binding methods of peaceful 
settlement attempts have greater influence on subsequent voting patterns (H3c), which is to say 
that states that pursue more legal and binding methods end up seeing greater voting similarities 
in the UNGA with their fellow disputants as compared to those who pursue bilateral 
negotiations. In addition, it is also interesting that the strength of the impact of violent attempts is 
less than that of peaceful attempts. This might well indicate that disputing states in the UNGA 
take peaceful settlement attempts into account more than violent attempts when considering 
voting. When these findings are taken together, the null hypothesis is rejected, and support for 
the hypotheses on peaceful attempts leading to convergent voting in the UNGA (H1) and violent 
attempts leading to divergent voting in the UNGA (H2) indicate important backing for the first 
half of the theory, as well as some additional support for the second part of the theory (H3c). 
Among the control variables, a number of them have a significant relationship with 
voting patterns in the UNGA. First, the ratio of material capabilities of states, as represented by 
the CINC scores, are positively and significantly related to voting divergence in the UNGA. 
Accordingly, as the ratio between the states increases, power disparity goes up and the disputants 
will have less similar voting patterns than otherwise might have been the case. This result would 
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seem to indicate that power remains important for the determination of states preferences when it 
comes to voting in the UNGA. States that are strong will have different preferences and vote 
differently to some degree than those states still developing. Given the distribution of power in 
the international system, even though not tested explicitly, this would seem to indicate support 
for Western powers voting differently than states in Central and South America, Africa, the 
Middle East, and parts of Asia. Interestingly, rivalry, another factor often examined in regards to 
territorial disputes and state power, turns out to have different relationships to UNGA voting 
patterns depending on how the variable is conceptualized. Strategic rivalry, as formulated by 
Colaresi, Rasler and Thompson (2007), has a positive and significant relationship to UNGA 
voting patterns, whereas rivalry as formulated by Klein, Goertz and Diehl (2006) has a negative 
and significant relationship. In terms of strategic rivalry, which is dependent on the perception of 
threat and competition, this result makes sense, but the second conception of rivalry, being based 
on the occurrence of at least three militarized interstate disputes, does not fully fit within what 
the theory grounding this project might expect. Perhaps the degree that states have interacted 
violently as rivals is an explanation. Even though states might see each other as rivals, if they 
don’t approach the level of strategic rivals it is possible that this relationship might be 
ameliorated to some degree in terms of its impact on UNGA voting. 
Trade was also found to be positive and significant, though given the amount of trade 
involved between states it would take a large increase in trade value to have a measurable impact 
on UNGA voting pattern divergence. Regardless of the scale of impact, it is still interesting that 
trade is related to voting divergence in the UNGA. In the long term, given enough products and 
goods flowing across borders, it is possible that preferences in the UNGA and the consequent 
voting might become more divergent and lead to greater tensions in the UNGA. In terms of 
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territorial valuations, resource salience, strategic location salience, and offshore salience 
variables bear mentioning. According to the results of the analysis, an attempt at settlement on a 
territory that has resource value has no significance in the model. This result might indicate that 
the resource value of a territory might not matter so much its status as an offshore claim, or its 
strategic value. When offshore status of a dispute was examined it was found to be associated 
with UNGA voting convergence. This is interesting as it appears to indicate that states might 
care more about offshore disputes, with the results that attempts to settle them are received more 
favorable by the disputing dyad, which is reflected in voting within the UNGA. Conversely, 
however, for dispute settlement attempts over territory that has strategic value, voting patterns in 
the UNGA will see divergence. This makes sense to a certain degree, as states that are concerned 
about their physical security and their continued existence will see disputed territories that 
contain strategic worth as extremely value for these ends. Perhaps attempts to settle these kinds 
of disputes will lead to divergence in UNGA voting as peaceful attempts will see some degree of 
compromise in the disbursement of the territory, and violent attempts seek to circumvent the law 
to attain the territory for one state. In both situations, the optimal outcome of attaining the 
strategically valued territory does not occur for both states in the disputing dyad, likely leading to 
hard feelings and divergent voting as a result. 
The democracy indices examined here were interesting much the same that the rivalry 
variables were. While polyarchy democracy and deliberative democracy were found to be 
positive and significant, liberal democracy and participatory democracy was found to be negative 
and significant. This is interesting as it indicates that shared democratic or authoritarian status of 
the disputants itself might not have a fixed impact on voting patterns in the UNGA, but may in 
fact vary based on nuanced attributes of democracy or the lack thereof. The way in which a 
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democracy or authoritarian regime operates might well influence positive or negative 
perspectives of other states based on the degree they share similar ways of operating. 
Lastly is time since the occurrence of the latest MID in the dispute. The model finds that 
time since last MID lacked significance, indicating that the passage of time does not have a 
measurable influence on voting patterns between a dispute in a positive or a negative direction 
between the disputants. This brings me to the second set of analyses examining the impacts of 
settlement attempts on voting similarity in the UNGA to the United States that are used to assess 
support for the second part of my theory (H3a; H3b; H3c; H4). 
Table 1.2 presents the results of the second two models examining the impacts of 
settlement attempts beyond the dyad in terms of percent agreement in voting patterns of the 
UNGA with the US and then with China. Though not explicitly mentioned in the second set of 
hypotheses, the inclusion of the relationship of settlement attempts voting similarity with China 
serves an important purpose for the assessment of my theory. As these latter hypotheses are 
aimed at assessing contentedness with the international law based, US-led international system, it 
is expected that support will be found indicating that peaceful attempts will be related to UNGA 
voting convergence with the US (H3a), that the degree of voting convergence increases as 
peaceful settlement attempts move from nonbinding to binding and legal (H3b and H3c), and 
that violent attempts at settlement will see UNGA voting similarity to the US diverge. As China 
is the main challenger of the US for the role of most powerful state in the international system, 
should different relationships between the settlement variables and UNGA voting be found to 
differ in the case of similarity to China’s voting, this would indicate that China’s perspective on 
territorial dispute settlement, including the value it places of the different types of settlement and 
the importance of international law, would be different from the US. If this is the case this is one 
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more piece of support for the theory that China might well be discontented with its’ current role 
and the use of international law, especially in terms of territorial dispute settlement, and the place 
of international law in the international system. 
The results of these models also are largely in line with the second set of hypotheses, and 
moreover, are interesting for a number of reasons on which I will elaborate. Firstly, in terms of 
using percentage vote similarity with the US, the findings are in line with what could be 
expected in terms of the theory presented previously. MIDs were found to be positive and 
significant leading to divergence from voting agreement with the US. In the model controlling 
for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where 
MIDs have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with the US 
increases from .10 to .11 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1. Essentially this 
means that in dyads wherein militarized attempts are made in managing disputant’s territorial 
disputes, voting alignment with the US in the UNGA will decrease slightly. 
In addition to MIDs, both negotiations and adjudication were found to be negative and 
significant. In the model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in 
settlement attempt dyads where negotiations have been attempted, the difference between 
percent voting agreement with the US decreases from .11 to .09 when the combined negotiations 
attempt rises from 0 to 1. Thus, when disputants engage in peaceful settlement attempts of 
negotiation regarding their shared disputes, they are operating in line with what international law 
calls for regarding territorial management, and a convergence in voting with the US in the 
UNGA occurs. Adjudication has an even stronger impact, and in the model controlling for CINC 
scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where adjudication 
have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with the US decreases 
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from .10 to .07 when the combined adjudication attempt rises from 0 to 1. These findings are 
important as they indicate that the US is largely voting in line with the rules that it help construct 
for interactions in the international system over territory, specifically the push against violent 
actions and encouragement of peaceful settlement attempts. Though not found significant, in the 
model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt 
dyads where arbitrations have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement 
with the US decreases from .10 to .098 when the combined arbitration attempt rises from 0 to 1. 
When these findings are taken together, the hypotheses underlying the second part of the theory 
are modestly supported. Support is found for the hypotheses on peaceful attempts leading to 
convergent voting in the UNGA with the US (H3a). Further, while non-binding peaceful 
attempts are significant and related to convergent voting with the US (H3b), binding attempts at 
settlement are found to lead to an even greater convergence (H3c). Lastly, violent attempts are 
found to be significant and related to divergence in voting alignment with the US in the UNGA 
(H4). 
Control variable results for the US UNGA voting similarity model are similar to those 
presented previously. CINC scores are positive and significant, indicating that as the power 
disparity of the dyad increases, voting patterns will diverge. This would appear to indicate that, 
in the case of the US, the level of power a state has is related to the degree they will have similar 
votes in the UNGA. As mentioned previously in the general sense, this finding would seem to 
indicate that in the case of the US the level of power a state has will see more similar voting in 
the UNGA, presumably bringing it into greater alignment with western powers compared to 
others. Strategic rivalry (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007) is again found to be positive and 
significant, whereas rivalry (Klein, Goertz, and Diehl 2006) is again found to be negative and 
 66 
significant, though enduring rivalry is found to have a similar positive and significant 
relationship to spatial rivalry. This would seem to indicate that, in the case of the US, the 
presence of a rivalry matters in some situations, such as it being of a strategic nature or enduring 
over a longer period of time, but not in others. Given the global reach of the US and its concern 
with the stability of the international system that it stands atop, it stands to reason that actions 
between states that might upset the status quo would lead to divergent voting in the UNGA. 
Trade is also found to positive and significant at a similar level previously found. Again, 
this indicates that the financial ties that a state has with the US would bring into greater voting 
alignment in the UNGA by a small amount. In terms of salience, if the territory in dispute is 
considered homeland of the target state, the identity of the target state, or an offshore territory it 
had a significant and convergent relationship to voting alignment with the US in the UNGA. For 
the first two, these results seem to indicate that putting cultural disputes to rest is seen by the US 
as bringing stability between disputants, thus aligning with their desires for peaceful interactions 
in the international system. The findings regarding offshore territories is particularly interesting, 
as this seems to indicate the US places additional value on these disputes being put to rest, 
perhaps indicating an awareness of how much these disputes have a possibility of spiraling out of 
control, such as those that exist in the South and East China Seas. In the other direction, if a 
territory possessed resource salience, strategic salience, or was subject to either an identity or 
historical claim by the challenging state in a settlement attempt, there is a significant and 
divergent relationship to voting alignment with the US in the UNGA. It is possible that these 
values indicate to the US a greater likelihood of a settlement attempt upsetting the status quo, 
leading to divergent voting behavior as a result. Lastly, while polyarchy democracy was found to 
have a significant divergent relationship to US voting in the UNGA, participatory democracy 
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was found to have a significant convergent relationship. This again indicates that nuances of 
democracy matter for voting alignment with the US in the UNGA rather than a simple yes or no 
status. 
 The second model analyzed here covers percentage vote similarity of disputing dyads to 
China in the UNGA. Though not explicitly theorized about in the hypotheses, this model is 
important to the perspectives and values of the main challenger to the US in the international 
system, both to determine if China sees settlement attempts the same way and to set up the next 
chapter that more explicitly examines case studies involving China and its’ disputes. While MID 
onset is ultimately just non-significant, the direction of the relationship is still in the same 
direction as was found in the other models. Though not found significant, in the model 
controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads 
where MIDs have been attempted, the difference between percent voting agreement with China 
increases from .096 to .11 when the combined MID attempt rises from 0 to 1. 
Further, though negotiations and adjudication were found to be non-significant, 
arbitration was found to be significant and in the direction of the relationship to UNGA voting 
similarity to China was positive. In the model controlling for CINC scores, rivalry, trade, 
salience, and democracy, in settlement attempt dyads where arbitrations have been attempted, the 
difference between percent voting agreement with China increases from .10 to .19 when the 
combined arbitration attempt rises from 0 to 1.While it would have been preferable for all three 
other explanatory variables to possess significance, the fact that arbitration was found to have the 
significant and divergent relationship with voting by China in the UNGA  is indicative of support 
of the theory that China reacts to settlement attempts differently than the guiding norms and rules 
of territorial disputes in the US-led international system. As a result, this relationship carries 
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important connotations for the theory, which will be elaborated upon in the next chapter’s case 
studies. 
The control variables for this second of these latter grouping of models is mostly the 
same in terms of significance and direction of relationship to percentage Chinese voting 
similarity in the UNGA. In terms of rivalry, strategic rivalry is found positive and significant 
whereas rivalry is found, again, to be negative and significant. When it comes these different 
kinds of rivalry, China seems to be more concerned with those that are strategic in nature, 
perhaps in concern that they might be more likely to spiral into conflict. Resource salience and 
offshore claim also are again found to be negative and significant, while strategic location 
salience remains positive and significant. This would appear to indicate that China is more 
concerned with how disputants interact over strategic territory than territory that possesses 
resource salience or is categorized as being offshore. The democracy variables have similar 
results, with polyarchy democracy and deliberative democracy being positive and significant, 
whereas liberal democracy and participatory democracy remain negative and significant. Again, 
this would seem to indicate the grouping of states as simply being a democracy or not does not 
quite cover the whole relationship that modes of governance have with voting alignment in the 
UNGA. Peace years and peace years squared have opposed relationships to the percentage 
Chinese voting similarity in the UNGA. This is interesting in the sense that time since settlement 
attempts occurred has no strong interaction on China’s voting in the UNGA. Lastly, one variable 
stands out as being especially interesting: trade. Though trade has the same divergent and 
significant relationship, its impact on UNGA voting divergence is a whole power lower 
compared to that found in the other models. This means that the impact trade has on increasing 
divergent voting in the UNGA is, in the case of China, a tenth of what it would be for the United 
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States. For China then, while trade still carries weight it perhaps other characteristics of disputant 
situation carry more importance, such as the greater emphasis put on a dispute being part of a 
strategic rivalry as compared to the US. 
 
Conclusion 
My theory emphasizes the relationship between territorial settlement attempts, whether 
violent or peaceful, and voting alignments in the UNGA, as well as a state’s opinion of the 
structure of the international system as manifested in voting patterns of the UNGA in terms of 
similarity to the US and to China. In order to test this theory, in this chapter I conducted two sets 
of quantitative analyses of all territorial dispute settlement attempts (both violent and peaceful) 
from the founding of the United Nations in 1946 up until 2015. The first set focused on within 
dyad voting alignment following territorial dispute settlement attempts. I found support for 
peaceful attempts leading to convergent voting in the UNGA (H1) and violent attempts leading 
to divergent voting in the UNGA (H2). In the second set of analyses additional support was 
found for the second set of hypotheses. Peaceful attempts were found to lead to convergent 
voting in the UNGA with the US (H3a). While non-binding peaceful attempts were significant 
and related to convergent voting with the US (H3b), binding attempts at settlement were found to 
lead to an even greater convergence (H3c). Lastly, violent attempts were found to be significant 
and related to divergence in voting alignment with the US in the UNGA (H4). In the last model, 
though not tied directly to the hypotheses that were tested, the examination of voting alignment 
with China was included as a means to see if the main challenger to the US in the international 
system had different perspectives and reactions to settlement attempts, which would signify that 
discontent with the international law-based US-led international system as applied to the 
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management of territorial disputes. While it would have been preferable to find significance for 
all the explanatory variables of interest, the fact that arbitration was found to have the significant 
and divergent relationship with voting by China in the UNGA, the opposite of the US, is 
indicative of support of the theory that China reacts to settlement attempts differently in the US-
led international system than the guiding norms and rules for the handling of territorial disputes. 
In the literature, significant research has been conducted demonstrating the robust 
relationship of territorial disputes to conflictual behavior between states in the international 
system. It is clear from these analyses that this relationship might be expanded upon to say that 
interactions over territorial disputes can impact peaceful interactions such as in the UNGA. 
Moreover, even interactions beyond the dyad disputing itself can be affected, as demonstrated by 
the significant effects on voting agreement with the US and China in the UNGA. Control 
variables largely behaved as expected, though there were a few surprises discussed above which 
will be further elaborated on in the concluding chapter. Generally speaking, given these results, 
states should be more aware that their actions within their territorial disputes will be reflected in 
other aspects of their relationship with their fellow disputant, in this case specifically the UNGA, 
but also could well affect their relationships with states not involved in the dispute itself. In 
terms of takeaways for policymakers and scholars of both territorial conflict and interactions 
within international organizations, specifically the UNGA, my results are a new, small step in 
demonstrating greater importance of interactions between states beyond the phenomena under 
examination. In the case of this project, the decision to vote certain ways on issues presented to 
the UNGA are influenced by events beyond the Assembly Hall. Understanding that actions have 
consequences for interactions in international organizations, whether favorable or unfavorable to 
a state, is important towards gaining a greater understanding of the ebb and flow of the 
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international system itself. Hopefully gaining this understanding will contribute to more peaceful 
and cooperative activities. In the next chapter, I set out a number of case studies to present a 







































Chapter 4: Case Study Analysis of Five Territorial and Maritime Disputes Involving China 
Introduction  
In search of finding more support for the relationship between settlement attempt types 
and the resultant UNGA actions of the disputants, multiple cases studies following a most similar 
cases design (several disputes that China has with different disputants) is pursued, with 
differences in the government types and relative power of the second disputant. To best control 
for the potential range of responses by the UNGA to settlement attempts, five dyadic pairs are 
examined including: the Chinese-Russian frontier disputes over such areas as Yinlong/Tarabarov 
Island, Heixiaz/Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island and China’s eastern and western border; the Chinese-
Indian Frontier disputes over such areas as the Shaksgam Valley, Demchick, Chumar, Kaurik, 
Shipki Pass, Jadh, Lapthal, and Arunachal Pradesh; the Chinese-Vietnamese disputes over 
Tonkin Gulf, the Paracel Islands, and Spratly Islands; the Chinese-Japanese dispute over the 
Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; and lastly, the Chinese-Filipino disputes over the Spratly islands and 
the Scarborough Shoal. To further illustrate the reactions the UN has to the activities of the 
disputants, tables showing the general voting alignment in the UNGA with China over each of 
the disputes time period is also included, utilizing voting agreement data for the relevant 
timeframes from the work of Bailey, Strezhnev, and Voeten (2017). 
An important caveat to this outlined approach to these case studies is that the data utilized 
to illustrate and examine the individual case studies will not be the full range (1945-2015) but 
instead a truncated one from 1971-2015. This abbreviated data is due to the representation of 
China in the United Nations was held by the Republic of China (i.e. Chinese Taipei or Taiwan) 
from the founding of the international organization in 1945 until the vote on General Assembly 
Resolution 2758 in 1971, which passed with over 2/3’s of the UNGA votes and switched the UN 
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representative seat from the Republic of China to the People’s Republic of China, which held 
majority control over the mainland Chinese territories. This being the case, the discussions of the 
case studies below will provide historical background as relevant, though the context of the 
period of 1971 to 2015 will be of particular importance to understanding Chinese territorial 
dispute settlement attempts and resulting interactions in the UNGA in terms of voting in the 
same dyad year. In illustrating these attempts, academic search engines like Nexis Uni were 
utilized in the search for relevant news sources for each dyad to confirm if a peaceful/conflict 
settlement attempt occurred in a given year. Though there is a dearth of government documents 
directly linking dispute settlement activities to voting responses in UNGA, there were resources 
that demonstrate China’s thinking about the role of international law and the UN generally, from 
which we can infer how China will react to settlement attempts in terms of voting in the UNGA, 
which are reflected in the tables at the end of each section where I examine them alongside 
voting ideal points in the UNGA. 
General agreement on UNGA resolution voting is based on publicly available data of the 
voting record for each of the states in the selected dyads. Given that all we care about is the 
voting positions themselves, no additional qualifiers (outside the bounded timeframe of 1971 to 
2015) are used. I follow the lead of Voeten in how to calculate agreement between the disputing 
dyads on UNGA voting (which was already done for the US, Russia, and India) for Japan, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines. For the given resolutions in each dyad, each is coded as a 1 if they 
both vote the same, a .5 if either one of them abstains, and as a 0 if the votes are different. If one 
or both states is listed as non-voting, in other words not participating, I treat that data point as 
missing for the purposes of my analyses. Further, for the purposes of my analyses, I code and 
examine the voting data based on the year the vote occurs, not in terms of the UN session 
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number as this sometimes overlaps with a two-year timeframe. Lastly, each dyad is presented in 
terms of the historical interactions of the selected dyads over the disputes. 
In the pages to follow I begin by presenting a general overview of why China was 
selected as the state in common for the individual case studies mentioned above. From there I 
present information on China’s perspectives of international law and the UN, and why we might 
expect China to have a similar reaction to certain settlement attempts (i.e., negotiations) and not 
others (i.e. adjudication) in terms of voting alignment with their fellow disputants in the UNGA. 
I then proceed to outline the backgrounds of the specific case studies and interactions over the 
disputes themselves. After examining each case study, I discuss some of the relevant UNGA 
resolutions for their voting similarities between the disputing dyads and then I present some 
general conclusions. 
 
Why China’s Disputes? 
 China was selected as the country in common for these disputes for several reasons. 
Compared to many countries, China has had a greater number of disputes in which there has 
been different types of territory involved and different actions seen, rather than a one-size-fits-all 
approach to the disputes. These different types of territory include some that could be classified 
as homeland, frontiers, and offshore islands. Interactions over these disputes have included high 
level conflicts, low level conflicts, a mix of conflict levels, and peaceful resolutions. In addition, 
many of the disputes that China has been involved in are rooted in the 19th century or earlier. 
Since a number of these disputes are still ongoing, it would stand to reason that they would loom 
higher in the priorities of the disputing states, and thus be more likely to influence their direct, 
and indirect, relations. Lastly, recent research has found that China’s increasing power has 
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coincided with efforts to erode international norms like those regarding democracy, sovereignty, 
human rights, international order, and non-interference, especially between the period of 1999 to 
2009 (Brazys and Dukalskis 2017). As a result, if this project’s theory is supported UNGA 
voting will generally shift between China and its fellow disputants in line with the interactions 
over the territorial disputes, and specifically over UNGA resolutions on topics related to 
democracy, sovereignty, human rights, international order, and non-interference. For these 
reasons, China offers an excellent source of disputes to examine in a case study format relevant 
to the overriding theory of this dissertation. 
 An additional point of importance for selecting China lies in how, by understanding how 
interactions in these disputes ties to interactions in the UNGA, we will gain insight into an 
expanded impact on the international community beyond the dyadic interactions. In the time 
period selected to examine China’s dispute interactions, the country went through significant 
political and economic changes, the reverberations of which continue to this day. When the 
examination of this is combined with the generally western imposed system of international law 
and acceptable international behavior, it is hoped that these interactions give increased insight 
into how China has reacted to its place in the US-led international system. Further, to ensure the 
rigor of the examination of these disputes, the case studies will be examined over the period of 
time from China’s ascension to its current seat in the UN during 1971 until 2015. Again, the 
hope is that this will make it easier to trace how the interactions over these disputes between 
China and its fellow disputants have impacted their actions in the UNGA over time. 
 Finally, the selection of China as the country in common for all the cases examined is an 
attempt to provide a further examination and insight into the “China question” in international 
relations research. This question is essentially summed up as whether or not China’s rise will be 
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characterized by peaceful or violent actions (Fravel 2008), given how fast it has accrued power, 
wealth, and prestige over the past fifty odd years. The former scenario would see China take its 
place in a new multi-polar international system, while the latter would see it destabilize the 
international system. Though a simplification of the options and how they might occur, this 
question does compliment this dissertation’s examination of the impacts of territorial dispute 
interactions on UNGA voting. In addition, this may well be a timely examination given 
continued tensions in interactions between China and its fellow disputants over the South China 
Sea and the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. It is expected regarding these disputes that, given the value 
of territory to states that was presented in the first chapter, it would stand to reason that these 
interactions over disputed territories will affect interactions in the UNGA. 
 
China, International Law, and the UNGA 
 For a long period of time China had significant issues with the application of 
international law to govern the interactions between states. To China, it was the Western powers 
who had created, interpreted, and propagated international law and expected all others in the 
international system to follow it (Chan 2014). In Qing China, the monarchy resisted all intrusions 
and efforts to apply the foreign international law to their territory, although it did sporadically 
use international law itself to defend its sovereignty and attempt to renegotiate the grating 
concessions it had been expected to make to the European powers (Chan 2014). In fact, China’s 
use of international law and the League of Nations in an effort to defend its’ sovereignty and 
territorial integrity from the Japan-backed Manchuria helped contribute to the rise of customary 
international law and that it is unlawful to recognize a state or territory that comes into existence 
through the threat or use of force (Chan 2014). Communist China would also initially object to 
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the role of international law in interactions between states, again holding it to be merely an 
imperialist tool to oppress weak states, and in that period to also prevent worldwide communist 
revolution. This would change gradually after 1971, however, when China realized through its 
interactions with international organizations that recognizing it and working within international 
law would allow China additional influence in how international law and international relations 
were conducted in the world system (Chan 2014). Over time this would see China engage more 
in the international legal regimes as well (Potter 2007). Despite this, the question still remains to 
what extent China’s increased participation in the international legal regimes has resulted in an 
internalization of the normative underpinnings of international law (Potter 2007). 
  In its early years in the UN, China’s activities made it clear that it had no perennial 
friends or foes, only consistent interests it was pursuing (Kim 1974). China would often take a 
twofold approach to diplomacy, wherein it would release militant revolutionary announcements 
on one hand and on the other pursue cautious, even pragmatic behavior on the other (Kim 1974). 
Over time it became clear to the other member states of the UN that China was neither a state 
seeking to break the international organization nor fully committed to widespread structural 
reform, deciding instead to largely follow the established rules regarding the protection of world 
peace (Kim 1974). Working within the UN allowed China to participate as an influential actor in 
shaping the international system, though it also had a stance against unbridled expansion of the 
UN’s role or its functions. For this first decade, the conclusion would be that China had minimal 
impacts on the governance of legal issues, and tended to at once present qualified acceptance of 
the traditional international law yet also worked towards the establishment of a new legal order, 
as their interests and situation required (Kim 1978). Interestingly, Kim (1978) attributes these 
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actions in part to historical memory of the unfair international treaties imposed on them prior to 
the first World War. 
 That being said, China’s relationship with international law again shifted in the years 
after Mao’s death. In the period of 1979 to 1986, China would take greater strides to embrace 
international law, seeing it as part of an effort to catch up with the rest of the world (Kim 1987). 
Even in doing so, however, China still remained concerned with protecting its status, its security, 
and most of all its sovereignty (Kim 1987). For this reason, international law became to be seen 
as a tool to use to attain foreign policy goals and objectives, thereby inextricably tying it to the 
domain of politics (Kim 1987). If used correctly, international law would allow China to more 
easily fulfill its quest for a stable and predictable international environment (Kim 1987). 
 In more recent years this has led to China being more active in international law, such as 
by supporting the creation of an international criminal court. Such a court would grow into an 
expectation that states could more easily pursue peaceful settlement of their disputes, and help 
inhibit military and other leaders from conducting illegal activities (Zhu 2015). Unfortunately, 
though the court came into existence China opted to remove itself as party to its jurisdiction, 
cited that the way the court was constructed violated principles of state sovereignty (Zhu 2015). 
Rather than sign on and signal to the rest of the international system that China would abide by 
decisions in the court, China instead decided to follow the lead of past decades of policy to 
protect its sovereignty to the utmost. 
 Overall China has a bit of a mixed record regarding the application and adherence to 
international law. On the one hand, in the UNSC, China’s voting behavior and stated arguments 
in front of the Security Council has demonstrated the importance it places in the role of 
international law in the international system (Chan 2013). According to Chan (2013) this is no 
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clearer than the repeated reference to international norms and principles in the drafts of Security 
Council resolutions, though it consistently defends non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states. On the other hand, to some extent China’s participation in the international legal arena 
seems to reflect its power aspirations and that, should international law fall against it, 
participation would be withdrawn until its state interests might be restored (Potter 2007). Across 
some issues this has meant that China attempts to accommodate the international community, 
while in others complete disregard is shown (Feinerman 1995). Justifications for this are 
nowhere clearer than how it presents international laws relationship with domestic law. 
 To the Chinese, international law should be treated as a legal system separate from 
domestic law, though in a supplementary fashion, and thus is not a replacement to it (Pan 2011; 
Vanhullebusch 2015). Further, for the Chinese, international law comes about due to the efforts 
and wills of states in the international community, and as such should be subject to the wills of 
the states themselves (Pan 2011). China has carried over theses perspectives in their interactions 
in the UNGA, where they consistently demonstrate a sense of strategic purpose in regards to 
when, where, and how to pull their weight in the organization as it applies to their foreign policy 
goals (Cooper and Fues 2008). For this reason, China for a long time acted as a bit of a system 
stabilizer in the UNGA, as it enjoyed the structure of the status quo in the international system, 
though as it has increased in power and rank, a new mixture of pressures have emerged on it, 
namely one to assist in reforming the organization to be more in touch with the current state of 
world politics (Cooper and Fues 2008). In the worst-case scenario, the argument has been made 
that should China continue to see the UN as being dominated by the interests and values of 
Western states, China might turn to regionalism and Southern alliances as alternatives to 
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engagement in this organization, instead reducing their activities or even outright withdrawing 
(Cooper and Fues 2008). 
With the inherently close ties between international law and the operation of the UN, 
China endeavored to make clear where they stand on how the latter is applied in the 66th Session 
of the UNGA (China State News Service 2011). In the document, China affirms its support for 
the UN’s central role in international affairs, as well as its commitment to uphold the purposes 
and principles of the organization, as elaborated upon in the Charter of the United Nations, that 
world peace, common development, and international cooperation all might be realized. That 
being said, China also reaffirms and reiterates a number of caveats to these functions in the 
following pages. When it comes to interactions and interventions, China upholds that consent of 
the parties is required, impartiality must be applied, and that non-use of force is required except 
in scenarios of self-defense (China State News Service 2011). Moreover, the core of this stance 
is that sovereignty and territorial integrity must be fully respected, and other states must refrain 
from interfering in local political disputes or impeding a peace process (China State News 
Service 2011).  
With putting so much emphasis on these qualifications to the role of the UN and 
international law, it is clear that China is stating its preference for negotiations as the primary 
peaceful means with which to settle their disputes with other states, particularly those involving 
territory. If this holds true, negotiations as a peaceful method should predominate in the case 
studies below, and arbitration or adjudication efforts in settlement would likely be introduced by 
China’s fellow disputants rather than China. Given this history, China’s stance on international 
law and the role of the UNGA, we might expect a number of observations in the five case studies 
examined below. First, peaceful interactions, predominantly negotiations, over the territorial 
 81 
disputes should lead to convergence in UNGA voting due to China’s preferences (H1). Violent 
interactions should similarly lead to more divergence in UNGA voting (H2). In terms of voting 
alignment with the US, we also might expect that China’s engagement in peaceful interactions 
will contribute to UNGA voting convergence (H3a), which will be higher in the event that 
arbitration and adjudication are used (H3b; H3c). Violent interactions will remain related to 
UNGA voting divergence as well (H4). Having given background on China’s perspective on 
international law and the UNGA, as well as how this might apply to settlement interactions over 
their territorial disputes, this next section provides a brief introduction to the types of territorial 
disputes China is engaged in before presenting the first of the five dispute dyads involving 
Russia. 
 
China’s Frontier and Offshore Island Disputes 
 Regarding the territorial disputes themselves, the Chinese disputes come in two main 
types: frontier disputes and offshore island disputes. China shares land borders with fourteen 
countries, and the border disputes that went with them were inherited by the Chinese Communist 
Party once they rose to power in 1949. For the purposes of this dissertation, the China-Russia 
and China-India disputes are particularly worthy of attention. These two disputes are useful for 
several reasons. First, both exhibit within-case variation in terms of policy decisions, which 
further vary over time regarding the specific territorial disputes. Secondly, there is cross-case 
variation in terms of the ultimate resolution, or lack thereof, in these border disputes, with the 
Chinese-Russian disputes being resolved, while the Chinese-Indian disputes continue to plague 
relations between the two Asian powers. Both of these disputes have further utility for case 
studies due to their longevity. With each lasting at a minimum of several decades, it allows for 
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an examination of the development of settlement attempts over time. Lastly, the border disputes 
themselves are larger and possess greater strategic importance compared to some of the other 
Chinese border disputes, with the result that the salience of them in their interstate interactions 
should be higher. 
 In addition to its border disputes, China also shares several water boundaries with 
neighboring states. China shares the Yellow Sea with North Korea and South Korean, the East 
China Sea with Japan and South Korea, and the South China Sea with Brunei, Malaysia, 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Much like the border disputes with Russia and India, 
China inherited these maritime boundaries with its neighbors in 1949, but unlike the border 
disputes these areas were not demarcated. As such, China has disputed its neighbors over four 
distinct island groups; the White Dragon Tail (Bailongwie) Island in the Gulf of Tonkin, the 
Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands in the East China Sea, and the Paracel (Xisha) and Spratly (Nansha) 
Island groups in the South China Sea. Tied up in all these claims are sovereignty of islands and 
rights to maritime features including rocks, reefs, shoals, territorial seas, contiguous seas, 
massive Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and continental shelves, as well as the resultant 
ownership of resources. Unlike the more flexible policies China has pursued in its territorial 
border disputes, the policies that China has utilized toward its offshore island and maritime 
feature disputes have been more stringent. In point of fact, as of 2015 China has only 
compromised on the White Dragon Tail Island dispute with Vietnam. For the other offshore 
island and maritime feature disputes, China has generally pursued delaying tactics or aggressive 
actions since 1949. Since 2009 the disputes in the East and South China Seas have been 
increasingly intense, such that a failure to include these dyadic disputes as case studies in this 
dissertation would overlook important data for the illustration of this project’s theory. Thus, for 
 83 
the purposes of this dissertation, in addition to the two previous cases mentioned, the China-
Vietnam, China-Japan, and the China-Philippines island disputes are also included. 
 To briefly reiterate, my theory seeks to explain interactions in the international system at 
the level of voting in the UNGA by examining the interactions over territorial disputes by 
disputing states. Based on how these interactions are in line with or against the founding 
principles of the UN and prevailing international norms regarding the use of force, violent 
interactions between China and its fellow disputants will lead to a voting divergence in the 
UNGA, whereas peaceful interactions will lead to a voting convergence in the UNGA. This 
being projected, and having already tested this theory in a large N quantitative analysis, I now 
seek further support by examining specific case studies that include China. The examination of 
each of the cases concludes with a regression analysis mirroring the previous chapter in format, 
but limited only to the universe of dispute cases involving China and these five disputants. 
Overall, and apart from the consistent case variation, this set of five Chinese dispute cases are 
important for understanding the stability of the international system as a whole, given China’s 
status as a great power and, increasingly, one of the main challengers to the US led international 
system. Understanding how Chinese territorial dispute activities relate to their approach to the 
UNGA can provide insight into how China approaches its place in the international system, as 
well as potentially serve as a means to predict when future convergence with or divergence from 








 Beginning in the middle of the 16th century, Russia directed its eastward expansion in 
Siberia with simultaneous expansions south to the Pacific seaboard (Maxwell 2007). Gradually 
this expansion brought Russian territories into contact with Chinese claims where previously 
there had been no contact between their frontiers prior to the 17th century. In particular, 
contention began to increase between the states following Russia’s expansion into the Amur 
basin and the river that lead into the estuary (Maxwell 2007). 
 By the mid-17th century, the rulers of China saw the threat of unchecked incursions by 
the Russians in the north and began to make forceful overtures to remove the invaders. What 
followed was a series of small conflicts between the two sides in the areas around the Amur 
River beginning in 1652 and lasting more than thirty years. The two sides would meet in 
Nerchinsk in August of 1689 to create the first boundary agreement between Russia and China, 
to be called the Treaty of Nerchinsk. This treaty would result in the delimitation of a frontier 
between Russia and China rather than a specific boundary, as the language was based on major 
geographical features rather than specific lines on a map to precisely separate each party’s area 
of control (Maxwell 2007). 
 The Treaty of Nerchinsk was a success and initially satisfied both sides of the dispute. 
The Manchu rulers of China at the time saw the treaty as an effective means to prevent the 
further eastward expansion by Russia, as well as a means to remove their outposts in the Amur 
basin, thereby ensuring the stability of China’s eastern frontier which would allow them to direct 
more attention inwards to deal with domestic upheaval and consolidate greater political control 
(Changbin Jiang, Guojie Dongduan de Yanbian 2007, pg. 68-71). Similarly, the Russian 
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Emperor was content with the treaty as it provided legitimization of his control of territory in the 
Far East, and a much larger territory than he originally thought he would be able to get at that, 
which constituted some 90,000 square miles (Changbin Jiang, Guojie Dongduan de Yanbian 
2007, pg. 63). 
 The status quo resulting from this treaty would last for over one hundred and fifty years 
until the mid-19th century (Sidorov 2014). Seeing how the British Empire and France were 
successfully exhorting a weakened China, Russia coerced Chinese leaders into a new series of 
territorial treaties, part of which was to eventually create a Manchurian shortcut between 
territories controlled in the form of a new railway (Carlson 1986). The resulting Treaty of Aigun 
(1858) and Treaty of Beijing (1860) would establish much of the modern border between Russia 
and China (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1981; Maxwell 2007). The new Treaty of Aigun 
would reverse the Treaty of Nerchinsk by forcing China to concede the equivalent of the land 
area of France on the northern bank of the Amur River directly to Russian control. 
 The Treaty of Beijing that was signed two years after the Treaty of Aigun would allow 
the Russians to further consolidate the territorial gains that had coerced out of China. According 
to this treaties terms, the eastern boundary between the two empires would be set along the 
Argun, Amur, and Ussuri Rivers, with the result that all the land along the Ussuri boundary 
would now be folded into Russian control and provided an opening for the creation of Russian 
consulates in Mongolia and Xinjiang (Maxwell 2007). 
 By the time the CCP rose to power in China in 1949, the Russians (now in the guise of 
the Soviet Union) had been able to secure full control over Manchuria, using the railway that 
crossed to Port Lushun (Arthur) to develop interests in Xinjiang and maintain control over the 
Mongolian People’s Republic, a Soviet puppet state that had previously been Outer Mongolia 
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(Maxwell 2007). Despite steps to counter Soviet influence in Manchuria and Xinjiang in the 
early 1950s, the Soviet presence in these areas would remain significant with them refusing 
immediate departure nor a return of Chinese control to the Trans-Manchuria Railway, the Port of 
Lushun, or the Port of Dalian (Daren). The boundary rivers of Argun, Amur, and Ussuri, core 
components of the previous territorial treaties, would largely remain under Soviet control as 
well. Things would spiral in open fighting in the late 1960s along the disputed border, and 
despite the deplorable Siberian conditions vicious fighting and deaths for both sides resulted 
(The Guardian 1984). 
 
Dispute Settlement Interactions 
 Before the settlement of the border issue between Russia and China, there were three 
Chinese-Soviet/Russian borderlines. The first of these was the Treaty Line, which had been 
defined by the series of treaties previously discussed that had been signed by previous Chinese 
governments and Russian Emperors. The Chinese government saw these treaties as being 
unequal and the source of some 930,000 square miles of territorial losses to Russia. That being 
said, while the Chinese government did not recognize the validity of these treaties that the Qing 
government had signed, thy were open to using them as the start of border negotiations with the 
Russians. The second of these borderlines was the Map Line, which referenced the small map 
that Russia had attached to the Treaty of Beijing, and was contrary to the wording of the treaty 
itself in that it appeared to give more territory to Russia than the wording of the treaty allowed 
for (Maxwell 2007). Last was the Line of Actual Control which, in a number of places, actually 
lay further to the south of the Map Line. As can be imagined, these three contradictory 
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borderlines complicated the settling of border issues between Russia and China for quite some 
time. 
 Partly as a result of this, the Chinese-Russian border since 1949 was broken into two 
sectors, an eastern and a western, that was separated by the buffer state of Outer Mongolia. On 
the map, the eastern sector shows Chinese Manchuria bordering the Russian Far East, and the 
western sector shows Xinjiang province bordering what would eventually become Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan (Maxwell 2007). Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, these borders 
would total almost 5000 miles between the states, though this would be reduced to just over 2600 
miles in 1991 as the western border with Russia would mostly disappear barring a small 36-mile 
section remaining. Given that the majority of the western border with Russia ceased to exist in 
1991, due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the eastern border area receives the majority of 
attention in this case study following this period in time. 
 The problem of the eastern border area between China and the Soviet Union/Russia 
largely stems from the Treaty of Beijing, which left a great deal unspecified and inconsistent, 
especially considering the included map (Maxwell 2007). Regarding the Argun, Amur, and 
Ussuri rivers, the text of the treaty denotes each as boundary rivers without actually stating 
where the boundary line itself falls, thus meaning it was unclear who actually held sovereignty 
over the rivers themselves, nor the river islands that lay within them. The included map denoted 
all of the rivers up to the Chinese banks (which included some 700+ islands and islets) were 
exclusively under the control of the Russians. The Heixiazi/Tarabarov Island and the 
Abagaitu/Bolshoy Ostrov Islet are two major ones included in this demarcation. Covering almost 
750 square miles, this area was a significant water, fishing, and lumber resource for whomever 
controlled it which, according to the disputed Map Line, was the Russians. 
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While there is a lack of China’s participation in the United Nations until the vote to 
recognize it in 1971, this period is still worthy of particular focus to be brought to bear in terms 
of Chinese-Russian interactions, especially regarding the increase in tensions between the two 
during the period of the Soviet Union’s existence. These tensions increased in 1964 following 
the refusal by Khrushchev to negotiate a new treaty, with the Chinese reacting by framing the 
border contest not solely as a territorial dispute but also as a struggle against the Soviet’s social 
imperialism. This situation occurred despite China declaring that same year that they renounced 
any claim to the roughly 60,000 square miles that Tsarist Russia had annexed in previous 
centuries in the unequal treaties that China had be goaded into signing (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts 1981). Further, China presented a readiness to settle all border issues with the Soviet 
Union if they were will to proceed (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1981). 
In October of 1969 the Sino-Soviet border talks would go ahead, but in the process of 
negotiations the Soviets would change their minds, despite this change being contrary to the 
earlier understanding of what the starting point of the border talks would be (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 1981). Despite this and other, similar acts of bad faith on the Soviets part, 
China asserted that both states should continue to work towards the complete settlement of the 
disputed boundaries through peaceful negotiations, even if this meant that the unequal treaties 
that had been signed hundreds of years ago would serve as the starting point (BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 1981). 
Starting with clashes between the states in 1969, the tensions between China and the 
Soviet Union remained high throughout the 1970s, especially with each acting to secure the 
loyalty of the inhabitants in these areas, such as through economic investment (Maxwell 2007; 
Paine 1996). Military actions to attempt to assert control would also prove popular, with the 
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Soviets deploying additional forces in 1972, and the Chinese pursuing a nationwide program of 
war preparations for the possibility of war breaking out. Demonstrating how serious they took 
the threat of the Soviet Union, China re-designated them as their primary opponent, over and 
above the capitalist US, and as such the greatest potential source of war (Lieberthal 1978, 56). 
China was clearly apprehensive over its vulnerability to an attack from the Soviet Union, and 
knowing that it would be at threat of annihilation in such a war, made overtures to the US to try 
to bring the countries closer together, even though the Chinese were scornful of the US policy of 
détente (US News and World Report 1975b). There was even some speculation that China 
sought to be brought under the nuclear umbrella of the US (US News and World Report 1975b). 
As a result of these concerns, the disputed border areas took on greater importance to 
China, as they represented a primary avenue of attack by the Soviet Union into Chinese territory, 
as well as a potential source of security for China if they could be secured. Luckily for China, it 
would be around this time that Peking began to accrue greater influence in Asia, at the cost of the 
Soviet Union. With the situation on the ground changing, the Soviets could not afford for the 
possibility that a war involving both China and the US broke out, and began to act in a manner to 
ensure that the two states were not pushed into colluding (US News and World Report 1975a; 
US News and World Report 1976b).  
Despite the awareness of what a potential war might look like, outside observers were 
still of the opinion that the border disputes would not be resolved anytime soon. There were just 
too many elements separating what each state wanted out of a settled dispute (US News and 
World Report 1976c). Even with China’s future being up in the air due to the aging Mao Tse-
tung and sickness of the Premier Chou En-lai, the possibility of the states remaining foes endured 
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(US News and World Report 1976a). Nonetheless, due to Soviet concerns and Chinese fears, the 
1970s would see consistent attempts at negotiation between the states over their shared disputes. 
Throughout the 1970s China would be more concerned with cultivating ties with the US 
as a counter to the Soviet threat that minimal efforts were exerted in the Far East for the 
communist cause (US News and World Report 1977). No meaningful progress would be made in 
negotiations during these years, and China would clash with the Soviets across the disputed 
4,500-mile borders multiple times. The most serious of these fights occurred in March 1969 
when more than 200 Soviet soldiers and more than four times that many Chinese troops were 
killed in skirmishes over the small island in the Ussuri River near Khabarovsk in the Far Eastern 
Siberia (Wallace 1979). Rather than accelerate into outright war, the border violations continued. 
In May of 1978, Soviet troops would again cross over into Chinese territory, though Moscow 
would attempt to frame this as a mistake (Wallace 1979). By this time there were more than 
800,000 Soviet troops, six heavy-tank divisions, and 2,000 aircraft and rockets placed along the 
border, as well as nuclear missiles targeted on Chinese targets (Wallace 1979). The Chinese 
themselves deployed between 70 and 80 Army divisions, amounting to a larger number of 
personnel along the border facing their Soviet rivals (Wallace 1979). The large scale of these 
forces contributed to additional border violations and sabre rattling between the disputes through 
the rest of the 1970s. 
However, the calculus changed again in the 1980s, with the distribution of the border 
areas becoming less crucial, as China expanded its military capacity and ability to deploy 
medium to long-range missiles. This technological advancement culminated in China’s 
successful deployment of intercontinental missiles and medium-range bombers. As a result, the 
ownership of the islands and disputed border areas in Manchuria suffered a reduction in 
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importance, as now China and Russia both could strike deep into the other’s territory if a war 
were to break out. Perhaps related to these developments was the thawing of the Soviet position 
regarding their relations with China, with China itself quickly following. The Soviets themselves 
still likely feared Chinese diplomacy leading to an alliance with the US and Japan (US News and 
World Report 1980). The resulting overtures for negotiations made to China resulted in a 
positive response, especially following the death of Mao (Zagoria 1983). 
 Though these greater agreements to pursue a phased settlement for the territorial disputes 
signaled efforts to avoid conflict, the fears of such a conflict still lingered. These fears were 
particularly high in Xinjiang, which shared a long border with the Soviet Union, contained 
restless religious and ethnic minorities, and Peking was overall doubtful about their committed 
loyalty (Wallace 1982). At least 250,000 Chinese troops were always stationed in the region in 
the hopes of warning off an incursion by the Soviets (Wallace 1982). For the Soviet’s part, they 
possessed several concerns relating to the disputes as well. Chief among them was the 
accusations they leveled against Chinese scholars as attempting to misrepresent history in the 
form of territorial claims, and keeping the border issue in reserve as a means to hamper relations 
between the states (The Xinhau General News Service 1983). In response, China reiterated 
multiple times that it had no territorial claims on the Soviet Union, nor did it demand the return 
of the territories ceded to Tsarist Russia (The Xinhua General News Service 1983). In fact, they 
took pains to convey that their primary hope was for the overall solution of the border issues to 
occur through peaceful negotiations and taking into consideration the actual conditions on the 
ground (The Xinhua General News Service 1983). The progress towards settlement began to 
make more sustained progress under Mikhail Gorbachev when he came to power (S. 1985). It 
was the Soviet’s leaders’ hope to realize China and the Soviet Union as two great neighboring 
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socialist states (S. 1985), a status that would be far easier to achieve if the territorial disputes 
could finally be settled. 
The Soviet position would gain greater flexibility starting in 1986, when Gorbachev gave 
his July speech in Vladivostok, in which he championed a cooperative strategy with China over 
their shared border disputes, as well as greater cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region. Soon after, 
formal proposals of normalization of relations began to occur (Macleod 1986). Progress was 
gradual, slowly moving from bilateral trade and investment to cultural and knowledge 
exchanges, until outright economic and technological cooperation culminated in the 
normalization of relations between the two states following the visit of Gorbachev to Beijing in 
1989. Part of the commitment to bringing this about, the Soviets promised to ease tensions along 
the 5,000-mile frontier by thinning out troops and accepting a Chinese position on the dispute 
over the Amur and Ussuri rivers that had been the site of so much violence in the 1960s 
(Macleod 1986). 
For the disputants, this commitment would bear fruit in renewed promises for both China 
and the Soviet Union to resolve their boundary disputes through equal consultation according to 
the principles of understanding and mutual accommodation (BBC Summary of World 
Broadcasts, 1987a). As a side effect, these actions would lead to greater economic activities, 
such as trade expansion and Soviet ships being repaired in Chinese shipyards, as well as shared 
investments between the powers were increased (Handelman 1988). This would prove to be 
particularly important to the Soviets, since in this period of time they had an urgent need to cut 
back military spending in order to inject new life into domestic industries (Ries 1989). 
Tensions decreased even further following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
and as a result cooperation continued, and even increased, between the two states following the 
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end of the Cold War. Even when the Soviet Union broke up, China maintained the course 
towards peaceful settlement, as it recognized the need to continue to maintain normal state 
relations with Russia, and to avoid returning to the level of animosity that governed their 
relationship prior to the 1990s (Agence France Presse 1991b). Also, occurring in this period was 
a rapid increase in Chinese nationalism which, when combined with the post-Tiananmen Square 
sanctions by the United States and other countries, resulted in China being angry, particularly 
with the United States. Progress towards settling these disputes was finally made in 1991 with a 
boundary agreement for the eastern sector signed in May of that year that stated that the 
boundary ran in the median line of the Argun, Amur and Ussuri rivers, and that the islands that 
straddled these lines would be allocated to either state based on recommendations given by a 
joint commission (Bakshi 2001). The rest of the outstanding territorial disputes were left to the 
future to be settled. This approach would again bear fruit with new agreements reached with 
Boris Yeltsin that further reduced armed forces along their shared borders and the ushering in of 
a new period of cooperation between the two states (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1992; 
Helmer 1994; Preston 1992). China and Russia even went so far as to reach an agreement on not 
aiming nuclear weapons at each other and to never use force against each other (Specter 1994). 
With the eastern sector agreement made, the demarcation work was conducted between 
1992 and 1997, resulting in fairly even divisions of the territory between the two sides (Fravel 
2008, 142). Part of this agreement was to recognize Zhenbao Island as being in China’s territory, 
while the Heixiaz/Bolshoi Ussuriysky island and Abugaitu/Bolshoy Ostrov shoal were firmly in 
Russia’s control (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1993). Building off this good will, the 
western boundary agreement was signed in 1994 (Bakshi 2001). They formally announced the 
settlement in December of 1999 and with that their thirty-year-old border dispute had been 
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successfully resolved. From the signing until the formal announcement China expanded its 
investment and trade with Russia, while Russia provided China with armaments and assistance 
with infrastructure development (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1995a; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts 1995b; IPS Correspondents 1995; The Globe and Mail 1994). 
 Despite progress, there were some on both sides who continued to distrust their previous 
foes, especially for some Russians who saw a drawback in military forces in the Far East as 
putting Russian territory at risk of being lost to China (Delyusin 1996). Private citizens and 
paramilitary forces even took it upon themselves to patrol the border areas in an effort to prevent 
border violations (York 1997). Nonetheless, diplomatic relations continued to flourish and 
cooperation continued to occur on outstanding issues (Magistad 1996), such as the remaining 
disputed borders, though this might well be in part due to the inability of Russia to effectively 
project military strength beyond its own borders into China by this point (Garnett 1996). This 
reduction of their military presence in the region likely contributed additional support to 
statements about managing their borders peaceably made in 1994 (Xinhau News Agency 1996). 
Likely the continued pace of expansion for NATO indirectly contributed to cooperation as well 
(Platt 1999). Nonetheless, the 1990s would conclude with recommitments to bilateral 
negotiations (ITAR-TASS 1998) and calls by both sides for international disputes to be settled 
peacefully through the UN, while still respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all 
countries (Saiget 1999). 
 In the early 2000s the extent of cooperation between Russia and China would again be 
expanded with an eye to the future (ITAR-TASS 2001). Instances of cooperation like this would 
pave the way to an eventual joint-summit in 2004 in which both countries announced a new 
supplementary agreement to the previous two made regarding the delimitation of the border 
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between the two states (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2004b). The remaining disputed 
islands along their shared border were distributed between the two parties in 2004, and the 
distribution agreement was in turn ratified by the respective legislative branches of each state in 
2005. Eventually this would culminate in finally putting the boundary disputes to rest with a joint 
announcement in 2008 (Russia & CIS Diplomatic Panorama 2008). These settlements would 
hold despite occasionally resurgent concerns that China has designs on reasserting control over 




In the thirty-eight years of the China-Russian disputes presented in Table 3, there were 
twenty-four years where only peaceful interactions occurred, two years where only violent 
interactions occurred, and six years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred. The 
convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions on voting in the UNGA is 
mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, for ten years there was divergence and for fourteen 
years there was convergence. For violent interactions, there was an even split of divergence and 
convergence. Lastly, in the years in which both peaceful and violent interactions occurred, there 
were four divergences and two convergences. That being said, when I calculated averages for 
each of the interaction types the pattern becomes clearer. Peaceful interactions saw years with 
closer convergence on UNGA voting on average (mean =1.4265) over purely violent interactions 
(mean = 1.6952). The higher average UNGA voting divergence (mean = 1.8977) might be 
explained by 1979 being really tense due to a large number of border violations and increased 
fortification and reinforcement of troops along the border by both sides, and 1993 to 1994, when 
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settlement efforts resulted in neither side completely getting the territory they claimed and fought 
over in the previous decades. 
 The relatively close spread of settlement attempts on UNGA voting convergences and 
divergences, as well as the similar voting alignment averages, might be due in part to the unique 
nature of the China-Russia dyad. Starting in 1969, there were several border clashes between the 
Soviet Union and China, which helped contribute to the former becoming essentially the main 
foe of China from the period of 1971 to 1991. As a result, each violent interaction over these 
disputed territories would see highly divergent voting in the UNGA (mean = 1.6952), and even 
for peaceful attempts (mean = 1.4265), albeit at a slightly lower extreme. That being said, the 
value and importance of the disputed territories between the disputants varied over this time 
period, which was reflected in their interactions. In the 1970s, there were little changes in the 
value of the territorial disputes between the two states, with the result that a delaying policy 
towards the disputes was pursued by both sides. This would shift starting in 1986 when the 
economic values increased and military importance declined, leading to cooperative policies that 
would continue until 2004, and the next year would see the dispute resolved peacefully by both 
sides and concluded in 2008. Further spurring on these interactions would be the shared concerns 
over US military adventurism in the international system following the end of the Cold War. 
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds 
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad 
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating that it is not just the case of a few types of 
resolutions being influenced. For example, in 1976, where China and Russia had a peaceful 
interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same on a range on 
resolutions, including such topics as the status of previously colonized states, the importance of 
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self-determination, the topic of Palestine, and human rights (see these sources for examples: UN 
General Assembly 1976e, 1976f, 1976h, 1976i). In addition, in 1978, where they engaged in both 
a peaceful and a violent interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same 
on some resolutions, including ones on former colonial states, self-determination, Palestine, and 
human rights topics (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1978a, 1978b, 
1978f, 1978i, 1978j), while voting differently on resolutions dealing with non-interference in the 
internal affairs of states, the non-use of nuclear weapons, and the status of the Western Sahara 
(see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1978c, 1978d, 1978g, 1978h). Thus, 
with all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years that don’t fully 
align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions having values indicative of 
convergence (H1) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more 
divergent voting (H2). Unfortunately, there can be no conclusions reached regarding specific 
kinds of peaceful attempts having different impacts, as for each of the years in the time period 





The next dyadic interaction that I examine is the border dispute between China and India. 
The basis for the disputed frontiers between China and India are found in the nineteenth century 
during a surge in imperial expansion by the British Empire that brought territorial control up to 
where Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan. During this period of expansion, the British proposed up to 
eleven different boundary lines for the area, as claims shifted back and forth based upon the 
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political situation on the ground. The first, and only, border alignment proposed to the Chinese 
government was the Macartney-MacDonald Line of 1899, in which the majority of Aksai Chin 
and the entirety of the Karakash valley was enveloped in the western frontier. Since China never 
responded to this proposal by the British, they took it as a sign that they agreed to the new 
boundary area (Maxwell 1970). Finally, there is the MacMahon Line established in 1913, in 
which a conference was held between the Chinese, the Tibetans, and the British Indian 
governments. In this conference, secret negotiations occurred with the Tibetans in which they 
ultimately agreed to move their border north along the crest of the Himalayan Mountains, 
thereby moving the border up some sixty miles. Again, none of these eleven boundary lines were 
ever accepted by the Chinese government in the years in which they were penned, and it is their 
wide variation that has resulted in a range of complications for the Chinese-Indian border 
following the dissolution of the British Empire in India. For China, it would be these actions that 
would sow the seeds of the boundary disputes it would later have with an independent India 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982a). 
 As it currently stands, the borderline between China and India is roughly 2,100 miles 
long and, excluding the border between Sikkim and Tibet, is defined by the Line of Actual 
Control (LAC) which is not designated on the ground nor mutually accepted maps. Roughly 
speaking, these eastern, middle, and western sectors together constitute some 77,000 square 
miles. The eastern sector itself covers roughly 56,000 square miles south of the McMahon Line 
and north of what China claims as being the customary boundary of Tibet. The smallest of the 
three is the middle sector, which comprises 1,200 square miles of disputed area between Aksai 
Chin to the west and the borders with Tibet, India and Nepal in the east, which is under Indian 
control. Lastly, the western sector composes roughly 20,500 square miles next to Xinjiang and 
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Tibet’s Ali District, most of which is controlled by China as part of its Xinjiang Autonomous 
Region, though it is called Aksai Chin whereas India claims it as part of Ladakh. The reason why 
these disputes have not been resolved singularly is a result of how they have often been used 
individually as leverage in negotiations over the others. That being said, in general, since the 
eastern and western sectors are so much bigger they have been the primary source of the contest 
between China and India in recent decades. 
 
Eastern Sector 
 The eastern sector, generally called Arunachal or South Tibet, is the greatest source of 
economic value of the three disputed areas. The region itself is extremely fertile, allowing for the 
growing of rice, maize, millet, wheat, sugarcane and ginger among other crops. In addition, 
roughly eighty percent of it is covered by evergreen forest, which is a boon for the forest industry 
that operates there. The Brahmaputra River (Yaluzangbu River according to China) runs through 
Arunachal Pradesh and is a major source of irrigation as well as a potential source for massive 
amounts of hydroelectricity. Apart from the richness of the soil, the area is also rich in minerals 
such as hydrocarbons, quartzite, limestone, and marble. Lastly, the area has a rich biodiversity 
with a climate that ranges from snowy mountains in the north to the plains of the Brahmaputra 
valley in the south. 
 China has claimed this are from as late as 1951, following the time that Tibet was 
annexed by China. From the Chinese perspective, part of what makes this region so valuable is 
how Tawang is the cradle of Tibetan Buddhism, and a religious and cultural symbol of much 
importance to the ethnic Tibetans that have become a part of China. For this reason, the Chinese 
government holds that attaining control of Tawang is necessary to cement legitimate control over 
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the Tibetan region as a whole. In essence, should China be able to bring the Tawang Monastery 
and greater territory into the Tibetan region, it will contribute stability to the area by showing 
that the Chinese are capable to safeguarding Tibetan culture and reunite a large number of 
Tibetans and source of history and culture back into Tibet (Reeves 2011). Due to this, China is 
not able to admit that Tawang is non-Chinese, as this would signal that the holy sites of Tawang 
are outside their control, at which point it would become questionable for China to claim that 
Tibet was truly part of Chinese territory and thus make it that much harder to control. 
 
Western Sector 
 The western borderland of Aksai Chin is essentially a vast, desert plain doted by a few 
salt lakes and rocky pinnacles. Due to the high altitude, combined with the harsh weather and 
barren soil, has made it harsh enough that there are no permanent residents apart from some 
Chinese soldiers stationed there. The further lack of any valuable natural resources, such as oil or 
minerals, means that the population of this area will not likely change in the near future. That 
being said, it possesses the greatest military importance among the three disputed sectors, thus 
leading to the main developments here being strategic or military oriented. 
 The Aksai Chin plain itself is the most easily accessible land bridge between Xinjiang 
and Tibet, which has been reflected in passage through this area between the two since ancient 
times. Moreover, due to the geographical advantages of the area, Aksai Chin is a natural fortress 
on western China’s border. In point of fact, should major war break out between China and 
India, Chinese forces in Aksai Chin would easily be able to descend down and overrun New 
Delhi and from there into Mumbai, potentially securing a quick Chinese victory. Lastly, with it 
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being located so close to Kashmir, if India and Pakistan were to go to war, China would be able 
to intervene if they so desired, giving them additional leverage in the area. 
Events that occurred there in the 1950s and 1960s illustrate the military importance of 
this area well. The first of these events is the Tibetan rebellion of 1959, that stems from the 
occupation of Tibet by China nearly a decade earlier. Following their victory in the civil war, 
Chairman Mao Zedong sent troops to seize Tibet to be integrated into China, in large part due to 
its strategic importance. As a result of this, on May 23 of 1951, the governments of Beijing and 
Lhasa signed the Seventeen-Point Agreement, allowing the Chinese to move into control Tibet in 
1951 without resistance, that it might be saved from imperialist forces (Davis 2008). Protests and 
demonstrations against the Chinese were held in Tibet in early 1952, and though the Chinese 
government tried to adjust policies to placate the population the measures were at best 
temporary, for they did not bridge the profound issues facing the annexing of Tibet. Even this 
domestic discontent would contribute to outright resistance and rebellion in Lhasa and 
throughout Tibet in the following years. 
 Unfortunately, despite putting a rebellion down. In the late 1950s, China’s concern over 
the stability of Tibet would remain as the Dalai Lama and his followers had fled to India under 
the cover of the conflict. India quickly granted them asylum and allowed them to set up the 
Tibetan government-in-exile at India’s Dharamsala. Further complicating the situation is how a 
significant number of Tibetan rebels were able to flee into India as well, where they would 
eventually take up station near the frontiers and be re-supplied with weapons, medical supplies, 
and food to continue the struggle, a significant part of which was due to overwhelming sympathy 
and support from India’s public, who were largely critical of the PLA’s suppression of the 
rebellion in Tibet (Jian 2006). 
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 There were further suspicions directed against India by China when they learned the 
central leadership of the rebellion was established in India’s Kalimpoing, as this meant it was 
possible, perhaps even likely in Chinese eyes, that the Indians had been working with the Tibetan 
rebels behind the scenes. Such was possible as an independent Tibet would have served as an 
effective buffer zone between India and China. Regardless, due to the fact that the now exiled 
Dalai Lama and the remnant of the Tibetan rebels were established on the northwestern frontier 
of India, the value of these contested borderlands for the security of China increased. Should 
China be able to attain control of these areas, it would be easier to maintain control over Tibet. 
 The second event contributing to the military importance of this sector had its basis in the 
events of November 2, 1961, on which day the Indian government issued the “Forward Policy” 
ordering that Indian patrols range as far as possible past the positions that India occupied towards 
the international border, as recognized by India (Noorani 1970). There were several reasons 
underlying this action, calculated on India’s part as a means of attaining their goals without 
leading to war with China (Garver 2006). In terms of geography, China was surrounded by the 
military power of the Soviet Union to the north, the United States to the east and south, and India 
to the west. Essentially this means that China was in a vulnerable strategic location with the 
possibility that either the Soviets or the Americans might intervene in any border conflict with 
India. The difficult situation facing the Chinese was further exacerbated by the ongoing 
economic difficulties of the time resulting from several years of natural disasters and the 
disastrous Great Leap Forward campaign. With more than 90% of Chinese forces deployed to 
the north and east of their country, the forces available to them in Tibet were limited and already 
preoccupied with maintaining control over the post-rebellion Tibet. As a result of these factors, 
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more than 100 Indian posts were created along the disputed borders, with some even being set up 
past the McMahon line in the eastern sector.  
 
Settlement Attempt Interactions 
From 1962 to 1985 both states continually blamed each other for violating the LAC, and 
occasionally instances of violent interactions occurred. In the 1960s, border violations are 
committed by both Chinese and Indian troops into Sikkim (Mint 2017), which ends up 
contributing to the 1967 clash between India and China is the last major fighting to occur in the 
disputed border (Krishnan 2020). There were high tensions in 1971 during the war between 
Pakistan and India, though due to a lack of dominant positions along their shared border, China 
did not act militarily in support of its ally Pakistan, but instead called for an immediate ceasefire 
(The Economic Times, 2017). Later in 1973 China accused India of committing aggression on 
the Sikkim (Mint 2017), and in 1975 a patrol of Assam Rifles, Jawans were ambushed by the 
Chinese at Tulung La in Arunachal Pradesh (Krishnan 2020). Both sides later described the clash 
as an accident with both patrols losing their way in the fog (Gilani 2020). It was interactions like 
these that contributed to China working to reinforce the disputed border areas in 1977 and 1978, 
bringing the number of deployed troops up to 350,000 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
1979b). 
 Despite the potential threat these reinforcements posed, India reaffirmed its long, 
peaceful friendship with China and declared an intent to continue with cooperation on their 
disputes (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1979a). Yet at the same time, India also 
demanded that China return territory seized in Aksai Chinduring the border war in 1962, an area 
equal to 14,000 square miles, that India insisted that China was illegally occupying (BBC 
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Summary of World Broadcasts 1980a; Hazarika 1979). Ignoring these calls to return the 
territory, China continued to ramp up the deployment of troops to the disputed border areas 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1980c). Eventually reconciliation was pursued with 
interest by both sides, not only to settle the disputes by also to increase trade and investment 
(Francis 1981). 
Building on these earlier events, India and China met in Delhi for another round of talks 
related to their outstanding boundary disputes, and though no concrete results occurred, a general 
outline of the issues themselves was agreed upon (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982b). 
Though China expressed commitment to peaceful settlement, they also put forward a proposal 
that the currently occupied territories would remain Chinese, while no new claims would be 
pursued (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1982b). Needless to say, India was not exactly 
enamored with this proposal. Despite this disconnect negotiations would continue, especially 
considering that India was just as much fixated on the threat from Pakistan, if not more so, 
considering the structure of their military and its budget (Defense and Foreign Affairs 1983). 
With the likelihood of future conflict with Pakistan being high, India and China instituted 
additional rounds of negotiations in 1983 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1983). 
Unfortunately for the overall peace process, the negotiations in this period would be 
marred by distrust and acts of bad faith. China repeatedly released statements to the effect it was 
committed to improving relations with India, that they shared no conflicts of interest, that China 
was not threatening India, and that China had no ambitions regarding its neighboring countries 
(BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1984a). The realities of the matter, however, were that 
China was still consistently trying to acquire pieces of Indian territory, often sending troops past 
the contested border areas to plant Chinese flags, though they would invariably be driven back 
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by the Indian armed forces, events that took place during all negotiations since 1980 (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 1984a). Further, India expressed concern over an atlas released 
by China during this time that appeared to show large parts of the border areas as belonging to 
Ancient China, including the whole of Ladakh, Himachal Pradesh, eastern Nepal, the whole of 
Sikkim, Bhutan and Aramachal Pradesh (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1984b). The link 
between this atlas’ release and the negotiations was clear, as it had been carefully published and 
publicized just before the resumption of talks that year (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 
1984b). Moreover, it was common knowledge by that point that China had used similar 
cartographic ploys to attempt to justify territorial claims with other neighboring states (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 1984b). As if by magic a number of periodicals contained 
statements about a number of areas in north-eastern India that were referenced in this atlas as 
belonging to China in the past. These rounds of negotiations would continue to occur between 
China and India, though hopes for a conclusive settlement remained out of reach (Tenorio 1985). 
The status quo was changed in 1986 following an increase in border tensions in the 
eastern sector, arising in part because of differences over the precise boundaries of the McMahon 
Line in Arunachal Pradesh (Mint 2017). China consistently insisted that the McMahon Line is 
not legitimate (United Press International 1986), and that India was engaging in frequent border 
violations. When asked about its own violations, China ended up rejecting that Chinese forces 
intruded into northeastern India as being propaganda (United Press International 1986). Further 
complicating settlement attempts in this year, General Sundarji of India implemented a forward 
policy, including Operation Chequerboard and Operation Falcon along the Indian-Chinese 
border, which included air-land exercises, airlifting heavy equipment like tanks to Arunachal 
Pradesh, and even going to so far as to occupy neutral areas in the eastern sector and moving 
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troops past the McMahon Line. Even worse from the perspective of the Chinese, India granted 
Arunachal Pradesh statehood and increased military capabilities there, at which point China 
expressed strong condemnations of these actions (Mint 2017).  
 Accusations of border violations by India continue, with China warning that these forces 
need to be withdrawn to prevent unpleasant responses (Mann 1987). India responds to say 
accusations are baseless and that no conflict is wanted (Mann 1987). Though tensions continued, 
both sides reiterated an agreement by both to avoid conflicts over the territory and to push to 
improve relations in other areas before attempting to settle the differences over their disputed 
borders (The Associated Press 1987). The next round of talks move ahead, though like the 
previous rounds there is not much hope for conclusive settlement (The Associated Press 1987) 
especially as reports continue that Chinese and Indian troops clash in several skirmishes, even 
though both sides have consistently denied the fighting (Sydney Morning Herald, 1987). 
Accusations fly back and forth that India is nibbling away at the border, and that China is 
deploying troops in preparation for a large-scale attack (Sydney Morning Herald 1987). Despite 
these accusations of massing troops, India takes pains to again remind China that peace must be 
maintained along the border and that each of the disputes must be settled via negotiations (BBC 
Summary of World Broadcasts 1987b). 
 Unfortunately, the chances of peaceful settlement decrease due to India’s unilateral 
declaration of statehood for the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh (The PRS Group 1988). 
China issued strong protests against this action, leading to sharp exchanges between the two 
states, and by May each accused the other of renewed border violations around Arunchadal 
Pradesh (The PRS Group 1988). By fall of 1987 tensions have eased enough, and border talks 
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have contributed to an atmosphere of optimism to such a degree, that China invites the Indian 
Prime Minister to Peking for talks. 
 In 1988, the Indian Prime Minister engaged with the Chinese government in talks aimed 
at rebuilding friendship and addressing their shared border disputes (Tyson 1988). Unfortunately, 
like earlier direst negotiations, both sides said that no breakthrough will result that year in the 
territorial disputes dividing the two states (Tyson 1988). Ultimately this contributed to India 
taking a two-track approach to improving relations in other areas while still trying to make 
progress on the shared border (Pomfret 1988).  
 These efforts seemed to be well received by the Chinese, as in 1989 the Chinese Vice-
Premier made a visit of his own to New Delhi to discuss troop along the India-China borders, 
though once again India downplayed the hopes of an imminent resolution to the disputes (IPS-
Inter Press Service 1989). The primary result of this latest effort would be a continued 
commitment to hold another round of border consultations and pursue the setup of a bilateral 
demarcation committee, though critics would say this largely came about when India refused to 
condemn China for the crushing of the Tiananmen Square pro-democracy uprising, to which the 
Chinese responded by accelerating the pace of border negotiations (Japan Economic Newswire 
1992a). 
 In the early 1990s the possibility of meaningful progress on settling the disputes 
peacefully continued to improve. The Prime Minister of India, when asked about an upcoming 
meeting of the India-China working group, stressed that there is will on both sides to resolve the 
boundary issue but also that there continued to be a need to broaden the spectrum of cooperation 
with China into other fields (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1990). In 1991, Chinese 
Premier Li Peng visited India to pledge Chinese resolve to address the boundary question 
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through friendly consultations (Mint 2017), with the Prime Minister of India echoing these calls 
at a banquet held in the visiting diplomats honor (Agence France Presse 1991a). 
 In 1993, these efforts would finally bear significant fruit when the Prime Minister of 
India visited China to sign the Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the 
Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border areas (Gilani 2020), in which both states 
agreed to reduce deployed armed forces along the 2,433-mile Himalayan border dispute 
(MCGirk 1993). The agreement did not completely settle the two countries’ conflicting territorial 
claims. Instead, both nations said they would abide by the existing Line of Actual Control, a 
buffer zone drawn up between the two countries when the Chinese army spilled into the extreme 
western and eastern flanks of India in 1962 (McGirk 1993). To further reduce tension, both states 
agreed to notify each other in the event the conducted military exercises in the Himalayas, and 
that a team of diplomats and military officials would meet later that year to pinpoint which parts 
of the mountainous terrain belong to whom (McGirk 1993). 
 Likely due in part to the effectiveness of these actions in reducing tensions, India and 
China began talks on further reducing deployed forces and an outright redrawing of the 
Himalayan boundary after three decades of tensions (Guruswamy 1994). The talks would 
continue into 1995, when both India and China agreed to pull back troops in the disputed eastern 
sector (Mint 2017). These talks also arrived at an agreement to pursue a phased demilitarization 
of the disputed frontier, as well as a commitment to pursue more concise demarcation of the Line 
of Actual Control along the border (Agence France Presse 1995). 
 By 1996 the agreement had been reached, so Chinese President Jiang Zemin visited India 
to sign the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field along the LAC in 
the India-China Border Areas. (Gilani 2020; Mint 2017). While a step forward in terms of the 
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peaceful settlement, India remained suspicious of China, as it also continued in this time to 
supply missiles and nuclear technology to Pakistan, and set up new military bases in Burma 
(Srivastava 1996).  Fortunately for both states, an influential section of policy-makers in both 
states began to view continued hostility and suspicion against each side as being detrimental to 
both the regional and global interests of each state (Srivastava 1996). For this reason, along with 
the agreement on the Line of Actual Control, an agreement was signed to further reduce troop 
deployments in this area (Srivastava 1996). Finally, after successful drawdowns of troops, India 
and China agree to go ahead in consultations to define the Line of Actual Control in 1999 
(Kazmin 1999). 
 In 2002, India and China agreed to quicken the pace of LAC delineation in order to 
resolve the border disputes in a reasonable time-frame (Mint 2017). As a result, negotiations 
continue more openly and consistently from this point until 2015 (Mint 2017). Perhaps helping 
in this regard was India’s acknowledgement of the Tibet Autonomous Region as being part of 
the territory of China and reiterated its commitment not to permit Tibetans living in India to 
engage in anti-China activities. In return, India received de facto recognition from China of 
Sikkim’s status as a state of India (Thakur 2003). From this point negotiations appear to 
accelerate further, with negotiations entering a fast track, though India still had issues in framing 
the settlement attempts as being in mutual interests (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 2004a). 
 Nonetheless, this fast-tracking of negotiations and exchange of mutual recognitions of 
different territorial controls lead to several positive developments. In 2005, the Protocol on the 
Modalities for the Implementation of Confidence Building Measures in the Military Field Along 
the Line of Actual Control in the India-China Border Areas was signed (Gilani 2020), and the 
trade route through Nathu La on the disputed border was opened again in an attempt to further 
 110 
dispel diplomatic distrust that had plagued relations between citizens in China’s southwest and 
India’s northeast (BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific 2006). Ten of these productive talks would 
occur between 2003 and 2007 (Agence France Presse 2007). 
 Unfortunately for the settlement, a wrench would again be thrown into the process in 
2007, when Indian intelligence agencies began reporting a consistent rise in Chinese intrusions 
deep across the border, to include as many as 130 separate actions by the end of 2007 (Shukla 
and Unnithan 2007). Further, an increase of 10,000 soldiers would be stationed by China in the 
Tawang Sector of the Arunachal Pradesh border (Shukla and Unnithan 2007). There was even an 
intrusion into east Sikkim, the area previously recognized as being rightfully under to 
sovereignty of India, almost as if all these actions were part of a renewed Chinese strategy to 
strengthen claims to the disputed border areas (Shukla and Unnithan 2007). All this occurred as 
India had been building infrastructure along the Chinese border for the past several years 
(Raghuvanshi 2008), and entered into an eleventh round of border negotiations since 2003 
(Bezlova 2008). 
 At this point it should be noted that Tawang had taken on the status as the largest 
tinderbox in relations between India and China. To the Chinese, it was the primary focus of their 
territorial disputes with India, as tied into it was Chinese claims of sovereignty over all historical 
Tibet (Rupee News 2009). In this time period both states acted to further cement their claims to 
Tawang. The situation would heat up in 2008 when the Dalai Lama announced for the first time 
that Tawang was a part of India, bolstering India’s territorial claims and infuriating China 
(Rupee News 2009). Though India officially recognized Tibet as part of China in 2003, and the 
Chinese reciprocated by recognizing Indian control over Sikkim, it was unlikely that anything 
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similar would happen with Tawang as that would weaken China’s credibility and authority over 
the Tibetans that reside within their borders. 
 Thankfully by this period in time relations between the two states, beyond that of their 
territorial disputes, had grown enough to ensure that there was no real likelihood of a sudden 
outbreak of violence (Shadiq 2011). Instead, efforts were channeled into creating a border 
apparatus to handle the different perceptions of the Line of Actual Control and restart the joint 
military exercises between Indian and Chinese army from earlier in 2012 (Shadiq 2011). India, 
perhaps taken advantage of this progress, pushed for China to compromise more, especially 
given how they have compromised with states in other territorial disputes (Wu 2012). 
 In the rest of the time period under observation India and China would not attain a 
conclusive settlement, but they would make positive progress in signing the 2012 Establishment 
of a Working Mechanism for Consultation and Coordination on India-China Border Affairs and 
the 2013 Border Defense Cooperation Agreement between India and China (Gilani 2020). The 
significance of China and India having signed agreements in 1993, 1996, 2005, 2012 and 2013 
that outline ways to maintain peace along the borders between them is a positive development. In 




In the forty-four years of the China-India disputes presented in Table 4, there were thirty 
years where only peaceful interactions occurred, three years where only violent interactions 
occurred, and seven years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred. Much like the 
case of the Chinese-Russian disputes, the convergence or divergence patterns of these settlement 
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interactions on voting in the UNGA are mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, for 
fourteen years there was divergence and for sixteen years there was convergence. For violent 
interactions, there was an even split of one divergence and one convergence, with one year being 
the first observation. Lastly, in the years where both peaceful and violent interactions occurred 
there was four divergences and three convergences.  
That being said, again like in the Chinese-Russian case, when averages were calculated 
for each of the interaction types, the pattern becomes clearer, albeit in a way that challenges the 
theory to a certain degree. Peaceful interactions saw years with more divergence on UNGA 
voting on average (mean = 0.2980) over purely violent interactions (mean = 0.1583). This result 
might be explained by the gradual increase in tensions and a feared outbreak of a new conflict in 
the years following these three years of only violent interactions in the early 1970s, which would 
remain roughly even until the end of the Cold War in 1991, wherein the Soviet Union dissolved 
and the calculations changed such that voting convergence, even in the face of continued 
sporadic tensions, drew closer. It should be noted, however, that when both violent and peaceful 
interactions occurred in a given year, the voting divergence (mean = 0.5299) in the UNGA was 
higher than for the years that saw purely peaceful interactions, which is more in line with what 
the theory would predict. Overall, the lower divergence in UNGA voting across settlement 
interactions as compared to the rest of the case studies might be due also to the consistent and 
long-term engagement of peaceful negotiations that saw roughly similar progress towards a 
settlement, as well as the fact that India was especially concerned with their dispute with 
Pakistan whereas China was concerned with their border disputes with Russia, who to them was 
a larger military threat up until the 1990s. 
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Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds 
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad 
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of 
resolutions being influenced. In 1976, where China and India had a violent interaction over 
disputed territory the previous year, they voted differently on a range on resolutions, including 
on resolutions dealing with the non-use of force in international relations, emoluments for the 
International Court of Justice and the disarmament of nuclear weapons (see these sources for 
examples: UN General Assembly 1976a, 1976b, 1976c). For an example in the other direction, in 
1992, where they had a peaceful interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted 
the same on a range on resolutions, including topics like the prohibition of nuclear weapons, 
colonial independence, self-determination, the law of the sea, national sovereignty, and human 
rights in Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 
1992d, 1992e, 1992f). With all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the 
few years that don’t fully align, support has again been found for peaceful settlement interactions 
having values indicative of convergence (H1) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and 
in the direction of more divergent voting in the UNGA (H2). Much like in the first case, 
unfortunately, no conclusions are able to be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful 
attempts having different impacts, as for each of the years in the time period examined only 








In recent decades, the majority of tensions between China and Vietnam have laid over 
their contested offshore territories, most specifically the White Dragon Tail Island, the Paracel 
Islands, and the Spratly Islands. Overall, China has approached each dispute in a variety of ways 
over time, thus an overall examination of each of these disputes is important in order to fully 
grasp a background of their dyadic interactions.  
 
The White Dragon Tail Island 
 In the middle of the Gulf of Tonkin, the shared water boundary between China and 
Vietnam, lies the White Dragon Tail Island (known as Bai Long Wei in China and Bach Long Vi 
in Vietnam). The island itself lies almost in the middle of the gulf, though it is slightly close to 
the Vietnamese coast. The dispute itself can be traced back to 1955 when the Vietnam war broke 
out between the North and South, each supported by allies in the struggle to see whether 
communism would rule or be stomped out in the reunified state. Two years later in 1957, Mao 
Zedong decided to hand over the White Dragon Tail Island to the control of North Vietnam. The 
handover itself was quietly done and it has only been in recent decades that it has attracted more 
attention. 
 White Dragon Tail Island is plateau roughly three square miles in size, and though it is 
covered by grass and surrounded by beaches, it has only limited freshwater, arable soil or other 
natural resources. That being said, the waters surrounding it are a major source of fish and 
mollusks, though this is true of the Gulf of Tonkin at-large, as it is one of the main fishing zones 
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for both China and Vietnam. The economic value of the island increased over time, starting in 
the late 1970s when hydrocarbon resources were discovered in the gulf.  
In addition to the economic value of the island and its nearby waters, White Dragon Tail 
Island also possesses some military value due to its strategic location near the center of the gulf, 
positioning it well to serve as an important outpost for either state. This can be demonstrated 
with the outbreak of the Vietnam War in 1955, after which the White Dragon Tail Island became 
a transportation hub through which Chinese support flowed through to the North Vietnamese. It 
was further reinforced as a military base, with radar, air defenses, and communication assets 
constructed on the island to fortify it against the South Vietnamese as a way to provide an early 
warning system for the coastal cities of North Vietnam. 
One point of interest regarding the White Dragon Tail Island is that the Chinese 
government never reported the transfer of the territory over to the hand of the North Vietnamese. 
Not much is known about the handover itself, though the two governments are confirmed as 
signing a treaty to transfer the island in 1957, and it is possible that part of the agreement was for 
North Vietnam to recognize Chinese claims in the South China Sea (Fravel 2008). It was not 
until the signing of the “Agreement on the Delimitation of the Tonkin Gulf” that White Dragon 
Tail Island was clearly, publically stated as belonging to Vietnam (Keyuan 2004). Roughly four 
decades after the transfer the Chinese public finally knew what happened during the Vietnam 
War. 
 
The Paracel and Spratly Islands 
 Additional islands under dispute between China and Vietnam include the Paracels (also 
Xisha in Chinese and Hoang Sa in Vietnamese) and the Spratlys (also Nansha in Chinese and 
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Truong Sa in Vietnamese), both of which are in the South China Sea. The Paracels themselves 
are also roughly midway between the southern coast of Hainan island and the central coast of 
Vietnam, while the center of the Spratleys is a bit closer to Vietnam’s coast than it is to Chinese 
territory. Of the two, the Paracels is quite a bit smaller with only 23 islands, rocks, reefs and 
shoals, split into two groups including the Cresent Group in the west and the Amphitrite Group 
in the east. The Spratlys are spread over a wider area and number more than 230 features. 
Though each is claimed by more than two states, the Spratlys have received the most attention 
given the geographic spread of their features. 
 Both the Paracels and the Spratlys have economic value stemming from three resources. 
First on the features themselves, each possesses natural resources like guano deposits and 
coconut palms. This is further buttressed by the fact that the waters surrounding these features 
are full of fish, with many fisherman plying the South China Sea using them as fishing bases and 
shelters from storms for centuries. Perhaps most importantly to the Chinese, however, is the fact 
that the South China Sea lies between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean with transoceanic 
shipping lanes linking China and its neighbors to the West. In the periods before modern states, 
these sea lanes were a sort of Maritime Silk Road, and with the Paracels and Spratlys 
strategically placed in between shipping lanes they will continue to play an important role in 
both trade and security for which state ends up controlling them. 
 In terms of history from the Chinese perspective, the strategic importance of these island 
groups was not fully recognized by leaders until the 1970s. This makes sense to a certain degree 
given the United Nations embargo on China and Mao Zedong’s resulting policy of self-reliance, 
both of which contributed to a general lack of economic relationships with other countries 
around the world. This situation was made worse due to a number of campaigns implemented by 
 117 
Mao during his tenure, such as the Three-Anti/Five-Anti campaigns (1951-1952), the Hundred 
Flowers campaign (1956-1957), Anti-rightist Movement (1957-1959), the Great Leap Forward 
(1958-1961), and the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). Under the policies tied to these political 
campaigns, China’s economy stagnated and, as a consequence, little attention was directed to the 
resources and opportunities that the South China Sea represented. 
 Further impacting the perceived usefulness of the island groups was that, prior to 1982, 
coastal states under traditional international law were only allowed three nautical miles of 
territorial sea rights with no maritime zones like EEZs or continental shelves allowed to be 
claimed by states. After 1982, this territorial sea limit would be extended to 12 nautical miles and 
license to 200 mile EEZ and continental shelves due to the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention of the Law of the Sea. As a result of this, the economic values attached to both the 
Paracels and the Spratlys shot up, especially as technologies advanced allowing greater 
exploration and exploitation of offshore hydrocarbons previously not accessible. 
 There were an additional two factors that increased the perceived economic value of the 
South China Sea island groups in Chinese eyes. The first was due to the growing population of 
China and the resulting demand for additional resources. Given the expanding population was 
quickly consuming available resources, the acquisition of resources in the South China Sea 
began to acquire more significance to Chinese leadership, especially since China still relied 
significantly on self-sufficiency at this time. 
The second of these factors was China’s “Reform and Opening Up” policy, which 
quickly expanded a Chinese presence on the economic world stage. By 1987 the fleet of Chinese 
merchant ships expanded to over 1000 and Chinese ports quickly attained attention by the rest of 
the world’s shipping. The South China Sea itself saw roughly 90% of Chinese trade and the 
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import of 80% of the hydrocarbons that China needed to keep expanding its economy. As 
pressure grew to acquire more, the reserves in the South China Sea near the disputed islands 
acquired more importance. Further increasing this attention was the presence of fisheries that 
would both feed their expanding population as well as increase their market share of this 
valuable sector of the global economy. 
 When it comes to the military salience of the Paracels and Spratlys, both have acquired 
such principally based on their geographic locations in the South China Sea, which lie within the 
principle sea lanes. Access to the Paracels and Spratlys allows China additional capabilities to 
monitor the shipping and air traffic lanes in the area and, if outright occupied, would 
significantly enhance Chinese power and leverage in the region. With bases and missile batteries 
on these disputed islands, it would allow China to block hostile forces from venturing into 
China’s coastal waters to launch attacks against their provinces and ports. Loss of control of 
these features, however, would result in a greater strategic threat to China itself. That being said 
the overall emphasis of the South China Sea for security purposes varied over time before rising 
to high importance in the current time. 
 During the height of the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s, the states bordering the South 
China Sea were broken up into Communist and Anti-Communist groups, with the greatest threat 
to China coming from the alliance between the United States and South Vietnam. This would 
change by the 1970s when the Vietnam War ended and China-US relations shifted due to a 
readjustment of interactions, culminating in Nixon’s visit to China and the signing of the joint 
Communiqué in 1972. What followed was a period where the Us withdrew military forces and 
there was a gradual improvement in Chinese-American relations, and the military importance of 
the South China Sea region decreased as a result. 
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 This situation did not last long, however, as by 1975 Soviet penetration into the region 
reasserted the military importance of the South China Sea for China. There was concern that the 
Soviets would continue to encircle China, especially given the recent border clashes in 1969. 
Tensions in 1975 ratcheted up when Vietnam entered into a number of agreements with the 
Soviet Union. For economic and military support, Vietnam granted the Soviet Union military 
access to its facilities in Da Nag and Cam Ranh Bay, which allowed the Soviets to link their 
Pacific fleet with its forces in Northeast Asia, at Vladivostok. Without the Soviet Union posing a 
threat to China, the Paracels and Spratlys gradually increased in importance as a way to check 
Soviet adventurism in the region. Should the Soviets have seized these islands, the southern coast 
of the Chinese mainland would be under threat, but if China were to secure them the naval threat 
the Soviet Union posed would be pushed back several hundred miles. Thus, actions were taken 
to push back the joint Vietnamese-Soviet threat. 
 The situation changed against in 1985, however, when the newly ascended Gorbechev 
signaled that the Soviet Union would be beginning the process of scaling back financial aid and, 
more importantly military presence, in the region. Without backing by the Soviets, Vietnam did 
not have the resources to meaningfully challenge China, and with their withdrawal from 
Cambodia by 1989 the relations between the two countries improved with fully normalized 
relations by 1991. With the reduction of the US military presence in the Philippines also 
occurring around this time, tensions in the South China Sea would largely disappear for nearly 
two decades 
 Lastly, in terms of symbolic value for the Chinese, the discovery of many of these islands 
by Chinese mariners goes back as long as two thousand years. That being said, however, the fact 
that there is only a historical connection but no long-term occupation of any of these islands by 
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the Chinese results in a hit to their legal claims. In fact, both the Chinese and Vietnamese 
historical claims to both the Paracels and the Spratlys “…rely on the discovery, temporary or 
repeated occupation, or the maintenance of relations of any kind to the islands (Dieter Heinzig 
1976, p. 21).” 
 
Settlement Attempt Interactions 
 In terms of how this was manifested in their strategies for attaining recognized 
sovereignty over the disputed islands, China pursued a general delaying strategy in the 1950s and 
1960s by tolerating South Vietnam’s activities in the region, though by the early 1970s this was 
replaced with a more aggressive approach. Given the still improving nature of their naval 
capacity in the 1970s, China directed the majority of its attention to the Paracels, as the Spratlys 
were too far afield. By the early 1970s, China had taken possession of the eastern Paracels with 
South Vietnam, though this would change in 1974 when China began waging skirmishes on the 
land and sea, claiming that sovereignty disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands had started 
(Japan Economic Newswire 1983). Launching a lightning strike backed by air support, the 
Chinese Navy took over the western part of the Paracels and kicked South Vietnam out (Mehta 
1993). Chinese troops engaged in conflict with military positions on the Duncan, Pattle, Robert, 
and Money Islands, as well as launched attacks on a number of South Vietnamese warships, 
inflicting extensive damage (Mehta 1993). 
 The new status quo would last until the administration of a unified Vietnam. At this 
point, China complained that Vietnam was drawing too close to the Soviet Union and receiving 
too much aid, to which the Vietnamese responded that a substantial increase in aid from China 
would lead to a more independent Vietnam (Munro 1977). With tensions so high, the conflicting 
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claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands were so volatile that each side could do little more 
than reiterate their conflicting claims, even in situations where they were drawn together to the 
conference table (Munro 1977). Eventually border confrontations in 1976 escalated into 
firefights, and Vietnam would accuse China of a series of border violations, and demand they 
stop apparent war preparations (The Associated Press 1980). Unfortunately, this was not to be, as 
this in turn escalated into the outbreak of a border war in 1979 following the expelling of 
thousands of Chinese from Vietnam (Japan Economic Newswire 1983). 
 Following the end of this brief border war, China and Vietnam held a number of 
unproductive sessions discussing their shared territorial disputes (The Associated Press 1980). 
Peking claimed that it had consistently advocated resolving their disputes with Vietnam through 
negotiations and was ready to continue talks at any time, though Vietnam stated that they had 
proposed holding another round of talks only to have China get embarrassed and present 
implausible pretexts to reject the proposals (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts 1980d). 
 Tensions would remain high and violent interactions would continue to occur in the 
following years. In 1981, China claimed to have killed more than 150 Vietnamese soldiers 
following what they termed the largest border invasion since 1979 (Loong 1981). Vietnam 
responded to these accusations that China was simply trying to heighten tensions in South east 
Asia (Loong 1981). In 1982, China accused Vietnam in turn of committing forty-four 
provocations along their shared border during the lunar New Year, despite Hanoi’s calls for a 
cease-fire to last the duration of the holiday (UPI 1982). Vietnamese troops crossed into the 
Yunnan and Guangxi provinces, planted mines, and directed gunfire at Chinese citizens (UPI 
1982). For the rest of the year, both states continue to try to create the impression that the other is 
responsible for the rise in tension and conflict along where the war had been fought in 1979 (UPI 
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1982). In 1984, both China and Vietnam would report to the public that they had engaged in 
inflicting staggering losses on the opposing armed forces across the border, while only suffering 
light casualties, all of whom were civilians (Wren 1984). These events followed patterns of 
clashes in 1981 and 1983, and China would end up rejected Vietnamese offers to negotiate. In 
1985, China again stated that Vietnamese troops had attacked into Yunnan (AP 1985), and would 
step up border attacks against Vietnam into 1986 (Crossette 1986). Things would remain tense in 
the area into the late 1980s. In 1987 China would accuse Vietnam of border violations and 
provocations, while Vietnam would make claims of having decimated a Chinese army division 
that had attempted to seize four hilltops in the border province of Ha Tuyen (The Toronto Star 
1987). As things stood the possibilities of a successful peaceful settlement were barely better 
than zero. 
 Meanwhile, after having taken control over the Paracels, China spent fifteen years 
fortifying their control over them and Hainan, with an eye towards eventually escalating in the 
Spratlys. In 1987 China’s naval forces conducted military exercises over a wide area of the 
western Pacific in the same time period the land border violations were occurring (The Toronto 
Star 1987). It was not long after this that the Chinese established an observatory on Fiery Cross 
Reef, which was strategically located in the geographic center of the Spratlys, which was further 
surrounded by reefs that were occupied by Vietnam. Further, China constructed steles to denote 
their control on eleven other unoccupied reefs in the area. Simultaneous with these actions was 
the issuing of numerous statements by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs reiterating their 
claims of sovereignty over the Spratlys as well as protests over occupations therein by the 
Vietnamese. 
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 For Vietnam’s part, they were caught off-guard by Chinese actions in the area. Since 
Fiery Cross Reef is submerged at high tide by several feet of water, and not very close to the 
Chinese mainland for that matter, it was not seen as a likely action by China. Reeling from 
surprise when the Chinese did in fact occupy the strategic location, an alarmed Vietnam quickly 
moved more troops to cement greater control over the Spratlys by occupying more reefs. In 
addition, Vietnam also began to harass Chinese vessels involved in survey and construction 
activities in the area, which ultimately contributed to a breaking out of confrontations between 
the two states. Tensions came to a head in March of 1988, when a deadly incident occurred 
between both sides, coming about due to Chinese occupation of the Fiery Cross, Johnson, and 
Cuarteron reefs (Mehta 1993).  
 Several dozen Chinese warships were in the act of conducting naval exercises in the area, 
when additional forces moved to occupy several reefs in the Spratlys, specifically the Fiery 
Cross Reef, Huges Reef, Cuarteron Reef, Gaven Reef, and the Subi Reef. The Vietnamese media 
would report that China was able to successfully occupy these features by using several warships 
to block Vietnamese transport ships from entering the features (Boston Globe Forum 2015). Not 
much later, Chinese forces push Vietnam out of the Johnson South Reef following a skirmish in 
which it is claimed that sixty-four unarmed Vietnamese navy engineers are killed and several 
ships reported as being sunk (Boston Global Forum 2015). Moving quickly, China rapidly 
constructed fortresses on six features in the area, and turned Fiery Cross Reef into a man-made 
island with a wharf, oil reservoir, heliport and observation station. Essentially, they became 
footholds from which to acquire other Vietnam held features once the Chinese were ready to do 
so. 
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 After the success of 1988, China again largely moved to implement a delaying strategy 
with regards to the Paracels and Spratlys. Though China sometimes pursued joint development 
of resources in the area with Vietnam, overall limited progress has been made, especially as 
China was unwilling to share control over the Paracels and primarily sought greater access into 
areas controlled by Vietnam in the Spratlys.  
By 1992 Chinese forces had successfully occupied all of the Paracels and nine features in 
the Spratly islands. Despite these changes in China’s favor, the relationship with Vietnam began 
to thaw following the end of the Cold War and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. 
Announcements were made that both states would normalize relations after years of conflict and 
China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979 (Wilhelm 1991). Further, both states released information 
to the effect that they were considering joint development projects of the disputed islands 
believed to sit on top of rich hydrocarbon deposits (Wilhelm 1991). New negotiation sessions 
discussing the disputes would occur in Vietnam, and greater efforts were exerted to indicate the 
sides were interested in settling their sovereignty issues over the oil exploration area, with China 
in particular being open to business cooperation (Japan Economic Newswire 1992b). 
Part of the motivation behind these moves for Vietnam was the fact they had lost a 
substantial amount of Soviet economic aid and political support, without which it would be far 
harder to challenge China militarily (Wilhelm 1991). A brief point of tension arose when 
Vietnam accused China of violating sovereignty in an oil deal that lay close to the Vietnamese 
coast, but that they still remained open to peaceful negotiations (Mehta 1993). Though both firm 
in their claims of sovereignty, the promises to refrain from military actions seemed to indicate 
the path forward for both had opened. As if in support of this, joint working groups were 
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established to discuss the three disputes, with priority given to the land boundary and Gulf of 
Tonkin (Storey 2008). 
 Unfortunately, by 1993 it appeared that Vietnamese and Chinese negotiations had failed 
to reach a compromise of the disputes. While they had been drive to settle the border dispute, 
both had stuck with their historical claims and refused to give much ground (Mehta 1993). 
Further complicating progress was China continuing to send conflicting signals about its 
intentions, ranging back and forth between threats and uses of force to the more peaceful pledges 
of negotiations (Mehta 1993). Perhaps aware of how this was impacting their neighbors, both 
China and Vietnam took additional steps to promise no escalation in the disputes and promised 
the nearby states that there was a general willingness on both sides to attain a peaceful 
settlement. They even announced the formation of an expert group to navigate the conflicting 
claims in the Spratly Islands in the hopes a satisfactory settlement might be found (Wilhem 
1994). While all this was formally proceeding, each continued to act to explore oil deposits in the 
Spratlys and the Tonkin Gulf, and acted to further secure claims like Vietnam building 
lighthouses on some features in the Spratlys while China reciprocated by deploying additional 
naval forces (Wilhelm 1994). Perhaps partly due to these actions unofficial reports in this period 
indicated little to no progress on negotiations (Wilhelm 1994), particularly after China sent naval 
ships to blockade a Vietnamese oil rig, even though it resided in Vietnam’s international 
recognized territorial waters (Boston Globe Forum 2015). 
 Another forum for negotiations was created upon Vietnam’s entrance into ASEAN. Much 
like its fellow members, after joining the organization Vietnam formed a bilateral working group 
with China to go over the claims in the Spratly Islands (Othman 1995). Part of this process was 
to focus all bilateral discussion solely on the overlapping claims. Despite this expansion in 
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engagement, China acted domestically in the National People’s Congress to pass a measure 
confirming Beijing’s claims to the archipelagos (Nette 1996). Vietnam became increasingly 
worried following this action as China continued to make progress in a massive modernization of 
their armed forces, especially in terms of the creation of a new powerful, long range navy (Nette 
1996). As a result of these concerns, and despite never ceasing to call for peaceful resolutions to 
the disputes, Vietnam began to devote more resources to develop its military and scientific 
infrastructure on the territory it occupied in the disputed islands (Nette 1996). 
 Tensions would go on to peak in the late 1990s through such actions as Vietnam filing 
formal protests to China over a Chinese oil rig entering into Vietnamese waters (Phuong 1997). 
Demands were made that all drilling cease immediately and that negotiations start. Thankfully, 
though tensions were high, tangible progress was made when an agreement was reached on a 
border agreement and efforts to settle the question of demarcation in the area of the Beibu Bay in 
2000 (Fefofuk 1999). As a result, on December 30, 1999 the Land Border Treaty was finally 
signed and would go into effect in July of 2000, following the ratification by both China and 
Vietnam (Storey 2008). Not too long after this, after seventeen rounds of negotiations, Vietnam 
and China signed the Agreement on the Demarcation of Waters, Exclusive Economic Zones and 
Continental Shelfs in the Gulf of Tonkin, which divided the gulf along equidistant lines. These 
agreements were not ratified, however, until July 2004 due to protracted negotiations over 
lucrative fishing rights in the area (Storey 2008). 
 In 2002 efforts were made to further reduce the possibility of conflict by China and the 
ten Southeast Asian members of ASEAN, who passed an accord on ways to avoid conflict over 
the disputed features (Penh 2002). Though useful, it would not be enough by itself to end 
struggles over fishing rights, such as in 2005 when a Vietnamese fishing boat was assaulted by 
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Chinese fishery officers in the western part of the Gulf of Tonkin (Boston Global Forum 2015). 
Though outright violent militarized interactions were down, minor incidents would continue to 
occur between China and Vietnam. In 2009, China would detain thirty-three fishing boats and 
433 fishermen (Boston Global Forum 2015). In 2010, Vietnam would begin conducting surveys 
to complete a dossier for the UN on the boundaries of their continental shelf when a group of 
Chinese vessels would ram and sever deployed survey cables (Boston Global Forum 2015). 
Detaining of Vietnamese fishermen and molestation of Vietnamese survey efforts would 
continue into the following years, making it clear that ultimate settlement of these conflicting 
claims still had a lot of progress to make. 
 
Discussion 
In the thirty-eight years of the China-Vietnam disputes presented in Table 5 where 
UNGA voting occurs for both, there were eight years where only peaceful interactions occurred, 
ten years where only violent interactions occurred, and five years where both peaceful and 
violent interactions occurred. Much like as in the case of the Russian and Indian disputes, the 
convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions on voting in the UNGA is 
mixed and unclear. For peaceful interactions, four years there was divergence, three years there 
was convergence, and one year was the first of observation. For violent interactions, there was a 
split of four divergence and six convergence. Lastly, in the years where both peaceful and violent 
interactions occurred there was three divergences and two convergences.  
That being said, when average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the 
different interactions, the pattern lines up more with the theory. The average UNGA voting 
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convergence was closer during peaceful interactions (mean = 0.5600) as compared to violent 
interactions (mean = 1.4380) with years of both interactions in between (mean = 0.6048). 
 The reason that mixed years that saw multiple types of settlement attempts resulted in a 
UNGA voting average just above that of solely peaceful attempts years might be due to China’s 
approach towards dealing with the White Dragon Tail Island dispute. As the leaders of states that 
willingly give up territory are likely to be penalized for their actions, the Chinese were careful to 
handle the White Dragon Tail Island dispute carefully that an upsurge in nationalist sentiment 
and criticisms against the regime might be avoided. On the other hand, when it came to the other 
disputes in the South China Sea, China escalated to the use of force as opportunities arose in the 
contested areas, even in situations where promises to avoid conflict and pursue future 
negotiations were made, likely due to the belief that their opponents would be unwilling to fight 
a war or would back off from a confrontation due to lack of support from other actors. Perhaps 
furthering this on Vietnam’s side were the still fresh experiences with the brief border war and 
continuing struggles in the years of 1981 to 1988. For Vietnam, then, it is possible that this 
pattern of actions might have manifested in a likely larger divergence in voting patterns in the 
UNGA compared to China.  
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high 
between China and Vietnam adds more context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions 
that the disputing dyad respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the 
case of a few types of resolutions being influenced but more a general pattern in support of the 
theory. In 1982, wherein China and Vietnam had a violent interaction over disputed territory the 
previous year, they voted differently on a range on resolutions, including topics like security for 
non-nuclear states, the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the role of the UN in Lebanon, the 
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prevention of a space arms race, the non-use of force, and human rights in Chile, El Salvador, 
and Guatemala (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1982a, 1982b, 1982c, 
1982d, 1982e, 1982f, 1982g, 1982h). Further, in 1992, where China and Vietnam had a peaceful 
interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they voted the same on a range on a number 
of resolutions, including ones with such topics as the prohibition of nuclear weapons, colonial 
independence, self-determination, the law of the sea, national sovereignty, and human rights in 
Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992e, 
1992f). Again, with all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years 
that don’t fully align with the theory, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions 
having values indicative of convergence in UNGA voting (H1) as compared to violent attempts 
being higher, and in the direction of more divergent voting (H2). Unfortunately, much like in the 
previous two cases, no conclusions can be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful attempts 
having different impacts, as only negotiations are presented as having occurred between the 




 The Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the South China Sea are a number of uninhabited islets 
and rocks under dispute between China and Japan. The islands themselves lie a hundred miles 
northeast of Taiwan, almost two hundred twenty miles east of China, and two hundred fifty miles 
to the southwest of the island of Okinawa in Japan. For all the controversy surrounding who 
reigns sovereign over them, the islands themselves are only about four-square miles in size, with 
the largest one not even being two and a half square miles in size. Officially the islands have 
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been under dispute between China and Japan since 1970, with each side having conflicting 
claims over who holds sovereignty. 
 It has been China’s stance that it has the stronger claim to sovereignty over the islands 
based on historical, geographical, and legal grounds. China asserts that it was their people that 
discovered and named the Diaoyu islands, and that Chinese fishermen have been using them as 
fishing shelters and nautical landmarks since as early as the fourteenth century. Further they 
claim that China’s jurisdiction is further supported by their incorporation of the islands into their 
coastal defense. They claim that the Treaty of Shimonoseki, which ended the Chinese-Japanese 
War in 1895 and gave the islands to Japan, was an unequal treaty that was effectively reversed 
following the end of World War II in accordance the Cairo Declaration (1943), the Potsdam 
Proclamation (1945) and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender (1945). Thus, it is no surprise that 
China was upset when the United States included them under its trusteeship in 1951, and 
recognized the renewed control over them by Japan 1971. 
 Japan, on the other hand, asserts that the islands were unoccupied as of 1885, and thus 
capable of being formally incorporated into Japan according to their status as terra nullius in 
1895. Even when under the trusteeship under the United States, Japan asserted claim to them so 
when returned following the Okinawa Reversion Agreement in 1971 they asserted de facto 
control. In 1996 Japan followed up by declaring an EEZ around the Senkaku islands, all the 
while that China consistently protested their control over the islands stating that doing so 
violated Chinese sovereignty. 
 When it comes to the value of the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands they have economic, military 
and symbolic worth to both China and Japan. The economic value of the islands primarily comes 
from the rich fisheries off the islands and the extensive deposits of oil and natural gas. The 
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fishing area covers about seven and a half thousand square miles with yearly yields of over 
150,000 tons of fish. Fishing vessels from the nearby coastal provinces of China would 
consistently fish in these waters until 1996 when Japan declared an EEZ over the islands and 
utilized their Coast Guard vessels to prevent their fishing in the waters. In terms hydrocarbon 
reserves, since 1969 there have been speculations that they were extensive resources present, 
which began to be confirmed in 1982 with the Pinghu field, and the additional fields of 
Chunxiao, Tianwaitian, Duanqiao and Longjing by 2000. 
 For the Chinese, these islands have increased in value over time for two reasons 
pertaining to each of the present resources. With other fisheries nearer the Chinese mainland 
being depleted, the greater reserves off these disputed islands are increasingly appealing. The 
same goes for the hydrocarbon deposits in the area. With the Chinese economy continuing to 
expand the need for energy resources has continued to grow, making access to the reserves 
around the contested islands a strategic aim over those in the South china sea which are a bit 
further away and harder to access. 
 In terms of military value both Japan and China recognize the geostrategic importance of 
the islands. By lying essentially between both states, they serve not only as a source of national 
defense but also a potential springboard for an attack, especially when ownership over the 
islands would bring with it sovereignty over the nearby waters and the airspace over them. In 
addition, for China, in order to access the Pacific Ocean and/or protect their shores from an 
opponent in war, they would need to control two island chains, in which the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
islands lies next to a gap in the first chain. In terms of geography, the Chinese naval bases face 
either the East or the South China Sea, so for their naval forces to enter into the western Pacific 
though would need to pass through the Miyako Strait (between the Okinawa and Miyako islands) 
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or through the Bashi Channel (between the Philippines and Taiwan). If the Chinese had control 
over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, however, their navy would have more options and easier 
mobility in the area. 
 From the Japanese perspective things progressed a bit differently, which is owed in large 
part to events since the end of World War II. Given the events of the war, the new Constitution 
constructed for post-war Japan included Article 9 as means to curtain the state from again 
threatening international peace. In Article 9, aggression is outlawed and Japan is denied any sort 
of offensive military forces at all. Further, it dictated that the defense of Japan not be militaristic, 
with no military establishment permitted even in the case where the industrial capacity to support 
it developed. This would last for three years until the outbreak of the Korean War. 
 With the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950, the majority of the forces of the American 
occupation were transferred to the Korean theatre, which quickly left Japan relatively helpless in 
its capacity to enforce the rule of law within their borders, let alone if a foreign power decided to 
act against their interested. As a way to address this situation, the National Police Reserve was 
created which, over time, turned into the Self-Defense Force (SDF). With tensions continuing to 
increase between the West and Communism, the decision to keep Japan pacifist was set aside 
and their military capabilities were upgraded over time. What followed was several decades of 
improvements, starting with the First Defense Build Up Program (1958-1961) and continued by 
a Second Program (1962-1966) and Third Program (1967-1971). Due to these actions the 
Japanese defense forces developed from the 1950s and 1970s into a well-equipped military force. 
 When the Diaoyu/Senkaku dispute arose in the 1970s, China and Japan were in the 
process of improving their relations, including formalizing their bilateral relationship in 1972 
and formally signing a Treaty of Peace and Friendship in 1978. This resulted in a lowering of 
 133 
tensions between the disputants, though they did not dissipate altogether. The military 
importance of the islands rose to an entirely new level in 2009 when President Obama of the 
United States announced a strategic pivot of naval forces and attention from the Middle East to 
East Asia. As Japan is one of the United States most strategic allies in the region, it has played 
host to a high-level military presence for some time. All told some 35,000 US military personnel 
are based in Japan, including the United States Seventh Fleet out of Yokosuka and the Third 
Marine Expeditionary Force based in Okinawa among others. Given the ties between these two 
countries in the area, it comes as no surprise that the strategic placement of these disputed islands 
has resulted in renewed tensions. 
 There is special symbolic significance attached to the islands for China as well. Given 
that the Diaoyu area has served as a major fishery for Chinese sailors, and as it lies nearby both 
the mainland and Taiwan, China places them within their historical control. Given the way in 
which they had been originally attained from China by the Japanese, and retained in the period 
after World War II, these past bitter conflicts have attached high Chinese nationalist significance 
to the dispute. The First Chinese-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Second Chinese-Japanese War 
(1937-1945), human experiments in eastern China, the Nanjing Massacre, these and many more 
events have contributed to a general level of hatred and grief on the part of the Chinese that, 
when tied to the dispute, make it that much more difficult to resolve. Viewed in this way, for the 
Chinese the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands are not just a territorial dispute but are also vested with 
importance of national dignity and memory. Lastly, the issue of sovereignty over Taiwan is also 
tied into this dispute. According to the governments of both China and Taiwan, the islands are 
part of the Toucheng township of Yilan County in Taiwan. For this reason, China’s claims on 
these islands and its claims on Taiwan can be seen as interdependent. If China decided to 
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compromise on the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands, fully accepting Japan’s legal sovereignty over them, 
its claim over the entirety of Taiwan might well be compromised (Zhongqi 2007). When this is 
combined with the traditional rivalry between China and Japan, and the close relationship 
between the latter and the United States, this has resulted in Japan being the target of much 
Chinese nationalist discontent. 
 
Settlement Attempt Interactions 
 Of all the states examined in these case studies, China and Japan had the fewest 
interactions over their territorial dispute. Moreover, it is the only case examined here in which no 
significant peaceful efforts in settling the dispute occurred. In terms of how each side has 
approach their interactions over the dispute, there have been some variations over time. Initially 
in the 1970s, China took a laid-back approach where the dispute was maintained, with occasional 
flare-ups, but no concentrated consistent efforts were exerted to end the dispute in their favor. In 
large part this was due to the security threat posed by the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance. Acting to 
counter this threat, China made efforts to improve its relations with the United States and Japan 
(Lieberthal 1978). 
 In terms of the flare-ups that did occur, there are six in particular that stand out. The first 
occurred in 1978, when the Japanese constructed a lighthouse on Diaoyu/Uotsuri Island which 
lead to over one hundred Chinese fishing trawlers acting to surround the island in protest. The 
result of this led to both governments acting to defuse tensions, and treating the structure as an 
unofficial lighthouse.  
Tensions would jump again in 1990 when the Japanese government reportedly accepted 
an application to recognize the official status of the lighthouse, with some efforts then following 
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to repair it. Much like in 1978, China lodged an official complaint which resulted in the 
lighthouse again being denied official status. By the end of the 1990s tensions would heat up still 
further when activists attempted to storm the disputed islands three times. One man would lose 
his life following a clash in September of 1996, when tried to swim to Senkaku but drowned 
before making it (Golovnin 2003). Later in June of 1998, a vessel with activists that sailed from 
Hong Kong sank near the islands under uncertain circumstances. China would claim that a 
Japanese patrol boat was involved in ramming it, while Japan would respond that they sunk 
themselves as a provocation (Golovnin 2003).  
The Chinese navy and government officials would engage in activities related to the 
disputed islands as well. In 1996, when a new lighthouse was constructed on that same island, 
the Chinese navy acted to blockade the island, though both sides ended up releasing statements 
to downplay the issue (Kurtenbach 1996). Regardless of this attempt to mitigate the fallout of the 
interactions, China went ahead to file a protest demanding that the structure be removed as a 
violation of Chinese sovereignty (Kurtenbach 1996). In response to this backlash, Japan acted in 
defiance, stating that under both historical control and current international law the islands 
rightfully belonged to Japan and, though they did not wish to provoke China further, were 
adamant in this claim (Kurtenbach 1996). In the years to follow the extent of interactions 
between the two states would follow this general pattern. 
In 1999, China’s navy conducted exercises in close proximity to the disputed islands, to 
the extent that ten warships were nearby conducting drills from July 12-15, with research and 
surveillance ships in the area as well (Golovnin 1999). Rather than escalate further, Japan opted 
to take no measures against China at that time (Golovnin 1999). They would, however, commit 
to actions of their own designed to buttress the claims Japan had to the islands. In 2002, Japan 
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would make an agreement with the private owner of three of the five Senkaku islands, who 
themselves lived in the Okinawa Prefecture in Japan, to commit to a yearly lease to be paid in a 
lump sum (Japan Economic Newswire 2002). By engaging in this rental, Japan could take a 
more active hand in the management and maintenance of the islands. Moreover, the lease had the 
benefit of working to prevent the resale of the islands to other third parties as well as further 
block the possibilities that individuals or groups might land there in protest of Japanese control 
(Japan Economic Newswire 2002). While China would protest these actions as violating their 
sovereignty, the fact of the matter was there was little they could do beyond what they had 
already engaged in as protest (Golovnin 2003). 
 A series of incidents occurred in the early 2000s. In 2003, Japanese patrol boats would 
impound a Chinese schooner carrying activists within the 12-mile Japanese control zone with the 
intent of landing on the islands to protest for the return of the to Chinese control (Golovnin 
2003). The consistent ability of Japanese forces to prevent landings on the islands and conduct 
arrests was due to the fact that, for three decades, the Japanese Coast Guard had stationed at least 
one patrol ship in the waters surrounding the islands twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year. 
Unfortunately, these patrolling efforts were not one hundred percent full proof, as evidence by 
activists successfully landing on the islands in 2004 (Yoshida 2004). It was around this period in 
time that Japan would reiterate their stance that Chinese claims had only really emerged after 
1968, when the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East had released a report after 
conducting research that indicated the possibility of massive oil reserves around the islands into 
the continental shelf in the surrounding areas (Yoshida 2004). Following these activities, 
domestic protests broke out in parts of China over the shared dispute with Japan and, while 
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Tokyo tried to smooth things over diplomatically, revenge attacks occurred in Japan against 
Chinese banks and schools (Pocha 2005). 
 Similar events would occur in 2010 when Japan detained another captain of a Chinese 
fishing boat after they collided with two Japanese Coast Guard ships near the disputed islands. 
Though Chinese officials continue to demand that Japanese vessels not shadow Chinese patrol 
boats in the disputed area, the Japanese Coast Guard continues to maintain a close watch of the 
disputed islands, always on the lookout for the next Chinese patrol or ship of activists trying to 
press closer. Up until the end of the observation period in this case study, while no major 




In the forty-four years of the China-Japan disputes presented in Table 6, there were nine 
years where only violent interactions occurred, and zero years for the other kinds of interactions. 
Much like as in the other cases the convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement 
interactions on voting in the UNGA does not collaborate the theory directly. For violent 
interactions, there was a split of two divergence and seven convergence, something that might be 
expected not to occur given the hypotheses underlying the theory.  
When average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the different interactions, 
using the presence of no interactions in lieu of peaceful ones, the pattern lines up more with the 
theory. The average UNGA voting convergence was closer during no interactions (mean = 
1.5436) as compared to violent interactions (mean = 1.6839). The level of divergence in UNGA 
voting in years of violent interactions is similar to that of both Russia (mean = 1.6952) and 
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Vietnam (mean = 1.4380) for this period of time. Much like these two other states, the higher 
divergence in UNGA voting likely stems from security concerns, and particularly in the case of 
Japan, the lack of consistent long term peaceful engagement to attempt to settle the outstanding 
disputes over the Senkaku Islands. 
In terms of the differences in settlement interactions compared to the other disputing 
dyads, there could be a number of reasons for both the lack of peaceful settlement attempts as 
well as why even in the years that saw a lack of violent interactions the UNGA voting 
divergence was so high. First, the lack of peaceful settlement attempts likely are influenced to a 
certain degree on the leftover bad feelings following the atrocities of World War II, the strategic 
and economic value of other Chinese claims like the Paracels and Spratly Islands being higher, 
and more immediate security concerns of the borders shared with Russia, India and Vietnam who 
China was engaged in significant conflicts with in the 1990s and earlier. With all these points 
taken into account it is possible that this explains in part the relative lack of interactions over the 
Senkaku Islands, and why the divergent voting in the UNGA is closer to the alignment of voting 
during the years when no violent interactions occurred.  
Examining several years in which the change in convergence or divergence is high adds 
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad 
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of 
resolutions being influenced by the interactions over the disputed territory. For example, in 2000, 
where China and Japan had a violent interaction over disputed territory the previous year, they 
voted the differently on a range on resolution topics, including globalization, independence of 
former colonies, the democratic international order, respect for the UN Charter, and human rights 
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Iran, and Sudan (see these sources for examples: UN 
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General Assembly 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2000d, 2000e, 2000f, 2000g). Similarly, in 2003, where 
Japan was engaged with another violent interaction over disputed territory with China the year 
before, they voted the differently on a number of resolution topics again, including the 
prohibition of nuclear weapons, globalization, nuclear disarmament, children in armed conflict, 
multilateralism in disarmament, and human rights in such states as the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Iran, and Turkmenistan (see these sources for examples: UN General Assembly 
2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2003d, 2003e, 2003f, 2003g, 2003h). With these findings taken together, 
and explanations again offered for the few years that don’t fully align, support has been found 
for peaceful settlement interactions having values indicative of convergence (H1) as compared to 
violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more divergent voting (H2). Much like in 
the case of the previous dyads examined in this chapter, no conclusions can be reached regarding 
specific kinds of peaceful attempts having different impacts, as only negotiations are presented 




 Given the complicated nature of overlapping claims for different territories in the South 
China Sea, it is no surprise that China has dispute with another state over the Spratly Islands: the 
Philippines. To briefly reiterate the appeal of sovereignty over these islands one must be aware 
of the economic and strategic value they represent. Despite centuries over which these islands, 
shoals and rocks being largely ignored except as hazards of navigation (Dolven, Kan, and 
Manyin, 2013), in recent decades they have come to possess greater value to the disputants. 
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 To both states, the Spratly islands possesses value in the form of natural resources, such 
as coconut palms and bat guano. Scattered around the islands are rich fishing grounds, and the 
preferred areas for fishermen of the Philippines and China ply their trade. Given the 
susceptibility of these areas to tropical storms, the islands and features in the disputed area are 
used by many as shelters if they are unable to return to shore, a practice that has stretched back 
centuries and one that has endured even in the face of this territorial dispute. Perhaps most 
important to either state, however, is how these features of the South China Sea sit astride the 
transoceanic shipping lanes that link China and the other states of Southeast Asia to business 
partners and markets in the West. 
 After 1982, with the expansion of the territorial sea limit to 12-nautical miles and further 
license granted to a 200-mile EEZ and the continental shelfs on which each state stood, the 
potential economic values of these contested territories in the South China Sea shot up, 
especially as technology began to be developed that would allow the exploitation of any 
hydrocarbon deposits not previously harvested. Given its burgeoning population, especially in its 
cities, having access to the rich resources of the contested South China Sea islands shot up in 
significance to the Chinese leadership. Moving quickly to exploit the situation, China expanded 
its fleet of merchant ships to one thousand by 1987 and began to gobble up all energy resources 
it could get its hands on. The importance of these contested hydrocarbon resources increased. 
 Much as mentioned previously, the islands themselves would improve Chinese abilities 
to monitor shipping lanes and air traffic in the region and, with the installation of additional 
bases and missile batters, China would be able to buttress its security with the capacity to block 
any hostile forces on its way to China’s coastal waters. Lastly, there remains some symbolic 
value of the disputed islands to China as well, who hold that the discovery and use of these 
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islands by Chinese mariners goes back thousands of years. To control these features would allow 
China to take another step towards retrieving the prestige of its past. 
 Regarding the claims of the two states to the Spratly Islands, the claims by China and the 
Philippines emerged in different ways. The most comprehensive claim by China is found in the 
declaration they issued in 2009 in a notes verbale to the United Nations. This map of the South 
China Sea was composed of nine dashes mimicking the map issued by the government of the 
Republic of China in 1947 before their overthrow. This map itself was modified in the 1950s, but 
the lines are themselves vague and China has since refused to clarify exactly where they lie 
(Schofield 2013). For China’s part, they insist that the claim can be traced back to documents 
created during the time of the Yuan Dynasty, that is the late 13th century, which showed the 
regime as having established administrative control over the area. If true this would indicate the 
claim they are asserting predates the ratification of UNCLOS, and as such supersedes the legal 
document. 
The claim put forth by the Philippines is of a more recent nature. Based on exploration of 
the archipelago that occurred in the 1940s and 1950s, it would not be until 1972 to the claim over 
53 islands and shoals in the Spratlys would be formalized by the Philippine government (Dolven, 
Kan, and Manyin, 2013). Wiegand and Beuck (2018) provides a good overview of events form 
the Philippine perspective since 1971 when the claim named the features the Kalayaan islands, 
which were then incorporated into the province of Palawan in 1972. The Philippines would 
further assert their control over the Kalayaan island group by declaring them subject to their 
sovereign control with Presidential Degree No. 1596, and that their existence provided the 
Philippines a 200-nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zone with Presidential Decree No. 1599 
(Wiegand and Beuck 2018). This assertion of sovereignty would not change in 1984 when the 
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Philippines signed on to the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, in which 
they declared that they were an archipelagic state that held sovereignty over the Spratly Islands 
and reefs that fell within their 200-nautical mile EEZ. 
 
Settlement Attempt Interactions 
Though recognition and restoration of diplomatic ties was given to China in 1975, it 
would not be until the 1990s that serious attempts began to be made to manage their shared 
disputes. By 1991 China stated that it was ready to join other countries with claims to explore the 
creation of appropriate mechanisms in a joint effort to secure peace and stability in the region 
(Coloma 1991). Having done so, however, China also stated that such efforts should first be 
attempted via bilateral negotiations, followed by sub-regional talks if they were to prove 
unsuccessful (Coloma 1991). Despite these overtures to peaceful settlement, Beijing alarmed its 
neighbors in 1992 when it passed a controversial law claiming ownership of the entire Spratly 
Island chain, and asserted the right to use military force to protect these claims (United Press 
International 1993). It would be actions like this that led to effort by the Philippines to mitigate 
the tensions of the dispute. In 1993, the President of the Philippines visited China in an effort to 
expand trade and investment ties, while also broach talks on the security situation tied to their 
shared disputes in the South China Sea (United Press International 1993). 
Though this would bear some fruit, and the Philippines would say they were satisfied 
with agreements to prevent conflict over the Spratly Islands, they also continued to express 
concern over China’s military buildup (Teves 1994). The Philippines was worried about China’s 
military modernization, especially of their air force and navy, as the Philippines has a smaller 
armed forces and smaller budget. This worry would soon prove to be warranted. In February of 
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1995, Chinese forces moved in to occupy Mischief Reef, when they quickly established several 
buildings (Boston Global Forum 2015). The Philippine government would go on to publish 
several pictures of the Reef that showed the presence of several Chinese navy supply vessels, and 
even a submarine support ship in anchor by the reef (Boston Global Forum 2015). The 
government of the Philippines would again state that it had no intention of engaging China in a 
military conflict over the disputed features, but China was still drawing to close to Philippine 
shores for comfort (Flipo 1995). Thus, while the Philippines could not compete militarily 
compete, it continued making efforts to reinforce defenses. 
 Following these events China and the Philippines gradually made the transition to 
focusing on increasing trade, investment, and their overall relationship, setting the sole focus on 
the dispute settlement before aside. At the same time, the Philippines hoped to use its links in 
ASEAN to pressure China to toe the line in its diplomatic conduct (Agnote 1997). There was 
speculation at the time that, without ASEAN’s diplomatic efforts, the territorial disputes in the 
Spratly Islands might have grown into a full-scale conflict over the valuable hydrocarbon 
deposits, thereby disrupting the stability and economic growth of the region (Agnote 1997). 
 Even with ASEAN’s efforts, however, the tensions continued between China and the 
Philippines into the late 1990s. In March of 1997, China sent several warships to survey the 
Philippine occupied Kankiam Cay and Loaita Island in the Spratly Islands (Boston Global Forum 
2015). The Philippines would act in April of 1997 by ordering a Chinese speedboat and two 
fishing vessels away from the Scarborough Shoal, after which Philippine fisherman removed 
Chinese markers and raised the flag of the Philippines (Boston Global Forum 2015). Later, China 
would begin to warn the Philippines to avoid flying too low over disputed shoals that held a 
Chinese presence in the South China Sea, that an accidental confrontation might be avoided 
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(Gomez 1998), though the Philippines ended up publishing pictures from these reconnaissance 
missions over Mischief Reef (Son 1999). 
 Despite several founds of dialogue between both of their governments, the accord 
reached in these meetings did not stop China from constructing new structures on the features 
they occupied in the South China Sea, no did it prevent them from stationing additional military 
vessels there (Son 1999). The 1990s would end with tensions continually stirred up from the 
Philippines continuing to arrest fishermen around Scarborough Shoal in 1998, and a Chinese 
fishing boat sinking after a collision with a Philippine warship in 1999 (Boston Global Forum 
2015). China would continue its pattern in this period of promising to never use force in their 
shared disputes then going ahead in building up its presence in waters uncomfortably close to its 
fellow disputant (Son 1999). Negotiations would continue the entire time this was going on. 
 In the early 200s, a new Sino-Filipino agreement was hailed by the sides as importance 
progress towards the settlement of the territorial disputes peacefully (Sui 2000). China would 
take steps to assure their counterparts in the Philippines that it was not a threat, and that what 
was needed now was for both sides to build up their mutual trust and confidences (Sui 2000). In 
the disputed waters themselves, however, continued practices of fishing stirred up incidents 
between the two sides. In 2000, the Philippine navy fired several warning shots at Chinese 
vessels to drive them away from the Scarborough Shoal, and later opened fire on Chinese 
fishermen, killing one and arresting seven (Boston Global Forum 2015). Incidents like this with 
Chinese fishermen would occur prominently until 2002. 
 Given the tensions and threats of the previous years, especially around fishing boats, 
efforts were taken to decrease the likelihood of outright conflict in 2002 by ASEAN and China 
who signed a landmark accord governing their interactions in the South China Sea called the 
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2002 Declaration of the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (Penh 2002). This spirit of 
cooperation would continue between China and the Philippines when both agreed to jointly study 
oil deposits in the South China Sea where their claims overlapped, as well as agreed to a three-
year research project (Agence France Presse 2004). This goodwill would be further buttressed by 
strategic cooperation between the two states and their efforts to consistently maintain contact in 
consultation on shared issues (Xinhau General News Service 2007). 
Unfortunately, shooting incidents would break out again in 2011, when a Chinese frigate 
fired shots at fishing boats flying the Philippines flags when they refused to leave the vicinity of 
the Jackson atoll.  In the same time period China issued a statement that it denied any plans to 
resort to force in the regional territorial disputes involved the South China Sea and Spratly 
Islands (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011). In fact, it reaffirmed commitment to a 
peaceful resolution of these same disputes, to which the Philippines responded with calls for a 
declaration guaranteeing an open seas policy and a general demilitarization of the region with 
garrisons withdrawn (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011). When this was not fully 
carried out, the Philippines removed wooden markers on three reefs and banks in the disputed 
area, and then formally protested intrusions by the Chinese navy into internationally recognized 
Philippine waters (de la Cruz, Rosales, Manalo, and Mallari 2011). 
A number of similar incidents occurred the next year as well. A Philippine naval ship by 
the name of Gregorio del Pilar engaged in a standoff with Chinese surveillance vessels off the 
Scarborough Shoal, while not long after the Chinese pressed a Philippine archeological ship to 
leave the area based on their violating sovereignty (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 
2016). In May of 2012, the Chinese government protested Philippine actions in the Scarborough 
Shoal and, to illustrate their displeasure, they issued a travel warning against the Philippines to 
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their citizens and imposed trade barriers against pineapples and bananas originating in their 
fellow claimant’s territory (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016). Late that same month 
a fishing ban went into effect on both countries for the Scarborough Shoal, though China would 
later return and remain around the shoal after erecting a barrier at its’ entrance. Likely in part a 
reaction to these events, Philippine President Aguino presented Administrative Order No. 29 in 
September of 2012 (Dolven, Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016), which asserted that the 
maritime areas to the west of the Philippine archipelago would henceforth be known as the West 
Philippine Sea, to which they possessed sovereign jurisdiction over the EEZ to the distance of 
200 nautical miles. A few weeks later China acted to increase the number of unmanned aerial 
vehicles (UAVs) that monitored the disputed features also claimed by the Philippines. These 
actions and others like them have only served to increase the tensions yet again between both 
disputants. 
It was around this period of interactions that the Philippines came to the determination 
that the dispute would likely continue into the future in this manner and that negotiations would 
likely not lead to an equitable outcome for both sides. As a result, in 2013 the Philippines took a 
legal step against China’s claims by formally notifying that it would be seeking international 
arbitration against China with the accusation that its activities in the South China Sea disputed 
areas were illegal and invalid (Gomez 2013). China would ultimately respond to the Philippines 
intent to carry through with these proceedings with a rejection of participating in it (Heydarian 
2014). China based this response on the claim that the tribunal did not have jurisdiction over the 
case, as it was beyond the scope of the United Nations Declaration on the Law of the Sea 
Convention and that the Philippines had previously promised to only use negotiations to settle 
the issue (Heydarian 2014). 
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Events came to a head in January of 2014 when China imposed a requirement of a fishing 
permit in the South China Sea, despite the objections of the Philippines and other states. As a 
result, the Philippines invoked the compulsory settlement of disputes clause under the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, where they submitted a case regarding their 
competing claims with China over the South China Sea to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 
The Hague. By 2015 the Philippines v. China was a pending arbitration case centered on the 
legality of China’s “Nine-Dash line” in the South China Sea according to UNCLOS (Dolven, 
Lawrence, Lum and O’Rourke 2016). Eventually the tribunal ruled that it had the power to hear 
the case and agreed to examine seven of the fifteen submissions by the Philippines, among which 
were questions regarding the legal status of features like Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef 
(Wiegand and Beuck 2018). The claims initially set aside by the tribunal were those that mostly 
accused China of simply acting unlawfully. Though it falls outside the time period examined, the 
tribunal would conclude rulings in favor of the Philippines, among which were the invalid nature 
of China’s nine-dash line and that the Philippines had the right to expand its EEZ and access to 
the continental shelf in its bordering sea. 
 
Discussion 
In the forty-four years of the China-Philippines disputes presented in Table 7, there were 
fifteen years where only peaceful interactions occurred, zero years where only violent 
interactions occurred, and eight years where both types of interactions occurred. Again, much 
like as in the other cases, the convergence or divergence pattern of these settlement interactions 
on voting in the UNGA does not collaborate the theory directly. For peaceful interactions, there 
was a rough split of seven divergences and eight convergences in the UNGA voting. For both 
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interactions occurring in a year, there was a split of two divergence and six convergence, 
something that seems to indicate a slight bit more weight given to peaceful interactions over 
violent ones. That being said, when average convergence of UNGA voting is examined for the 
different interactions, the pattern again lines up more with the theory. The average UNGA voting 
convergence was closer during peaceful interactions (mean = 0.3736) as compared to years 
where violent and peaceful interactions (mean = 0.3912) occurred. 
 The lack of a large meaningful difference between peaceful attempts and mixed attempts 
on divergent UNGA voting might be due to China’s approach towards other disputes, 
specifically those in the South China Sea. With these other disputes, China escalated to the use of 
force as opportunities presented themselves in the contested areas, again likely due to the belief 
that their opponents would be unwilling to fight a war or would back off from a confrontation 
due to lack of support from other actors. Also, in 2013 Philippines stated they were taking China 
to Arbitration over their conflicting claims in the South China Sea. Though not begun before the 
end of this studies bounded timeline (2015) the fact that this arbitration attempt initiation was 
announced in 2013 might explain in part why the following two years voting similarity in the 
UNGA jumped from 0.01 voting difference to 0.33 and 0.24 voting difference. These scores 
would make sense given China’s previously stated desire to avoid outside involvement over its 
territorial disputes. 
Examining several years with high changes in convergence or divergence contributes 
additional context demonstrating the variety of UNGA resolutions that the disputing dyad 
respectively agree or disagree on, indicating again that it is not just the case of a few types of 
resolutions being influenced. In 1992, following a year in which China and the Philippines had a 
peaceful interaction over disputed territory, the states voted the same on a range of resolutions, 
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including some dealing with the prohibition of nuclear weapons, colonial independence, self-
determination, the law of the sea, and human rights in Iraq (see these sources for examples: UN 
General Assembly 1992a, 1992b, 1992c, 1992d, 1992f). Another year seeing high convergence 
in voting was 2005, which also followed a peaceful interaction over disputed territory in the 
previous year. China and the Philippines voted the same regarding a range of issues including 
nuclear issues, the International Court of Justice, globalization, human rights, Palestine issues, 
the law of the sea, and national sovereignty (see these sources for examples: UN General 
Assembly 2005a, 2005b, 2005c, 2005d, 2005e, 2005f, 2005g, 2005h). Much like in the previous 
cases, when all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for the few years that 
don’t fully align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions having values 
indicative of convergence (H1), compared to interactions where violent attempts occur, which 
lead to more divergent voting (H2). Moreover, like in the other cases examined, the range of 
issues in which they had similarities in voting was wide. That being said, it must again be 
reiterated that no conclusions can be reached regarding specific kinds of peaceful attempts 
having different impacts on voting alignment in this case, as negotiations were the only type of 
peaceful attempts pursued. 
 
Overall China Voting Similarity with Disputants and the United States 
 Having gone through each case one at a time, I now present the averages across all the 
cases to determine general support for the theory in terms of China’s interactions with these five 
fellow disputants. In terms of the average voting convergence in the UNGA, peaceful 
interactions (mean = 0.6917) across the seventy-seven dyad years was closer than both mixed 
interactions in twenty-six dyad years (mean = 0.8173) and violent interactions in twenty-four 
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dyad years (mean = 1.3917). In general, it can be said that this allows for the null hypothesis to 
be rejected as the pattern of these values show that peaceful settlement attempts saw higher 
UNGA voting convergence (H1) compared to those that were violent (H2). 
This being the case, it is now time to examine Chinese settlement interactions as they 
relate to UNGA voting convergence and divergence with the US. Table 8 presents the number of 
peaceful and violent attempts in a given year from 1971 to 2015 involving China and one of the 
five disputants covered in the case studies. While not completely covering all territorial disputes, 
China was engaged with over this time period, the expectation is that having engaged with the 
five cases of this chapter that comprise states at different levels of power, different regime types, 
and different disputes, the interaction with US voting in the UNGA in terms of convergence or 
divergence will be sufficiently robust to make some conclusions relevant to the theory. 
 As is clear in this table, there are a range of possibilities for a given year in terms of 
interactions, going from as low as one peaceful and zero violent, up to four peaceful and two 
violent interactions in a given year. Generally speaking, the average UNGA voting divergence 
increases as more violent interactions occur alongside peaceful ones, which holds true across the 
majority of the dyad years. Voting convergence is lower for one peaceful interaction and no 
violent interactions (mean = 3.4308) than one peaceful interaction and three violent interactions 
(mean = 3.8255). For years with two peaceful attempts, voting convergence was closer when 
only one violent interaction occurred (mean = 2.8260) than if two violent (mean = 3.0341) or 
three violent interactions (mean = 3.0397) occurred. For years that saw three peaceful attempts, 
convergence is closer when zero violent interactions (mean = 3.4126) occurred as compared to 
when one violent interaction (mean = 3.4787) occurred. Lastly, for years in which four peaceful 
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attempts occurred, when zero violent interactions also occurred convergence was closer (mean = 
3.4421) than when one violent interaction (mean = 4.1780) occurred.  
Only three combinations of peaceful and violent interactions varied from this general 
pattern: years that saw one peaceful and one violent interaction; years that saw three peaceful 
and three violent interactions; and years that saw four peaceful and two violent interactions. The 
average for years in which one peaceful and one violent interaction occurred might be explained 
by China’s consistent efforts of engagement in the 1970s to improve relations with the US and 
Japan, as it feared a powerful Soviet Union across its disputed borders to its north, and the Soviet 
sphere of influence freshly expanding into Vietnam and South Asia to its west. A similar 
argument might be made for the year 1979 that saw three peaceful and three violent interactions. 
In this year, the overall convergence compared to other years that saw three peaceful attempts 
might be due to the brief border war that broke out between Vietnam and China. Part of the 
results of this war, which occurred during the height of the Cold War, would be a wedge driven 
between China and Vietnam, and by extension Vietnam’s backer the Soviet Union, which 
decreased the possibility of communist consolidations expanding beyond those portions of South 
Asia. In addition, it was this same period in time that China was making concentrated efforts to 
grow closer to the US, as the Soviet Union was seen as the greater, and closer, danger. Lastly, 
the average convergence of years that saw four peaceful and two violent interactions might be a 
bit lower than four peaceful and one violent interactions due to the events that occurred in 1998 
and 1999 in China’s dispute dyads. In these years, the land border treaty with Vietnam was 
signed, decreasing the possibility of a new border conflict from breaking out, China settled its 
eastern border dispute with Russia, and it also entered into negotiations with India to define a 
clear Line of Actual control boundary to mitigate the possibility of more conflict over their 
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disputes as well. As all these actions fall in favor what international law, and the US-led 
international system, call for in managing territorial disputes, it stands to reason this would lead 
to higher UNGA voting convergence in these years then otherwise, thereby throwing off the 
pattern to some small degree. With all these findings taken together, and explanations offered for 
the few years that don’t fully align, support has been found for peaceful settlement interactions 
having values indicative of convergence (H3a) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and 
in the direction of more divergent voting (H4). Unfortunately, the middle two of these latter 
hypotheses cannot be assessed in regards to China (H3b and H3c) as for each of the dyads in the 
time period examined only negotiations are presented as having occurred between the disputants 
as peaceful interactions. While arbitration does eventually occur between China and the 
Philippines, the start of the case falls outside the bounds of time of these case studies. However, 
it should be noted that selecting different Chinese disputes would not have changed this 
situation, as none of the disputant dyads that share China over this time period are coded in the 
dataset utilized as seeing anything other than negotiations as peaceful attempts. 
 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I examined five case studies on territorial disputes involving China over 
the years 1971 to 2015 in order to assess additional support for my theory. Initial examinations 
of the case studies provided mixed results in terms of support for my hypotheses. Peaceful 
attempts and violent attempts were assessed as either leading to convergent or divergent voting 
as compared to the previous dyad year, but without fail each resulted in mixed patterns of results. 
Particularly frustrating in this first examination was the China-India case wherein there were 
thirty purely peaceful attempts in the forty-four years under examination. Of these peaceful 
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attempts, fourteen lead to divergent voting and sixteen led to convergent voting. Russia, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines had similar distributions, with all but Vietnam having just slightly 
more convergent results than divergent ones. Upon conducting a closer examination of the 
scores, a good number of dyad years that saw divergent scores associated with peaceful attempts, 
and convergent scores associated with violent ones, were actually very small shifts in voting 
alignment. After averaging out shared UNGA voting scores in each dyad by number of peaceful 
attempts (mean = 0.6917), number of violent attempts (mean = 1.3917), and number of mixed 
attempts (mean = 0.8173) in each year, more conclusive support was found for the first set of 
hypotheses. Given previous discussions of China’s perspectives on international law and their 
wary stance of its use in settling territorial disputes, it is clear that they appreciate efforts exerted 
in negotiations according to the more convergent voting alignment in the UNGA. According to 
these results the null hypothesis can be rejected (H0), as UNGA voting alignment values signal 
support for peaceful settlement attempts having more convergent values (H1) than violent 
settlement attempts (H2). In addition, when at least one peaceful and one violent attempt 
occurred in a year, UNGA voting alignment possessed a mean between that of purely peaceful 
attempts and purely violent attempts. Unfortunately, case selection, while effective in giving a 
range of different kinds of states in terms of power and regime type, nonetheless was ineffective 
in leading to cases that had different kinds of settlement attempts. All peaceful settlement 
attempts that occurred between the five case studies were negotiations, though when additional 
cases involving China were examined, none with the time bounds (1971-2015) saw an attempt at 
arbitration or adjudication according to the dataset utilized. That being said, the pattern of results 
for settlement attempts involving China and resulting voting alignment in the UNGA with the 
US did fall in line with support for peaceful settlements having values indicative of convergence 
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(H3a) as compared to violent attempts being higher, and in the direction of more divergent 
voting (H4). Future work would do well to examine other case studies that do see these kinds of 
attempts. 
In the next and final chapter, I present an overall discussion of the findings of the 
chapters of this dissertation project, as well as what conclusions we might derive from the 
support of the hypotheses examined. I finish with a brief discussion of next steps in further fine 

































Chapter 5: Findings and Conclusion 
 Summary 
To what degree do settlement attempt methods influence disputant foreign policy 
preferences, as indicated by voting preferences in the UNGA? To what degree does the 
information actively conveyed by the settlement attempt method utilized by states in managing 
their ongoing territorial and maritime disputes signal contentment with the US-led international 
system? How is this reflected in general UNGA voting relative to the voting of particular 
disputants? In this dissertation, I sought to address these questions by proposing a theory of 
territorial dispute management influencing voting patterns in the UNGA, in which attempts made 
by states to settle their territorial and maritime disputes signals information on their preferences 
on international law in dispute settlement and perspectives regarding the US-led international 
system as helmed by the United Nations and the United Nations General Assembly. My theory 
emphasized how these attempts, whether violent or peaceful, provide insight into a state’s 
perspective on international law and the international system that it structures, which in turn is 
manifested in the voting patterns of the UNGA. The logic underlying these hypotheses can be 
summarized in several points. 
 Firstly, given the degree that the UN and international community at-large have acted to 
inhibit actions of forceful acquisition of territory, disputed or otherwise, one might expect the 
awareness of the behavior of states in interacting over their disputes peaceably, such as through 
negotiations, or violently, such as through border violations, will inform and influence voting in 
the UNGA, and even convey on how a state feels about the role of international law in territorial 
conflict management in the US-led international system. Keeping in mind that violent attempts 
are clearly confrontational, non-cooperation and demonstrate contempt for international law 
 156 
enshrined in the UNGA, we might expect this to be reflected in voting on UNGA resolutions, 
especially those related to international law. The opposite can be said regarding peaceful 
attempts, which demonstrate conciliatory collaboration and respect for the role of international 
law in attempting to settle disputes. Both these expectations were found to be the case, both 
generally in the regressions and specifically in the case studies. 
Secondly, it has been determined that signaling occurs when one actor is made aware of 
information relevant to another actor’s decisions in the international system (Morrow 1999). 
Early research into this phenomenon led to findings indicating that many outcomes of foreign 
policy decision making were dependent to some degree on the interactions between multiple 
activities taken by states (Gartzke, Carcello, Gannon, and Zhang 2017). Regarding interactions 
over territorial disputes, since we might see these as zero-sum interactions, issues of incomplete 
information and commitment arise (Fearon 1995), with the result that attempts at settlement 
themselves might serve as a good source of information indicative of state preferences for the 
distribution of the territory under dispute as well as information on their commitment and 
perspective on the settlement process itself. In terms of the UNGA, these interactions might 
further serve as sources of insight into contentment or discontentment with international law and 
the US-led international system as a whole. In this project, signaling might be sent regarding 
discontent with international law and the US-led international order in the form of violent 
interactions over disputed territory, or to instead demonstrate contentment for the same in the 
case of peaceful interactions. To assess the impacts of interactions over territorial disputes have 
on UNGA voting, dynamic ideal points are used as a quantified representation of the position of 
states in regards to their UNGA voting. As ideal points are generated from all votes taken in the 
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UNGA and generated in terms of their distance from a central point of US UNGA voting, it 
serves as an effective means towards glimpsing state preferences. 
 In terms of the relationship of territorial dispute interactions have to UNGA voting, based 
on the theory I expected violent interactions would convey information that the state is 
aggressive, untrustworthy, and lack respects for the role of international law and the US-led 
international system. As a result, UNGA voting of a disputant might be expected to diverge from 
their counterparts when violent interactions occur. On the other hand, if a state were to pursue 
peaceful interactions over their shared territorial dispute, information will be conveyed that the 
state is a good citizen of the US-led international system that has respect for the role of 
international law and the potential to be a more trustworthy partner. In this second situation, 
UNGA voting of a disputant might be expected to converge with its counterpart. 
 To test this theory, I generated two sets of hypotheses, one which applied directly to the 
disputing dyad itself, and one beyond that to other states in the UNGA, to the US, and to China, 
the last of which stands out as the greatest potential challenger to the US-led international 
system. In the first set of hypotheses, I theorized that peaceful dispute interactions would be 
significantly related to convergence between the disputants in UNGA voting (H1), and that 
violent interactions would be related to divergence between the disputants in terms of UNGA 
voting (H2). In the second set of hypotheses, I theorized that peaceful dispute interactions would 
be significantly related to UNGA voting convergence between the disputants and the US (H3a), 
that the strength of this convergence would increase as peaceful interactions became more 
binding (H3B; H3C), while violent interactions would be significantly related to UNGA voting 
divergence between the disputants and the US (H4). 
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 I utilized a multi-method design with combined quantitative analyses of all territorial 
dispute settlement interactions (both violent and peaceful) from the founding of the United 
Nations in 1946 up until 2015 with specific case studies of disputes involving China and several 
bordering states, specifically Russia, India, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines. The findings in 
my first quantitative analysis indicate support for the hypotheses that peaceful interactions led to 
convergent voting in the UNGA (H1), whereas violent interactions led to more divergence (H2). 
Further, as peaceful interactions go from non-binding to more legal and binding, the strength of 
this convergence increases.  
The individual case studies involving China, examined over the years of 1971 to 2015, 
demonstrated similar results supporting these first hypotheses. In addition, for the general 
support to the hypotheses, the cases themselves had a number of interesting findings. In the 
China-Russia case study, the relatively close spread of voting convergences and divergences 
might be due in part to the unique conflictual nature of the dyad, especially up until 1991, when 
both states saw several border clashes and China saw Russia as enemy number one until the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Examining this case study found support for both peaceful 
interactions being linked to UNGA voting convergence (H1) and violent interactions being 
linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). In the China-India case study, the overall lower 
divergence in UNGA across the territorial dispute interactions, especially compared to the other 
cases, might be due in part to the consistent, long-term engagement in negotiations that China 
and India engaged in, as well as the looming threat of Pakistan to India and of the Soviet Union 
to China for several decades into the case study. Much like the first case involving China and 
Russia, support was found for both peaceful interactions being linked to UNGA voting 
convergence (H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). In the 
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China-Vietnam case study, the reason UNGA voting divergence was nearly three times higher in 
violent interactions as compared to peaceful ones might be due to the scale of these violent 
interactions, especially considering the border war that was fought in the 1970s and the 
continuing land border fighting up until the end of the 1980s. Much like in the first two cases, for 
the China and Vietnam case support was found for both peaceful interactions being linked to 
UNGA voting convergence (H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting 
divergence (H2). Next, in terms of the China-Japan case study, though there were no peaceful 
interactions with which to compare violent interactions, the UNGA voting divergence in years of 
violent interactions was higher than when no violent interactions occurred, and further was of a 
similar level of divergence to both Russia and Vietnam, leading to support for hypothesis (H2). 
On violent interactions contributing to voting divergence in the UNGA. Lastly, in terms of the 
China-Philippines case study, the lack of a large meaningful difference between peaceful 
interactions and mixed interactions could be due to the frequent back and forth China engaged in 
regarding the South China Sea, as well as their efforts to seize multiple disputed features over the 
duration examined. With being in line with all the cases mentioned previously, this last case 
indicated more support for both peaceful interactions being linked to UNGA voting convergence 
(H1) and violent interactions being linked to UNGA voting divergence (H2). Further, after 
averaging out all the mean UNGA voting ideal points, peaceful interactions were seen to lead to 
voting convergence roughly twice as small as violent interactions, and mixed interactions lay in 
the middle closer to peaceful interactions in terms of their relationship on UNGA voting. This 
concluded my tests of support for H1 and H2. 
 In regards to the second set of hypotheses, I first utilized a second set of quantitative 
analyses. Much like for the first set, the results of these models were also largely in line in 
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support of my second set of hypotheses. Regarding support for settlement interactions as 
compared to UNGA voting by the US, peaceful interactions were found to have more convergent 
UNGA voting for the disputants (H3a), which increased from nonbinding (H3b) to more legal 
binding interactions (H3c), while violent interactions were found to lead to more divergent 
voting alignment (H4). In a second model, I examined these same settlement interactions as they 
applied to alignment with UNGA voting by China. Fortunately, in terms of support for my 
theory that states that might have issue with the role of international law in territorial dispute 
settlement, China’s UNGA voting was found to increase in divergence as states engaged in 
arbitration attempts on territorial disputes. When this is examined with the case studies, where 
China consistently presented clear preferences for negotiations over all other peaceful methods, 
the one instance of arbitration that is started by the Philippines to which China reacts badly sees 
voting divergence rise thirty-three times as high in the next year, and stays at twenty-four times 
as high in the year after that, at which point the time period under examination ends. The 
quantitative analysis and the reaction to the Philippines in the case study is a point in favor of 
China experiencing some discontent with the role of international law in territorial conflict 
management in the US-led international system. Regarding the last examination of the case 
studies combined as compared to US UNGA voting, the findings were generally consistent with 
the previous analyses of the third chapter. The average UNGA voting divergence increased more 
so for those years that had violent interactions, and the divergence generally increased above this 
as more violent interactions occurred. The years in which this relationship was not the case could 
be explained to some degree the specific events that occurred between China and its fellow 
disputes. The one major drawback for using case studies on five of China’s territorial disputes is 
that no instances of peaceful interactions beyond negotiations occurred. Unfortunately, all 
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territorial dispute dyads in the data utilized for the case studies lacked these latter kinds of 
peaceful settlement attempts, and it was judged that using China as the preeminent challenger to 
the international legal structure of the US-led international system had extra merit over other 
potential cases. 
 Having outlined my theory, my hypotheses, and presented the findings in support of them 
taken from the analyses and case studies I conducted, I now move to conclude this dissertation. 
In the final sections of this chapter, I present a reflection on the scholarly contributions of this 
dissertation, proceed into certain relevancies of the project to policymakers, and finish with a 
brief reflection on next steps in future research building open the theory introduced and 
examined over the course of these five chapters. 
 
Scholarly Contributions 
 The main scholarly contributions of this project are twofold. In regards to an expansion in 
thinking about how signaling might have additional impacts on interactions between states 
beyond the direct ones, this project goes a step further to suggest that states might be signaling to 
multiple audiences when interacting over territorial disputes. According to Fearon (1997), 
signaling to multiple audiences is possible, and given the importance and sensitivity of territory 
to states it is likely that signaling occurs to states beyond the dyadic partner of a dispute. 
Conceptualizing signaling in this manner regarding territorial disputes opens the door to greater 
inquiry into how peaceful and violent actions impact the development of international law and 
the functioning over international organizations in the international system. 
Second, a further branching out of how interactions over territorial disputes not only 
impact peace and conflict, but how they might also impact foreign policies of states in the 
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international system as they apply to international organizations and international law. 
Specifically, this project contributes the second point through the examination of territorial 
dispute management interactions for their relationship to voting patterns in the UNGA, both 
between the disputants in the dyad and between the disputants and the US as the titular leader of 
the international system following the end of World War II. This is an important addition to the 
existing literature as it seeks to move beyond the primary focus being on territorial disputes in 
their relationship to direct conflict and peace to determine their impact on other interactions 
between states, such as in international organizations. By utilizing voting patterns in the UNGA, 
I make additional contributions to the literature on factors that influence voting in the 
international organization. In making the connection between these two realms of interstate 
relations, my work increases the relevance of territorial disputes to understanding the 
relationships between states and opens up additional avenues of examination for the interactions 
of international organizations. 
 My examination of within-dyad disputes for their impacts on other states behavior 
outside the dyad is also somewhat novel. By examining these behaviors for interactions beyond 
the dyad, in this case related to voting patterns by the US and China, I treat states as being aware 
of what peaceful and violent interactions over territorial disputes mean for how the behavior of 
disputants might bleed over into perceptions and other actions in the international system, with 
the expectation states react accordingly, which in this case was shifting their voting patterns in 
the UNGA. By considering signaling in this way, as not necessarily being direct but still able to 
convey information, I open up to the concept to further explorations in its usefulness in 
explaining interactions between states. Further by using both statistical tests and case studies, I 
lay out some initial support for these theorized interactions. 
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 Lastly, by specifically examining the voting patterns of China and the US as being 
influenced by an awareness of how others are interacting over territorial disputes throughout the 
international system, I open up other avenues for the examination of what factors impact the 
behaviors of states that are great powers. Given the worries of many that a war between China 
and the US would be worse than World War II due to the military technologies of today, any 
potential additional insight into their interactions, as well as how they might disagree over such 
things as fundamental roles of international law, is well worth pursuing. To my knowledge this 
dissertation is the first work to attempt to bridge the gap between interactions over territorial 
disputes and interactions with other states outside the disputing dyad in an international 
organization like the UNGA. 
 
Policy Relevance 
 To some degree this dissertation presents some relevance to policymakers as well. While 
many are already aware of the direct impacts the interactions over territorial disputes can have on 
states, especially when they are violent, what is less well known is how these interactions can 
impact state relationships in other forums like the UNGA. Hopefully in demonstrating how these 
disputes are linked to other phenomena it will guide policymakers concerned with other goals 
and priorities that touch upon the UNGA and its purview to continue pursuing peaceful 
settlement attempts over any outstanding territorial disputes until all are settled. Of further 
relevance is the demonstration that territorial dispute settlement is a dynamic, complicated 
process with progress being made one year and backsliding the next, which can impact the issues 
and states in the international system beyond just the states involved directly. That there might be 
ups and downs in the interactions which will be reflected in other state to state interactions 
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outside those directly related to the management of the territorial dispute. Lastly, when it comes 
to voting behavior in the UNGA, being aware of how territorial dispute interactions impact state 
behavior in the international organization will lead to policymakers looking closer at voting to 
determine if other factors than the content of the resolutions themselves are in play. In the case of 
China, fluctuations in voting behavior could signal its changing perspectives on the role and 
usefulness of international law to the international system. Already it has presented strong 
stances on the respect of sovereignty and the internal jurisdiction of states being sacrosanct with 
few exceptions. In the future China may begin making a greater pivot towards issues like human 
rights abuses as being outside the role of the UNGA, and instead the stability of the international 
system as a whole should be paramount. Paying attention to how China votes in the UNGA, and 
how these votes align with other states that have more proactive stances on international law 
applications, might garner greater insight into if this might be occurring. Conversely, paying 
attention to the voting patterns of the US regarding states that either uphold international law in 
their interactions over territorial dispute or violate them in seeking to violently seize them could 
give insight as to the changing place, and different emphasizes of international law towards the 
functioning of the international system. 
 
Future Research 
 Having opened up new avenues of considering how interactions over territorial dispute 
influence interstate relations, and how UNGA voting in turn might be influenced by things other 
than grants and foreign aid, the next steps in research are threefold. The first step to be taken is to 
further clarify the relationship between territorial dispute interactions and voting in the UNGA. 
Studies aiming to do so would examine other case studies beyond China, both to assess peaceful 
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interactions beyond negotiations, but also with an eye towards collecting anecdotal or official 
government documents more explicitly linking actions taken over territorial disputes and UNGA 
votes. One particular set of cases of would be Israel and its fellow disputants in the Middle East. 
Like the China case studies, Israel would provide a longer time horizon to study in the UNGA, 
and moreover work has already been conducted to categorize votes related to Israel, its territory, 
and the Palestinians. If further support for this theory is find in studies like the one suggested, a 
logical next step would be to break down UNGA voting into what kinds of topics were voted on. 
The big link for part of this study was between perspectives on international law to territorial 
dispute settlement attempts and UNGA voting in general, but perhaps this relationship is 
particularly strong for specific kinds of votes, such as those dealing with human rights issues, or 
weak for others, such as purely economic issues. In addition, future work would also be well 
served to search for other factors that influence UNGA voting, perhaps even going so far as to 
determine the strength of relationships of multiple influencers as compared to each other. 
Gaining a more nuanced perspective of what factors influence how the UNGA functions, 
especially when compared to general voting patterns over time, will help provide insight into the 
directions that the UNGA is evolving, the changing roles of international law, and how the 
UNGA continues to maintain its relevance and importance to the international system into the 
future.  
 In conclusion, this dissertation demonstrates the linkages between interactions over 
territorial disputes and voting behavior in the UNGA. The shape of these interactions in terms of 
violent or peaceful, and the degree the latter are non-binding or binding, all modify the impacts 
on UNGA voting. My emphasis on the nuances of settlement interactions to the relationship of 
UNGA voting, and my examination of dispute case studies involving China to further clarify 
 166 
these relationships, all contribute to advancement in scholarly research on the impacts of 
territorial disputes directly between the disputants and on other states in the UNGA. Further, 
these findings present some relevance to policymakers, such as increasing awareness as to the 
potential impacts territorial dispute interactions can have beyond the direct dispute itself, which 
may need to be taken into account depending on the specific dispute to encourage peaceful 
settlement. Lastly, this dissertation has the potential to shape future examinations of both 
territorial disputes and UNGA voting behavior for other factor of interest, which may shape and 
influence how they occur. It is likely that other variables of interest remain to be examined as 
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Table 1: Regression Testing Interactions between Settlement Attempts and UNGA Voting on a 
Global Sample of Territorial Disputes, 1946-2015. 
 
IVs Coefficient S.E. 
MID Onset 0.080** 0.027 
Negotiations -0.114*** 0.023 
Arbitration 0.038 0.753 
Adjudication -0.129** 0.053 
CONTROLS   
CINC Ratio 5.928*** 0.285 
Strategic Rivalry 0.103*** 0.023 
Rivalry -0.114** 0.043 
Enduring Rivalry -0.065 0.040 
Trade 2.37e-06*** 4.07e-07 
Homeland (C) 0 Omitted 
Homeland (T) -0.470*** 0.053 
Population Salience 0.081** 0.026 
Resource Salience 0.030 0.023 
Strategic Salience 0.158*** 0.023 
Identity (C) 0.392*** 0.053 
Identity (T) -0.274*** 0.052 
Historical (C) 0.013 0.021 
Historical (T) 0.059 0.059 
Offshore -0.164*** 0.030 
Entirety Claimed 0.092 0.075 
Polyarchy 1.286*** 0.164 
Liberal Dem. -0.840*** 0.208 
Deliberative Dem. 0.802*** 0.203 
Participatory Dem. -1.255*** 0.263 
Egalitarian Dem. 0 Omitted 
Peace Years -0.003 0.003 
Peace Years2 -0.000 0.000 
Peace Years3 6.70e-07 5.02e-07 
_cons 0.646 0.103 
N 3,336  
Prob > F 0.0000  
R-Squared 0.2780  
Adj. R-Squared 0.2723  











Figure 1.1 Predicted Probabilities of MID Onset on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global 










Figure 1.2 Predicted Probabilities of Negotiations on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global 










Figure 1.3 Predicted Probabilities of Arbitration on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global 










Figure 1.4 Predicted Probabilities of Adjudication on UNGA Voting Alignment in the Global 

























Table 2: Regression Testing Interactions between Settlement Attempts and Percent Agreement 
UNGA Voting with US and China, 1971-2015. 
 
 Percent Agree 
US 
 Percent Agree 
China 
 
IVs Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
MID Onset 0.016** 0.005 0.011 0.006 
Negotiations -0.020*** 0.004 0.004 0.005 
Arbitration -0.002 0.014 0.093*** 0.018 
Adjudication -0.028** 0.010 -0.009 0.010 
CONTROLS     
CINC Ratio 1.154*** 0.054 1.164*** 0.065 
Strategic Rivalry 0.022*** 0.004 0.020*** 0.005 
Rivalry -0.039*** 0.008 -0.040*** 0.008 
Enduring Rivalry 0.020** 0.008 0.010 0.008 
Trade 1.69e-06*** 7.64e-08 8.41e-7*** 7.26e-8 
Homeland (C) 0 Omitted 0 Omitted 
Homeland (T) -0.090*** 0.010 -0.108*** 0.012 
Population Salience 0.009 0.005 0.001 0.006 
Resource Salience 0.017*** 0.004 -0.010* 0.005 
Strategic Salience 0.010* 0.004 0.034*** 0.005 
Identity (C) 0.070*** 0.010 0.020 0.014 
Identity (T) -0.028** 0.010 -0.013 0.014 
Historical (C) 0.012** 0.004 0.001 0.005 
Historical (T) -0.004 0.011 -0.031 0.019 
Offshore -0.015** 0.006 -0.037*** 0.006 
Entirety Claimed -0.027 0.014 0.001 0.014 
Polyarchy 0.261*** 0.307 0.124*** 0.032 
Liberal Dem. -0.006 0.039 -0.106* 0.042 
Deliberative Dem. -0.057 0.038 0.203*** 0.043 
Participatory Dem. -0.214*** 0.049 -0.107* 0.051 
Egalitarian Dem. 0 Omitted 0 Omitted 
Peace Years -0.001 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Peace Years2 0.000* 0.000 -0.000* 0.000 
Peace Years3 -2.03e-07* 9.37e-08 0.000 0.000 
_cons 0.099 0.019 0.165*** 0.027 
N 3,353  2,331  
Prob > F 0.000  0.000  
R-Squared 0.381  0.355  
Adj. R-Squared 0.376  0.348  







Figure 2.1 Predicted Probabilities of MID Onset and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with US 










Figure 2.2 Predicted Probabilities of Negotiations and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with 










Figure 2.3 Predicted Probabilities of Arbitration and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with US 










Figure 2.4 Predicted Probabilities of Adjudication and Percent UNGA Voting Agreement with 



























1971 1 0 -1.005798 -2.472733 1.466934 - 
1972 1 0 -0.748928 -2.094426 1.345498 Converge 
1973 1 0 -0.632851 -2.181508 1.548656 Diverge 
1974 1 1 -0.876150 -2.089906 1.213755 Converge 
1975 1 0 -0.304762 -2.362317 2.057554 Diverge 
1976 1 0 -1.039168 -2.004792 0.965623 Converge 
1977 1 1 -0.808055 -2.413198 1.605143 Diverge 
1978 1 0 -0.269900 -2.361727 2.091826 Diverge 
1979 1 1 -0.068625 -2.238038 2.169412 Diverge 
1980 0 1 -0.043389 -2.074371 2.030982 Converge 
1981 0 0 -0.049958 -1.980956 1.930997 Converge 
1982 1 0 0.161219 -1.907985 2.069205 Diverge 
1983 1 0 0.166471 -1.834074 2.000546 Converge 
1984 1 0 0.152464 -1.320554 1.473008 Converge 
1985 1 0 0.159504 -1.417421 1.576925 Diverge 
1986 1 1 0.148145 -0.877877 1.026022 Converge 
1987 1 0 0.162682 -0.951497 1.11418 Diverge 
1988 1 0 -0.05538 -0.766197 0.710812 Converge 
1989 1 0 -0.100480 -0.643784 0.543303 Converge 
1990 1 0 -0.163954 -0.160954 0.002999 Converge 
1991 1 0 -0.298786 0.676315 0.975101 Diverge 
1992 1 0 -0.695594 1.095015 1.79061 Diverge 
1993 1 1 -1.351557 1.312539 2.664096 Diverge 
1994 1 1 -1.596892 1.110595 2.707487 Diverge 
1995 1 0 -1.520172 1.211173 2.641345 Converge 
1996 1 0 -1.320387 0.764989 2.085376 Converge 
1997 1 0 -1.176031 0.569508 1.74554 Converge 
1998 1 0 -0.425443 0.511173 0.936616 Converge 
1999 1 0 -0.627692 0.418559 1.046252 Diverge 
2000 0 0 -0.734635 0.216840 0.951476 Converge 
2001 1 0 -0.574465 0.202670 0.777135 Converge 
2002 0 0 -0.514684 0.287654 0.802338 Diverge 
2003 0 0 -0.893533 0.273193 1.166727 Diverge 
2004 1 0 -0.837560 0.135905 0.973466 Converge 
2005 0 0 -0.737064 0.099269 0.836334 Converge 
2006 0 0 -0.865834 -0.182683 0.683151 Converge 
2007 0 0 -0.624256 -0.06459 0.559664 Converge 
2008 1 0 -0.638445 -0.191419 0.447026 Converge 
2009 - 1 -0.620556 -0.036537 0.584018 Diverge 
2010 - - -0.848149 0.050026 0.898175 Diverge 
2011 - - -0.705319 -0.142746 0.562573 Converge 
2012 - - -0.825919 0.139001 0.964921 Diverge 
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2013 - - -0.488547 0.021566 0.510114 Converge 
2014 - - -0.786504 0.094876 0.881380 Diverge 























































1971 0 1 -1.005798 -0.840080 0.1657174 - 
1972 0 0 -0.748928 -0.443996 0.3049326 Diverge 
1973 0 1 -0.632851 -0.354511 0.2783397 Converge 
1974 0 0 -0.876150 -0.865518 0.010632 Converge 
1975 0 1 -0.304762 -0.273817 0.030945 Diverge 
1976 0 0 -1.039168 -0.438988 0.600180 Diverge 
1977 0 0 -0.808055 -0.299237 0.508818 Converge 
1978 0 0 -0.269900 -0.0742285 0.195615 Converge 
1979 1 1 -0.068625 -0.253979 0.185353 Converge 
1980 1 0 -0.043389 -0.476265 0.432876 Diverge 
1981 1 0 -0.049958 -0.417178 0.367219 Converge 
1982 1 0 0.161219 -0.601465 0.762684 Diverge 
1983 1 0 0.166471 -0.360416 0.526887 Converge 
1984 1 0 0.152464 -0.401528 0.553992 Diverge 
1985 1 1 0.159504 -0.514108 0.673612 Diverge 
1986 1 1 0.148145 -0.763564 0.91171 Diverge 
1987 1 1 0.162682 -0.702626 0.865308 Converge 
1988 1 0 -0.055384 -0.563255 0.507870 Converge 
1989 1 0 -0.100480 -0.796083 0.695602 Diverge 
1990 1 0 -0.163954 -0.843021 0.679066 Converge 
1991 1 0 -0.29878 -0.696547 0.397761 Converge 
1992 1 0 -0.695594 -0.725823 0.032286 Converge 
1993 1 0 -1.351557 -1.148786 0.202771 Diverge 
1994 1 0 -1.596892 -1.341136 0.255756 Diverge 
1995 1 0 -1.520172 -1.618566 0.098394 Converge 
1996 1 0 -1.32038 -1.648031 0.327644 Diverge 
1997 1 0 -1.17603 -1.109218 0.066813 Converge 
1998 1 0 -0.425443 -0.678423 0.252980 Diverge 
1999 1 0 -0.627692 -0.610495 0.017197 Converge 
2000 1 0 -0.734635 -0.603020 0.131614 Diverge 
2001 1 0 -0.574465 -0.627477 0.053011 Converge 
2002 1 0 -0.514684 -0.129937 0.384746 Diverge 
2003 1 1 -0.893533 -0.125967 0.767566 Diverge 
2004 1 0 -0.837560 -0.403894 0.433666 Converge 
2005 1 0 -0.737064 -0.224291 0.512772 Diverge 
2006 1 0 -0.865834 -0.550319 0.315515 Converge 
2007 1 1 -0.624256 -0.464132 0.160124 Converge 
2008 1 0 -0.638445 -0.656581 0.018136 Converge 
2009 1 1 -0.620556 -0.475199 0.145356 Diverge 
2010 1 0 -0.848249 -0.529852 0.318297 Diverge 
2011 1 0 -0.705319 -0.510895 0.194424 Converge 
2012 1 0 -0.825919 -0.623534 0.202385 Diverge 
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2013 1 0 -0.488547 -0.583346 0.094798 Converge 
2014 1 0 -0.786504 -0.800663 0.014159 Converge 






















































1971 0 0 - - - - 
1972 0 0 - - - - 
1973 0 0 - - - - 
1974 0 0 - - - - 
1975 0 0 - - - - 
1976 0 0 - - - - 
1977 1 0 -0.808055 -1.114945 0.306889 - 
1978 1 1 -0.269900 -0.958503 0.688602 Diverge 
1979 1 1 -0.068625 -1.232734 1.164109 Diverge 
1980 1 0 -0.043389 -1.494475 1.451085 Diverge 
1981 0 1 -0.049958 -1.749747 1.699788 Diverge 
1982 0 1 0.161219 -1.634229 1.795448 Diverge 
1983 0 1 0.166471 -1.592337 1.758808 Converge 
1984 0 1 0.152464 -1.448861 1.601326 Converge 
1985 0 1 0.159504 -1.588699 1.748203 Diverge 
1986 0 1 0.148145 -1.508391 1.656536 Converge 
1987 0 1 0.162682 -1.231522 1.394204 Converge 
1988 0 1 -0.55384 -1.244139 1.188755 Converge 
1989 0 0 -0.100480 -0.741020 0.640539 Converge 
1990 0 0 -0.163954 -0.898298 0.734344 Diverge 
1991 1 0 -0.298786 -1.044067 0.745281 Diverge 
1992 1 0 -0.695594 -1.304068 0.608472 Converge 
1993 1 1 -1.351557 -1.564829 0.213272 Converge 
1994 1 1 -1.596892 -1.648241 0.051348 Converge 
1995 1 0 -1.520172 -1.554147 0.033975 Converge 
1996 1 0 -1.320387 -1.464186 0.143799 Diverge 
1997 1 0 -1.176031 -1.565615 0.389584 Diverge 
1998 1 1 -0.425443 -1.332127 0.906684 Diverge 
1999 1 0 -0.627692 -1.428839 0.801145 Converge 
2000 0 0 -0.734635 -1.287646 0.553010 Converge 
2001 0 0 -0.574465 -1.420417 0.845951 Diverge 
2002 0 1 -0.514684 -1.446776 0.932091 Diverge 
2003 0 1 -0.893533 -1.49806 0.604527 Converge 
2004 0 0 -0.837560 -1.462409 0.624848 Diverge 
2005 0 0 -0.737064 -1.394336 0.657271 Diverge 
2006 0 0 -0.865834 -1.432585 0.56675 Converge 
2007 0 0 -0.624256 -1.231114 0.606857 Diverge 
2008 0 0 -0.638445 -1.291166 0.652720 Diverge 
2009 0 0 -0.620556 -1.262436 0.64188 Converge 
2010 0 0 -0.848149 -1.300602 0.452452 Converge 
2011 0 0 -0.705319 -1.175198 0.469878 Diverge 
2012 0 0 -0.825919 -1.121792 0.295872 Converge 
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2013 0 0 -0.488547 -1.09201 0.603461 Diverge 
2014 0 0 -0.786504 -1.069775 0.283271 Converge 























































1971 0 0 -1.005798 0.832418 1.838216 - 
1972 0 0 -0.748928 1.281603 2.030532 Diverge 
1973 0 0 -0.632851 1.172948 1.805799 Converge 
1974 0 0 -0.876150 0.942564 1.818715 Diverge 
1975 0 0 -0.304762 0.939354 1.244117 Converge 
1976 0 0 -1.039168 1.218138 2.257306 Diverge 
1977 0 0 -0.808055 1.130449 1.938505 Converge 
1978 0 0 -0.269900 1.049927 1.319828 Converge 
1979 0 0 -0.068625 1.174535 1.24316 Converge 
1980 0 0 -0.043389 1.228904 1.272294 Diverge 
1981 0 0 -0.049958 1.272063 1.322021 Diverge 
1982 0 0 0.161219 1.251746 1.090527 Converge 
1983 0 0 0.166471 1.292274 1.125803 Diverge 
1984 0 0 0.152464 1.372912 1.220448 Diverge 
1985 0 0 0.159504 1.344655 1.185151 Converge 
1986 0 0 0.148145 1.324362 1.176217 Converge 
1987 0 0 0.162682 1.316847 1.154165 Converge 
1988 0 0 -0.055384 1.383989 1.439374 Diverge 
1989 0 0 -0.100480 1.469349 1.56983 Diverge 
1990 0 0 -0.163954 1.465591 1.629545 Diverge 
1991 0 0 -0.298786 1.279036 1.577822 Converge 
1992 0 0 -0.695594 1.013757 1.709351 Diverge 
1993 0 0 -1.351557 1.207474 2.559031 Diverge 
1994 0 0 -1.596892 1.228352 2.825244 Diverge 
1995 0 1 -1.520172 0.991576 2.511748 Converge 
1996 0 1 -1.320387 1.068965 2.389351 Converge 
1997 0 0 -1.176031 0.865223 2.041255 Converge 
1998 0 0 -0.425443 0.788789 1.214233 Converge 
1999 0 1 -0.627692 0.753941 1.381634 Diverge 
2000 0 0 -0.734635 0.749388 1.484024 Diverge 
2001 0 0 -0.574465 0.796971 1.371438 Converge 
2002 0 1 -0.514684 0.794361 1.309046 Converge 
2003 0 1 -0.893533 0.776992 1.670525 Converge 
2004 0 1 -0.837560 0.796298 1.633859 Converge 
2005 0 1 -0.737064 0.745431 1.482496 Converge 
2006 0 0 -0.865834 0.897749 1.763584 Diverge 
2007 0 1 -0.624256 0.634273 1.258531 Converge 
2008 0 0 -0.638445 0.562665 1.201111 Converge 
2009 0 0 -0.620556 0.634472 1.255029 Diverge 
2010 0 1 -0.848149 0.669961 1.518111 Diverge 
2011 0 0 -0.705319 0.713827 1.419147 Converge 
2012 0 0 -0.825919 0.665612 1.491532 Diverge 
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2013 0 0 -0.488546 0.772771 1.261319 Converge 
2014 0 0 -0.786504 0.958784 1.745289 Diverge 























































1971 0 0 -1.005798 0.395435 1.401234 - 
1972 0 0 -0.748928 0.445758 1.194687 Converge 
1973 0 0 -0.632851 0.073193 0.706044 Converge 
1974 0 0 -0.876150 0.210993 1.087144 Diverge 
1975 1 0 -0.304762 0.199811 0.504573 Converge 
1976 0 0 -1.039168 -0.178519 0.860648 Diverge 
1977 0 0 -0.808055 0.076316 0.884372 Diverge 
1978 0 0 -0.269900 0.050305 0.320206 Converge 
1979 0 0 -0.068625 0.001289 0.069915 Converge 
1980 0 0 -0.043389 -0.010042 0.033347 Converge 
1981 0 0 -0.049958 -0.180625 0.130666 Diverge 
1982 0 0 0.161219 0.170754 0.009534 Converge 
1983 0 0 0.166471 0.239412 0.072941 Diverge 
1984 0 0 0.152464 -0.011363 0.163827 Diverge 
1985 0 0 0.159504 -0.033545 0.193049 Diverge 
1986 0 0 0.148145 -0.164143 0.312288 Diverge 
1987 0 0 0.162682 -0.213428 0.376110 Diverge 
1988 0 0 -0.055384 -0.049720 0.005663 Converge 
1989 0 0 -0.100480 -0.126265 0.025785 Diverge 
1990 0 0 -0.163954 -0.621123 0.457169 Diverge 
1991 1 0 -0.298786 -0.737661 0.438875 Converge 
1992 1 0 -0.695594 -0.441215 0.254379 Converge 
1993 1 0 -1.351557 -0.668901 0.682655 Diverge 
1994 1 0 -1.596892 -0.476171 1.120721 Diverge 
1995 1 1 -1.520172 -0.538597 0.981574 Converge 
1996 1 1 -1.320387 -0.624419 0.695966 Converge 
1997 1 1 -1.176031 -0.850460 0.325570 Converge 
1998 1 1 -0.425443 -0.856713 0.431270 Diverge 
1999 1 1 -0.627692 -0.811444 0.183751 Converge 
2000 1 1 -0.734635 -0.483924 0.250711 Diverge 
2001 1 1 -0.574465 -0.396834 0.177631 Converge 
2002 1 1 -0.514684 -0.431338 0.083345 Converge 
2003 0 0 -0.893533 -0.506995 0.386537 Diverge 
2004 1 0 -0.837560 -0.435540 0.402020 Diverge 
2005 0 0 -0.737064 -0.448114 0.288950 Converge 
2006 0 0 -0.865834 -0.463534 0.402300 Diverge 
2007 1 0 -0.624256 -0.43799 0.186261 Converge 
2008 1 0 -0.638445 -0.488148 0.150297 Converge 
2009 1 0 -0.620556 -0.480300 0.140255 Converge 
2010 1 0 -0.848149 -0.481820 0.366328 Diverge 
2011 1 0 -0.705319 -0.331382 0.373937 Diverge 
2012 1 0 -0.825919 -0.423483 0.402436 Diverge 
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2013 1 0 -0.488546 -0.477756 0.010791 Converge 
2014 1 0 -0.786504 -0.457934 0.328570 Diverge 























































1971 1 1 -1.005798 1.714252 2.72005 - 
1972 1 0 -0.748928 2.109892 2.85882 Diverge 
1973 1 1 -0.632851 2.150352 2.783203 Converge 
1974 1 1 -0.876150 2.048959 2.925109 Diverge 
1975 2 1 -0.304762 2.396126 2.700888 Converge 
1976 1 0 -1.039168 2.691913 3.731081 Diverge 
1977 2 1 -0.808055 2.292782 3.100837 Diverge 
1978 2 1 -0.269900 2.270893 2.540793 Converge 
1979 3 3 -0.068625 2.332264 2.400889 Converge 
1980 2 1 -0.043389 2.416651 2.46004 Diverge 
1981 1 1 -0.049958 2.732683 2.782641 Diverge 
1982 2 1 0.161219 2.610053 2.448834 Converge 
1983 2 1 0.166471 2.623879 2.457408 Diverge 
1984 2 1 0.152464 2.798987 2.646523 Diverge 
1985 2 2 0.159504 2.825391 2.665887 Diverge 
1986 2 3 0.148145 2.957062 2.808917 Diverge 
1987 2 2 0.162682 3.026928 2.864246 Diverge 
1988 2 1 -0.055384 3.026567 3.081951 Diverge 
1989 2 0 -0.100480 3.100612 3.201092 Diverge 
1990 2 0 -0.163954 3.049283 3.213237 Diverge 
1991 4 0 -0.298786 2.930121 3.228907 Diverge 
1992 4 0 -0.695594 2.959768 3.655362 Diverge 
1993 4 2 -1.351557 2.925993 4.27755 Diverge 
1994 4 2 -1.596892 2.957176 4.554068 Diverge 
1995 4 2 -1.520172 3.155592 4.675764 Diverge 
1996 4 2 -1.320387 3.130425 4.450812 Converge 
1997 4 1 -1.176031 3.001963 4.177994 Converge 
1998 4 2 -0.425443 2.862664 3.288107 Converge 
1999 4 2 -0.627692 2.713628 3.34132 Diverge 
2000 2 1 -0.734635 2.689113 3.423748 Diverge 
2001 3 1 -0.574465 2.682369 3.256834 Converge 
2002 2 3 -0.514684 2.755723 3.270407 Diverge 
2003 1 3 -0.893533 2.931988 3.825521 Diverge 
2004 3 1 -0.837560 2.865051 3.702611 Converge 
2005 1 1 -0.737064 2.936058 3.673122 Converge 
2006 1 0 -0.865834 2.836643 3.702477 Diverge 
2007 2 2 -0.624256 2.771993 3.396249 Converge 
2008 3 0 -0.638445 2.774131 3.412576 Diverge 
2009 2 2 -0.620556 2.589479 3.210035 Converge 
2010 2 1 -0.848149 2.550539 3.398688 Diverge 
2011 2 0 -0.705319 2.530669 3.235988 Converge 
2012 2 0 -0.825919 2.632266 3.458185 Diverge 
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2013 2 0 -0.488546 2.729899 3.218445 Converge 
2014 2 0 -0.786504 2.718152 3.504656 Diverge 
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